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The Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Directives must be implemented no later than 31 December 1995. The Personal Investment Authority (PIA), a self‐regulating organisation under the Financial Services Act 1986, recognised in July 1994 and intended to be the lead regulator for retail financial services business, will become a competent authority for the purposes of these Directives and will be making new rules for the ‘investment firms’ among its members in order to give effect to the Directive requirements. The author, in a recent talk reproduced here, describes the new requirements, indicates PIA's approach to implementation and assesses the likely impact on the members of PIA.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why, as a matter of law and policy, loss suffered as a consequence of terrorism, insurrection and/or civil uprising is not generally compensable in insurance law. The paper postulates that it is the duty of the state, particularly in small states, to compensate loss of this type.

The paper achieves this objective by studying the attempted coup d'état by Muslim fundamentalists in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 and the devastating property losses suffered during the attempted coup as a consequence of looting and arson. The standard terms of two main policies then in use are meticulously set out and examined in the context of the relevant case law and textbook learning on the subject of losses of this type.

The paper demonstrates that losses occasioned as a consequence of activity of the type under reference – that is terrorist activity, insurrection and civil uprising – cannot be dealt with by insurance companies and that it falls to the state as the guardian of national security and as an honest broker in the development of the economy to ensure even development by compensating losses occasioned as a consequence of terrorist activity, insurrection and/or civil uprising.

The paper for the first time puts in context losses of the type now being experienced in many parts of the world and explains the limitations of the traditional insurance law principles to treat with these losses. The solution of state compensation as a last resort to compensate innocent victims in these circumstances is advanced as a possible solution.

This case concerned an attempt by predators based in New Zealand, Malaysia and Hong Kong to gain control of, and strip assets and cash from, a publicly listed New Zealand company (ENC). The predators included a New Zealand businessman, a Malaysian stockbroking firm and two gentlemen referred to throughout the case as ‘Koo’ and ‘Ng’. Koo and Ng were employed by the appellant company, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd (Meridian) and were, respectively, its chief investment officer and a senior portfolio manager. The appellant company was a Hong Kong investment management company with an Australian parent company, and although Koo was at the relevant time under the appellant's managing director in the corporate hierarchy of Meridian, in practice the evidence showed that he was given a very free rein in the conduct of the business of the company. The group of predators intended ultimately to finance their purchase of a controlling interest in ENC by using its own assets but interim finance was needed in order to buy the shares which would give them control of ENC's monies and assets. This was provided by Koo and Ng out of funds managed by Meridian as they improperly used their authority to act on behalf of Meridian and bought and re‐sold shares in various Asian companies (using the Malaysian stockbrokers who were also involved in this asset‐stripping raid on ENC). However, the plan went awry at the final stage when independent directors of ENC frustrated the predators' use of ENC's funds to repay Meridian. The result was that Meridian's Australian parent had to make good the losses suffered by the managed funds' beneficial owners.

Serious fraud trials are the sum of their component parts such that examination of one particular area often repays attention. The Roskill Fraud Trials Committee's criticisms were the backdrop for the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the enhanced investigatory powers that are to be found in s. 2 thereof. Seven years after the enactment of the 1987 Act it is apposite to examine whether in derogating from the confines of traditional criminal evidential practices a certain level of procedural and substantive fairness has been maintained. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its application to the rights of a suspect are also of importance. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between normative rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 abrogates the right to silence since a suspect is required to answer questions in pre‐trial investigations by the SFO, although the answers are inadmissible as evidence unless proceedings are brought under s. 2(14) for giving false information or by s. 2(8), where the individual ‘makes a statement inconsistent with it’. In a previous article, the writer has considered the necessity and effectiveness of s. 2 powers. It is also instructive to analyse the conceptual basis of s. 2 powers since this will aid in the interpretation of statutory ambiguities and will allow the courts to have a uniformity of approach when seeking to resolve the statutory ambiguities. The conceptual basis is also important as concerns the resolution of where the line lies between the effective investigation of offences pursuant to s. 2 and the rights of the individual subject to such questioning. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between normative rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

These two appeals arose out of the 1991 collapse of BCCI and were brought by two former employees of BCCI in London who had both lost their jobs as a result of the collapse. Mr Malik had worked for BCCI for 12 years, his last position being head of deposit accounts and customer services at BCCI's Leadenhall branch. Mr Mahmud had 16 years service with the bank and was manager of the Brompton Road branch at the time he lost his job. They claimed that as well as losing their jobs they had suffered damage to their reputations, and thus future employability, as a result of their association with BCCI. In all the courts through which the claims passed the liquidators agreed that the actions should proceed upon the basis of a set of agreed facts (although the liquidators made no admission of the veracity of those facts) namely

Serious fraud trials are the sum of their component parts such that examination of one particular area often repays attention. The Roskill Fraud Trials Committee's criticisms were the backdrop for the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the enhanced investigatory powers that are to be found in s. 2 thereof. Seven years after the enactment of the 1987 Act it is apposite to examine whether in derogating from the confines of traditional criminal evidential practices a certain level of procedural and substantive fairness has been maintained. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its application to the rights of a suspect are also of importance. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between prescriptive rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

This case concerned the validity of a scheme entered into by some depositors in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (hereinafter referred to as ‘BCCI’) in order to increase the level of payouts from the Deposit Protection Fund in respect of their original deposits with BCCI.

A time charter allows the charterer of a vessel to have its use for a predetermined period of time. The charterer is entitled, subject to certain restrictions, to employ the vessel as he wishes during the charter period, but is under an obligation to redeliver it to its owner upon the termination of that period. Timely redelivery is of considerable commercial importance to the shipowner, for the vessel may have been committed to another charter commencing immediately upon scheduled redelivery. On the other hand, the charterer will wish to maximise the number of voyages undertaken during the charter period. Given the large amounts of money involved in chartering a vessel as well as the degree of profit or loss that could be at stake in a single voyage, a charterer may find himself in a position where he feels obliged to give last voyage orders knowing full well that the vessel cannot be redelivered within the contractually agreed time. In Torvald Klaveness A/S v Ami Maritime Corporation, The Gregos the House of Lords attempted to reconcile the competing commercial requirements of shipowners and charterers and considered the effect in law of a charterer ordering a vessel on a so‐called illegitimate last voyage.

Budget Rent A Car Ltd (Budget) borrowed money from a consortium of financiers and bankers. The advance was secured by a debenture trust deed dated 5th May, 1987, entered into between Budget, Budget Lease Management (Car Sales) Ltd and the Appellant, New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd (the Trust Company). The holders of the debenture were the lenders involved in the consortium. The total sum advanced was £17.25m.