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In February 2003, President and CEO Nick Lazaris faces critical decisions on Keurig's launch of a new consumer coffee brewing system. Keurig has successfully sold single-cup brewing systems through commercial distribution channels and is now expanding to the lucrative consumer segment. However, a meeting with key strategic partners six months prior to launch raised questions about the product design. This prompted the Keurig management team to revisit its decisions on product design, pricing, and the marketing plan. With six months to launch, what should the company do?

From 2002 to 2011, coffee-machine manufacturer Keurig Incorporated had grown from a privately held company with just over $20 million in revenues and a plan to enter the single serve coffee arena for home consumers, to a wholly owned subsidiary of Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., a publicly traded company with net revenues of $1.36 billion and a market capitalization of between $8 and $9 billion. In 2003 Keurig had introduced its first At Home brewer. Now, approximately 25 percent of all coffee makers sold in the United States were Keurig-branded machines, and Keurig was recognized as among the leaders in the marketplace. The company had just concluded agreements with both Dunkin' Donuts and Starbucks that would make these retailers' coffee available for use with Keurig's specialized brewing system. The company faced far different challenges than when it was a small, unknown marketplace entrant. John Whoriskey, vice president and general manager of Keurig's At Home division, had to consider the impact that impending expiration of key technology patents and the perceived environmental impact of the K-Cup® portion packs would have on the company's growth. Whoriskey also wondered what Keurig's growth potential was, and how the new arrangements with Starbucks and Dunkin' Donuts could be leveraged to achieve it.

Derived from field interviews and secondary research, the case describes the dilemma that the Marketing Manager Bentley Collins of Sabre Yachts faces in developing a profitable marketing mix given the firm's current product line, competitors, industry and national economic trends. Sabre had always been a niche boat builder. Their product line was divided into two distinct categories; sail boats and power boats. Their sailboats were targeted toward boaters interested in the comfort desired for cruising but also the capability of competitive racing while their power boats were designed to be modern yachts that could cruise 20 knots or better. A majority of sales came from the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions with only sporadic success in other areas. Bentley worried that slower phone traffic in Spring of 2001 would be indicative of slower sales and wanted to know what actions the firm should take to continue their regional growth as well as their push to become a more nationally-based firm. The case has a difficulty level appropriate for a junior or senior level course. The case is designed to be taught in one class period and is expected to require between five to seven hours of outside preparation by students.