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Over the past few years, regulators, issuers, investors, and other market participants have expressed increasing concerns regarding the real or perceived effects of short selling. For example, thinly‐capitalized issuers whose shares trade on the over‐the‐counter market often blame short sellers for declines in the prices of their stocks. Recently, these issuers’ ire has focused on so‐called “naked short sellers,” i.e. short sellers who do not locate or borrow shares before selling. Likewise, other market participants have expressed apprehension about conduct involving short sales that may be viewed as disruptive or manipulative. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the self‐regulatory organizations (SROs) have addressed these concerns both by promulgating new regulations governing short sales and by pursing enforcement actions. This article summarizes the new short sales rules contained in Regulation SHO and the amendments to Regulation M, and discusses recent enforcement actions pertaining to short sales.

The aim of this chapter is to argue that charisma is a collective representation, and that charismatic authority is a social status that derives more from the “recognition” of the followers than from the “magnetism” of the leaders. I contend further that a close reading of Max Weber shows that he, too, saw charisma in this light.

I develop my argument by a close reading of many of the most relevant texts on the subject. This includes not only the renowned texts on this subject by Max Weber, but also many books and articles that interpret or criticize Weber’s views.

I pay exceptionally close attention to key arguments and texts, several of which have been overlooked in the past.

Writers for whom charisma is personal magnetism tend to assume that charismatic rule is natural and that the full realization of democratic norms is unlikely. Authority, in this view, emanates from rulers unbound by popular constraint. I argue that, in fact, authority draws both its mandate and its energy from the public, and that rulers depend on the loyalty of their subjects, which is never assured. So charismatic claimants are dependent on popular choice, not vice versa.

I advocate a “culturalist” interpretation of Weber, which runs counter to the dominant “personalist” account. Conventional interpreters, under the sway of theology or mass psychology, misread Weber as a romantic, for whom charisma is primal and undemocratic rule is destiny. This essay offers a counter-reading.

This study examines the impact of bureaucratic structure on morale among hospital staff. Hypotheses are drawn from Hage's axiomatic theory of organizations, including the predicted negative impact on morale of formalization, centralization and stratification, and the positive impact on morale of task complexity. Contingency hypotheses involving structure and task complexity are also examined. Results indicate morale is either positively affected or unaffected by structure, and negatively affected by process. Some evidence of contingent effects are found. The findings are discussed within the broader context of Weber's theory of bureaucracy. This paper addresses the relationship between several structural features of bureaucracy and workers' morale in a hospital setting. It examines these relationships from broadly defined theoretical perspectives. In this connection, Weber's theory of bureaucracy is treated, as was the case in his original, as part of his general theory of rationalization in modern western society. The study considers the relationship between: 1) Formalization and morale, 2) Centralization and morale, 3) Stratification and morale, 4) Complexity and morale. These structural features of bureaucracy—formalization, centralization, stratification and complexity‐are treated as the means at the command of management for attaining organizational objectives. Worker morale is often referred to as the “level of feeling” about themselves among workers or about the work they perform (Revans, 1964; Veninga, 1982; Simendinger and Moore, 1985; Zucker, 1988). In effect, the term is used in stating that morale is high or low to suggest that something is right or wrong about the organization. Surprisingly, many of these studies do not explain why they are suggesting a particular state of morale, but only that the state of morale is crucial to the performance of the organization. In essence, morale is the level of confidence of the employees. It can vary from one department to the other due to specific or overall structural conditions of the organizations; without giving it routine consideration, performance will degenerate (Nelson, 1989).

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

In this monograph the author discusses the problems in constructing a logical and ethical‐empirical foundation so that relevant social values may be studied by the scientific method. Part One is concerned with the difficulties posed by the prevailing methodology. Part Two presents a new research programme based on the simultaneous equilibrium versus disequilibrium approach in conjunction with Wittgenstein's logic and the current research in ethics.

The critical dimension and the one that can unify knowledge through systemic interrelationships, is unification of the purely a priori with the purely a posteriori parts of total reality into a congruous whole. This is a circular cause and effect interrelationship between premises. The emerging kind of world view may also be substantively called the epistemic‐ontic circular causation and continuity model of unified reality. The essence of this order is to ground philosophy of science in both the natural and social sciences, in a perpetually interactive and integrative mould of deriving, evolving and enhancing or revising change. Knowledge is then defined as the output of every such interaction. Interaction arises first from purely epistemological roots to form ontological reality. This is the passage from the a priori to the a posteriori realms in the traditions of Kant and Heidegger. Conversely, the passage from the a posteriori to a priori reality is the approach to knowledge in the natural sciences proferred by Cartesian meditations, David Hume, A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, as examples. Yet the continuity and renewal of knowledge by interaction and integration of these two premises are not rooted in the philosophy of western science. Husserl tried for it through his critique of western civilization and philosophical methods in the Crisis of Western Civilization. The unified field theory of Relativity‐Quantum physics is being tried for. A theory of everything has been imagined. Yet after all is done, scientific research program remains in a limbo. Unification of knowledge appears to be methodologically impossible in occidental philosophy of science.