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This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.

The purpose of this study is to investigate (1) how managers respond to stock price crashes, (2) why they respond and (3) how their responses affect shareholders.

This study employs a panel regression with various firm-level controls and firm- and year-fixed effects. The sample is comprised of 101,532 firm-year observations with 11,727 unique firms from 1950 to 2019. Using mutual fund flow redemption pressure as an exogenous variable to stock price crashes, the paper provides further evidence of the causality of documented findings.

Management becomes more focused on improving transparency, raising investment efficiency, reducing agency conflicts and regaining the trust of shareholders by investing in social capital and employee welfare. These actions increase firm value. This study also suggests that management undertakes these actions out of concern for their tenure of employment.

The catalysts of stock price crashes are well documented, but much less is known about what happens following stock price crashes. This study provides more insights into the understanding of corporate crisis management practices following adverse events.

This study analyses interlocking directorates from the perspective of an emerging market, Mexico, where formal institutions are weak, and family firms with high ownership concentration dominate. It responds to recent calls in the literature on interlocks, which urge the differentiation between family and non-family businesses and to complete more research on emerging economies.

A database was constructed for 89 non-financial companies (52 family-owned) listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) from 2001 to 2014. This period includes normal times and an episode of financial crisis (2009–2010). To test the hypotheses, a dynamic panel model (in two stages) is used, applying GMM.

In normal times, the advantages of Board Chairman (COB) interlocks for the performance of publicly traded Mexican family firms are obtained regardless of the weak formal institutional environment. By contrast, during financial crisis, interlocking family COBs are more likely to jointly expropriate minority shareholders with actions that further their family objectives, which mitigates the positive effect of interlocks on performance. These findings contrast with the insignificant effects of COB interlocks found for non-family corporates.

A new framework is proposed which, through agency theory, finds points of concordance among resource dependence and class hegemony theories, to understand the effect of interlocking directorates on the performance of family firms operating in Mexico. The results of the empirical exercise for family companies listed on BMV during normal and financial crisis periods suggest its applicability.

This study aims to investigate how the presence of female executives on the board affects a company’s capital structure decisions. The critical mass of female executives on the board was also considered to observe their impact on capital structure.

Samples were taken from nonfinancial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2012 and 2021 (3,707 firm-year observations). Capital structure was measured using four approaches, namely, debt-to-total asset ratio (DAR), debt-to-equity ratio (DER), short-term debt-to-total assets (STD) and long-term debt-to-total assets (LTD). The data were analyzed using panel data regression analysis, including a fixed effects model with clustered standard errors.

The presence of female executives on the board is significantly negatively related to capital structure as measured by DER and STD. The critical mass of women provided no evidence of a relationship with a firm’s capital structure. Robustness checks were performed, and the results were consistent with those in the main analysis.

Female executives can be appointed to management boards when determining a strategy to achieve the capital structure desired by a company.

This study increases the diversity of research in corporate governance by synthesizing various indicators from female executives into a single study to determine their relationships with companies’ capital structures. In addition, this study stands out by incorporating four distinct indicators for assessing capital structure and diverging from the norm observed in many other studies, many of which rely on just two indicators: DAR and DER. Moreover, it strongly emphasizes the unique economic, legal, social and cultural landscapes of developing countries like Indonesia in comparison to their developed counterparts, particularly Western nations.

This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.

The role of family business staffing practices in their ultimate success remains largely unknown. The purpose of this paper is to test the notion that firms with greater family essence manifest their commitment by leveraging referrals as a recruitment source, which in turn is associated with higher performance. The hypothesized model posits that reduced agency costs from hiring through owner referral utilization (ORU) provide high-family essence firms with stronger performance.

The study draws upon a sample of 194 small and medium-sized family business owners.

Findings from OLS regression and the PROCESS model in SPSS support the hypothesis that recruiting nonfamily employees from referrals helps lessen agency conflicts and serves as an intervening mechanism in the relationship between family firm essence and firm performance.

This study draws on agency theory to shed light on how family firms successfully bring nonfamily employees into the fold despite their human resource limitations. The results extend theory on family businesses by demonstrating that those with higher degrees of family essence are more likely to attract applicants via ORU. Leveraging this recruiting practice allows family businesses to hire nonfamily employees who share the values and goals of the family firm, thus lowering agency costs and fostering higher performance. More broadly, the findings offer insight into the role of staffing practices in family firm success.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

The board structure (BS) is pivotal in modern corporate governance (CG). This study aims to investigate BS variables (BSIZE, BIND and chief executive officer [CEO] duality) and their correlation with risk-taking behavior indicators, enriching the understanding of how CG shapes financial institutions’ (FIs) decision-making in Pakistan.

By scrutinizing data from 67 financial entities listed on the Stock Exchange of Pakistan spanning from 2011 to 2022 through panel data regression techniques, the research emphasizes that BS holds a substantial influence over the risk tendencies exhibited by these firms.

Key findings suggest that board size has a positive influence, aligned with previous CG research. Smaller boards perform better and avoid excessive risk-taking, contrasting some negative relationship claims. More independent directors are recommended to curtail risk and financial disruption. Holding both CEO and chair roles reduces risk exposure, resonating with reputational and employment risk theory. It is essential to recognize that BS’s impact on risk-taking is nuanced and context-dependent.

Policymakers, scholars, practitioners and investors working in the market for financial companies might greatly benefit from the empirical findings of this study. Imposing mandates on FIs to uphold adequate capital reserves functions as a safeguard against unforeseen losses, thereby diminishing the probability of unwarranted risk-taking.

Prior studies in this domain predominantly focus on nonfinancial sectors. In addition, existing research often explores the relationship between BS and firm risk-taking solely within the banking sector, overlooking other FIs. This study contributes by using a comprehensive data set encompassing all types of FIs, thus extending the existing literature.

The literature has dealt with the relationship between board characteristics (BC) and firm performance (FP) on a large scale. However, it yielded inconsistent results. Thus, this paper aims to examine the indirect relationship between BC and FP through the mediating role of the capital structure (CS).

This study used a sample of 528 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2015 to 2019. Also, a two-step system generalised method of moments estimation technique was applied.

The results show that board diversity and the frequency of board meetings positively affect financial performance, and it is negatively influenced by board turnover, size and independence. Also, the results indicate a positive relationship between the independence of the board and all CS variables. Importantly, the findings support the policy-setting role of the board of directors where CS (measured by total debt and short-term debt) suppresses some governance mechanisms’ detrimental effect on FP. Hence, the board of directors, apart from the monitoring function, introduce various policies (financial and non-financial) that enhance the overall performance of companies.

These results are consistent with the agency’s perspective that management practices in selecting the optimal capital reduce agency costs and improve performance. The findings contribute to developing a broader theoretical framework that accounts for the policy-setting role of the board of directors. The current study model of corporate governance offers insight for policymakers into the role of corporate governance other than monitoring functions in organisations and how CS should be taken into consideration with corporate governance and FP association.