Search results

This paper analyzes the connection between black political protest and mobilization, and the rise and fall of a black urban regime. The case of Oakland is instructive because by the mid-1960s the ideology of “black power” was important in mobilizing two significant elements of the historically disparaged black community: (1) supporters of the Black Panthers and, (2) neighborhood organizations concentrated in West Oakland. Additionally, Oakland like the city of Atlanta also developed a substantial black middle class that was able to mobilize along the lines of its own “racialized” class interests. Collectively, these factors were important elements in molding class-stratified “black power” and coalitional activism into the institutional politics of a black urban regime in Oakland. Ultimately, reversal factors would undermine the black urban regime in Oakland. These included changes in the race and class composition of the local population: black out-migration, the “new immigration,” increasing (predominantly white) gentrification, and the continued lack of opportunity for poor and working-class blacks, who served as the unrequited base of the black urban regime. These factors would change the fortunes of black political life in Oakland during the turbulent neoliberal era.

Purpose – We examine electoral politics in the City of Atlanta, GA, and shed light on the prospect that in 2009 Atlanta elected its “last Black mayor.”  We consider how African American tensions around class and social identity may demobilize key constituents of the Black electoral coalition while an increasing Black out-migration and White in-migration had changed the city’s racial balance of electoral power. Recognizing the margin of victory in the 2009 mayoral election between Kasim Reed (an African American) and Mary Norwood (a White challenger) was small (714 votes), we examine how electoral and demographic characteristics explain this result.Methodology – We utilize (1) the 2009 State of Georgia Board of Elections voter demographic file; (2) 2010 Census data (ACS 5 year estimates), and 2009 Mayoral Election count data. We presented descriptive statistics, comparing community level factors and voter characteristics.Research implications – The limitations of this work is that it is exploratory and thus we do not statistically isolate the effects of class and social identity.Findings – Our findings indicate that Reed and other Black elected officials will have to make concerted efforts if they hope to “retain” the Black poor as well as gay and lesbian citizens within a progressive electoral coalition.

Demands for atonement for past wrongs to ethno-cultural groups have become popular in Canada. On November 12, 2005, the Government of Canada announced to the Italian–Canadian community a package to atone for wrongs to individuals of Italian origin unjustly interned as enemy aliens during World War II. This package was part of the government's Acknowledgment, Commemoration, and Education Program.¹ The prime minster acknowledged, but did not apologize for, the injustice of the internment. $Can 12 million were set aside for commemorative projects, but not to compensate any individual survivors of the internment, or their heirs.² This money is part of a package of $Can 50million – double the $25million originally set aside in the 2005 federal budget – to compensate a number of ethno-cultural groups for injustices their real or fictive ancestors experienced.³ The editorial writers of Toronto's Globe and Mail objected to the government's encouragement of a “currency of grievance,” calling it “the antithesis of a forward-looking public policy.”⁴ This objection encapsulates the debate about public policies and monetary payments designed to compensate for past wrongs to groups, as opposed to policies and payments designed to redistribute wealth to groups and individuals suffering in the present.

Purpose – The African American electorate in Savannah, Georgia, has a history of being managed and manipulated, but over a period of time it reached its full potential. This electorate evolved during the leadership of a white Democratic mayor who manipulated the increased number of black registered voters as a result of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) to maintain white empowerment in a majority black city. This struggle for power proves that national reforms do not always have the immediate consequences that national leaders hoped. This chapter explores how the African American electorate persevered and took advantage of the political mistakes of others to attain its empowerment at the mayoral level. This evolution of political mobilization and empowerment would culminate with the election of the city’s first female African American mayor in 2011.Research design – We conduct a comparative analysis of election results over time.Findings – Federal intervention has been the most powerful and helpful to the African American electorate. However, while the Savannah African American electorate was managed and manipulated, such reforms were implemented in a gradual and limited manner. Hence, the rise of black mayoral power is the result of a lot of lucky political accidents due to a shrewd Democratic mayor who used the 1965 VRA to extend and maintain white empowerment in a majority African American urban city. Thus, national reforms do not always have the immediate consequences that national leaders hoped.

In my book, Rural Rebels, I examined the nature of two protest movements in Kenya and discussed their determinants. Here I will attempt a more general explanation of protest movements in colonial Kenya addressing the question of why they clustered among certain tribes and in certain areas and not in others. The fact that movements were not randomly distributed throughout the country but clustered, suggests that any explanation of causation that focuses merely on culture contact, or on colonialism or one of its aspects, is inadequate because these are not sufficient causes in themselves. The questions that need to be answered are, under what conditions does colonialism or culture contact lead to the occurrence of protest movements? Any adequate explanation should be able to account for their appearance in one area, and absence in another, within a particular country. Secondly, within tribes and particular areas, what are some of the factors involved in support for, and opposition to, colonialism? Third, why was the protest movement such a common response? The following analysis tries to answer these questions, however tentatively.

The purpose of this paper is to study the uneven geographies of corruption on the African continent. Corruption is an entrenched part of African political culture. However, the degree and impacts of corruption vary widely across the continent, ranging from failed states such as Somalia to the region’s bright spot Botswana. This paper first defines corruption and discusses its causes and effects. It then delves into the specifics of African corruption, including its causes and effects such as patrimonial political cultures, clientelism and the role of natural resource exports.

The study uses data from Transparency International to assess African corruption empirically and geographically, and links its levels of severity using correlations to gross domestic product per capita, literacy, income inequality and freedom of the media.

The major findings are that while the vast majority of the continent’s one billion people live under very corrupt regimes, the impacts of corruption on economic growth are questionable. Few geographic studies of corruption exist.

The paper’s novelty stems in part from being the first to explore African corruption from a spatial perspective, illustrating its widely varying contexts and consequences.

Analysts of modern-day sub-Saharan Africa have argued that its “neopatrimonial regimes,” descending from pre-colonial polities, translate badly to the scale of the nation-state and hinder democratic accountability. In this paper, I argue by contrast that the problem with today’s failed or failing states is that they are not patrimonial enough, if we understand patrimonialism in classic Weberian terms as a system based on traditions of reciprocal interdependence between rulers and citizens, and characterized by personal but malleable ruling networks. I make this argument by showing how the Asante Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries shifted from a working model, incorporating both patrimonial and bureaucratic forms of authority, to an exploitative one that reneged on its traditional commitments to the wider public. The cause of this shift was the expansion of exchange with European nations as a rival avenue to power and wealth. This problem continues today, where African rulers are incentivized by the demands of global banks, the United Nations, and G20 governments rather than internal authority traditions, thus limiting their ability to establish locally effective and publically accountable hybrids of patrimonial and bureaucratic governance.

The purpose of this paper is to problematise the concept of corruption as it is used in the African context by exposing the weaknesses in the business model used to define corruption and resource the massive yet incompetent anti‐corruption effort. The paper then aims to follow this critique by considering an alternative way of dealing with the awesome dimensions of African corruption.

The paper utilises in‐depth secondary source analysis, applying critical theory.

Corruption's main interpretive framework, neo‐liberalism, is exposed as dominating, business‐centric and non‐utilitarian. A new paradigm with a strong ethnographic texture is presented.

The paper for the first time co‐analyses two contending paradigms for the construction of African corruption in the context of the global economic crisis.