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This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

The paper starts from an observation of a discrepancy between the ambitions for sustainable change in the agro-industry and the actual changes being implemented. We offer one possible explanation by investigating the organizational structures conditioning change in this industry.

We apply a case study methodology, focusing on the Danish pig industry and its organizational conditions for change. Based on interviews and document analysis, and building on systems theory, we develop the concept of change structures, understood as decision premises that guide the change of further decision premises.

The analysis suggests that the pig industry’s change structures predominantly enable changes that cut costs and optimize the production, which may conflict with and possibly foreclose the changes needed to realize the industry’s sustainable ambitions. This conflict and its implications are not acknowledged by the industry.

The analysis indicates that the industry may be locked in its current form of organizational change. We suggest a way to overcome the lock-in by fostering organizational mechanisms that enable alternative interpretations to emerge internally. Without this, achieving the required sustainable change in the industry may hinge on stronger external regulation and support.

Conceptually, the notion of change structures supplements actor-oriented analytical approaches that focus on change agents and sense-making. Empirically, we contribute with an analysis of the conditions of possibility for sustainable change in an important yet understudied industry in organization studies; namely, the conventional agro-industry.