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This chapter examines the existence of dynamic herding behavior by Tunisian investors in the Tunisia stock market during the revolution period of 2011–2013. The sample covers all Tunindex daily returns as a proxy for the Tunisia stock exchange index over the period 2007–2018. The author modifies the cross-sectional absolute deviation model to include all market conditions (bull and bear markets) and the geopolitical crisis effect corresponding to the Tunisian Jasmine revolution during 2011–2013, and show that herding is indeed not present in the Tunisia stock market including during its turmoil periods. These findings imply that the Tunisian emerging financial market became more vulnerable to adverse herding behavior after the revolution. There is also a clear implication for capitalist firms and angel investors in Tunisia that adverse herding behavior tends to exist on days of higher uncertainty and information asymmetry.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.