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This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

There has been a long debate, with an extensive literature, over the control of the firm: who controls it, and how, and what implications does this have for managerial objectives and performance? It is not too simplistic to describe the argument for the most part as between those who see control by shareholders predominating, with the consequence that profit maximisation is the objective, and those who stress control by managers, leading to some other objective being followed — there being many and various alternatives canvassed (e.g. Marris, 1964; Leibenstein, 1966). In recent years, the partisans of shareholder control have been stressing the scope for it even where there was no single holding, or group of holdings, even approaching a majority of the shares. (For the US, see, among others, the Patman Report (1968) and Mintz et al. (1985); for the UK, see Francis (1980a), and Nyman and Silberston (1978)).

The purpose of this paper is to explore the linkage among three factors – shareholder‐manager relationships (or corporate governance), customer supplier relationships, and innovation, for two groups of UK firms in the speciality chemicals and electrical equipment industries.

This research was exploratory. In total, 12 companies were studied in depth. The level of innovation was measured through a questionnaire and interviews were carried out with managers, important customers and suppliers. A comparison of management practices was established between the more and the less innovative companies.

This research finds a close connection between shareholder‐manager relationships, customer and supplier relationship management and innovation. The firms subject to arms‐length relationships with shareholders (as UK‐based public limited companies) had more distant relationships with suppliers and customers and poorer innovative performance.

The validity and reliability of the conclusions require the undertaking of quantitative studies. Other aspects apart from those explored could affect the level of innovation of companies.

In the more innovative companies, strategic and investment plans tend to look to the long‐term (five years plus). And, customers and suppliers are involved from the beginning in the development of new products and production processes. Lack of shareholder engagement strongly inhibits “long‐termist actions”, which include the development of such close relationships with customers and suppliers.

This paper is the first to look at the possible link between corporate governance, customer and supplier relationship management and the level of innovation and has research and practical implications.

Wonders whether companies actually have employees best interests at heart across physical, mental and spiritual spheres. Posits that most organizations ignore their workforce – not even, in many cases, describing workers as assets! Describes many studies to back up this claim in theis work based on the 2002 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference, in Cardiff, Wales.

AT the Conference at Folkestone of the London and Home Counties Branch of the Library Association, Mr. Jast gave one more example of his old fire and vigour in a paper which he entitled Publishers and Librarians. No doubt in other pages than ours the text will be given in full. Here, in summary, we may say that he dealt with some of the needs of librarians and readers for well‐produced editions of good books which for some reason were obtainable only in double‐columned small type or otherwise almost unreadable or at any rate unattractive form. He instanced Disraeli's Curiosities of Literature. He urged that if a sufficient number of public and other librarians represented this want to publishers, promising that the libraries would support such an edition, it was unlikely that the request would be ignored. A further suggestion arose from the established fact that in the welter of editions of certain books many were ill‐produced and unworthy to be placed in the hands of unsuspecting bookbuyers. Robinson Crusoe was a case in point, and as many parents desired their sons to read this they were often persuaded to buy editions which were unsuitable. Here he made a suggestion which is entirely practicable: that the Library Association should examine all of the common classics for form and for textual accuracy—a feature in which he alleged that some were deficient—and fix on suitable editions, allowing the publisher to add to their title‐pages “approved by the Library Association.” We seize upon this point first because there is nothing Utopian about it. It is a work that ought to be done.