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The Soviet experiment on socialism provides several distinguishable politico‐economic models. Employing dialectical methodology, examines the political economy of War Communism (1917‐21) as an exemplar of the “Socialist Command Model”. Explores the economic, political and social forces that were responsible for the emergence of the model, its policies, programmes and consequences, and finally, the forces that made it obsolete for the subsequent stages of Soviet development.

Extensions/applications/revisions of the Marxian vision of socialism can broadly be categorized into two polar strands: the centralized and the decentralized strands of socialist economic systems. Explores the main postulates of a decentralized version of a socialist economic system as provided by Kautsky, Luxembourg, Bernstein, Bukharin and Lange. The centralized strand of socialist economic systems has been elaborated drawing mainly from the writings of Lenin, Trotsky, Dobb, Sweezy and Baran.

Gorbachev′s vision of democratic, decentralised and market‐oriented socialism has generated diverse and controversial perceptions in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev′s claim that the USSR is not retreating from socialism but advancing towards it, having dismantled the Stalinist Command model, is assessed.

This article investigates the intellectual roots of perestroika. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the architect of perestroika claims that his programmes and policies are aimed at a revolutionary transformation of the Soviet economy from an overly centralised command system of management to a democratic system based mainly on economic methods and on an optimal combination of centralism and self‐management. To facilitate the restructuring process, Gorbachev simultaneously initiated two sweeping political reforms: glasnost (no “radical change is possible without it”); and demokratizatsiya (”there is no present‐day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy”). Therefore, prominent features envisaged by perestroika would presumably include: an optimal combination between centralism and self‐management, that would imply decentralisation in the economic management of the country; replacement of administrative methods by economic methods, that would emphasise economic incentives and market processes more than machineries of central planning; democratisation and openness in Soviet society, aimed at guaranteeing greater democratic rights for citizens, and pluralism in governmental and political processes.

Examines Gorbachev′s (1985‐1991) period of Soviet development as an exemplar of a self‐declared movement towards a more democratic and humane socialism. Gorbachev′s perestroika envisaged a fundamental structural and technological renovation of Soviet economy, reactivation of Soviet persons and attitudes, and overall redirection of the nation′s economic, political and social priorities. Analyses Gorbachev′s model of democratizing socialism with respect to underlying causes or origins, and institutions and policies initiated in the Gorbachev years.

Continues an examination of the Gorbechev era (1985‐91) in Soviet development as an example of a movement towards a more democratized form of Soviet‐style socialism. An earlier artilce focused on underlying causes and origins of this democratized version of Soviet socialism and its institutions and policy measures. Extends analysis of the Gorbachev period to consideration of its economic and political consequences and its tensions and contradictions, leading to disintegration of the Soviet politico‐economic system.

The law of value performs its regulatory function in the capitalist system where the private ownership of means of production and commodity production prevail. Under the centrally directed system of socialism, the economic process must be determined by plans and valuations of the central authority to maintain the consistency of the system′s internal co‐ordinating mechanism. In theory, the process of building socialism is a process of the withering away of the operation of the law of value. Recognition of the law of value as a permanent feature of the socialist economic system means conceding either a lack of understanding of the fundamental differences between capitalism and socialism, or the failure of the Marxist‐Leninist dogma. It also acknowledges that the Soviet system of socialism was exposed to increasing contamination by elements incompatible with socialism and was gradually transformed into its opposite – a form of centrally regulated exchange economy where a new ruling class, grown from the Party, was (and temporarily still is) in control of public ownership of means of production, as well as of all markets. The evolution of Soviet socialism from the October Revolution to its disintegration can be characterized by its passage through distinct “official” attitudes towards the role of the law of value. Its denial under the totally centralized economy of War Communism was followed by its temporary reintroduction under the New Economic Policy, then the recognition of its restricted functioning during the transitory phase from socialism to communism, then its recognition as a permanent feature of socialism, and finally its abandonment together with the rest of the Marxist‐Leninist dogma following both the doctrinal and economic crises in the 1990s.

This paper focuses on nonlinear properties of economic transformation and provides illustrations from nearly a decade of economic transition experience of the formerly planned economies. A particular argument is that policies that move a system along “the edge of chaos” may have the best chance of succeeding. This paper also highlights various difficulties and possible complexities that have not been pointed out by earlier analysts. It suggests that policy makers should keep a watchful eye on smaller incremental changes in the economic and institutional environments critical for their general effectiveness, as some may have enormous impacts at certain points in a dynamically complex environment.

Examines the sequencing of economic reforms in the post‐communist transition, focusing on Russia. Proposes a moderately expansionary stabilization, succeeded by gradual liberalization and marketization, followed by a more ambitious economic restructuring and privatization.

The purpose of the paper is to examine convergence of economic interests – both empirically and theoretically – among labor-abundant (labor-sending) and labor scarce (labor receiving) countries, in the context of Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO. The paper also explores regional trade associations as an interim alternative forum for promoting temporary cross-border labor mobility in the backdrop of failure of multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Round.

The research methodology of the paper involves literature review, an analysis of databases and theoretical findings, and a critical examination of pertinent empirical and secondary information on the subject matter.

The findings reveal that although a convergence of economic interests seem to exist between the labor-sending and receiving countries for promoting cross-border labor mobility, this sector faces formidable trade and non-trade barriers across the world, especially in the developed countries. As multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Round have failed to make any progress toward liberalization of this sector, regional trade associations, especially those pursued by the USA, Canada and Australia, seem to provide a credible alternative vehicle, as an interim measure, for further liberalization of this sector. These RTAs can serve as examples for other RTAs to promote regional mobility of labor.

Cross-border temporary labor mobility, as envisaged by GATs of the WTO, is a burgeoning field. Although some serious works are available, especially sponsored by the World Bank and some leading universities, there is a considerable dearth in this field, especially in respect to contribution from individual scholars and researchers. This paper fills the void to some extent by ascertaining factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility, by pointing out limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and by exploring the regional trade associations as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility.

This paper points out factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility, ascertains crucial limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and explores the RTAs as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility – all these would have practical policy implications.

The originality of the paper lies with its critical and careful review of existing literature and available databases, with the determination of factors and forces that help or hinder cross-border mobility in the contemporary world, in pointing out the limitations of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO, and in exploring the RTAs as an interim measure for promoting cross-border labor mobility.