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I am not a scholar and this is not a scholarly article. This is a reflection on what I’ve observed and learned about leadership development during many years of living and working in Asia. I tell some stories, make shameless, sweeping generalizations, give highly opinionated views and offer totally subjective insights. I also do some lecturing. There are no charts or graphs and very few notes. I write mainly about American companies (with a bit about Japanese companies and a nod to the Swiss), because these are the organizations with which I am most familiar. By doing this I do not mean to let other companies and countries off the hook.

A bit about me – I am a learning and development practitioner who has been in Asia since 1981, so I have had the opportunity to observe a lot. The first 16 years of that time I spent in Japan, working for Matsushita Electric Industrial, Arthur Andersen, Union Bank of Switzerland and Morgan Stanley. In 1998 I moved to Hong Kong to join Merrill Lynch. I’m now an independent consultant. Since 1981 I have worked in China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.

My premise is that many American (and other) companies, whether they realize it or not, are approaching leadership development in Asia (and probably elsewhere) in a narrow and parochial way that limits the contributions of their Asian managers, and thus is not good for business. Instead of accepting and exploiting cultural differences, companies are either ignoring them or trying to expunge them. Instead of the lockstep global systems of performance management, training and review, I argue for using something called indigenous design in which people get to help design the criteria by which they are evaluated. Their contribution becomes part of the global performance management scheme. Indigenously designed training programs can be used in conjunction with corporate programs to fill in the bits that are missing from one-size-fits-all global leadership development. Indigenous design is happening in architecture, technology and social welfare programs – so why not in corporate learning and development?

The scientific correspondence between Harrod and Robertson was initiated by Harrod’s criticism of Robertson’s Banking Policy and the Price Level (1926).⁷ Harrod first wrote on 18 May 1926 (letter 2) raising at once the following “salient point”: Much of your argument depends on the view that justifiable expansions and contractions as defined by you are desirable. Why are they desirable? You give reasons on p. 22 why you think some instability in output desirable. But the reasons mentioned there (and I can’t find any others) don’t seem particularly directed to show that the special form of instability constituted by the so-called “justifiable” expansions and contractions is desirable. They seem to me to show that perhaps some instability, that, presumably, of less degree than we have been accustomed to in the past, is good, but by no means precisely how much is good. Thus, suppose the “hypothetical group member” or “the actual workman” of p. 19 were able to govern output according to their own self interest, there would still, according to the arguments of ch. 2, be some instability. Would not that be enough? Or if you want more, why stop at the “justifiable”? Why not have some of that due to “secondary” causes? It seems to me that you have been led away by purely aesthetic interests to identify that more moderate amount of instability which we really need (as shown on p. 22.) with that which we would get: (i) if secondary causes were removed; and (ii) if control of output stayed where it is now – in the hands of the entrepreneur. I don’t see how you can say to the banks more than “damp down fluctuation a bit, but leave some fluctuation, as that is healthful for the body economic”.He added two notes to his letter, in the first of which he commented upon the four proposed courses of policy outlined by Robertson on pp. 25–26 of his book. In the second note Harrod suggested that Robertson’s calculations in Appendix I to Ch. 5 of Banking Policy assumed the following behaviour of the public: (i) People do not allow for the effect of their withholding on the price level (this is reasonable). (ii) They are ignorant as the future course of inflation (or do nothing to meet it). (iii) On this basis they decide what withholding is necessary to restore H, decide that it would be too much effort to restore it at once, and…spread the restoration over K – 1 days. It so happens that by choosing K – 1 their 2 errors (or failures to take everything into account) cancel each other out, and they do effect the restoration in that time. If K or K – 2 had been chosen, this would not have been so.Harrod further argued that Robertson’s “so-called reasonable assumption of a restoration in K – 1 days is purely arbitrary,” and that “all this reasoning is rendered of doubtful value by the fact that we must suppose an alteration in view as to ‘the appropriate proportion between Real Hoarding and Real Income’ during the process of inflation. Not only will people not replenish H at once, but they may well voluntarily reduce it.”

This research provides accounting-ethics authors and administrators with a benchmark for accounting-ethics research. While Bernardi and Bean (2010) considered publications in business-ethics and accounting’s top-40 journals this study considers research in eight accounting-ethics and public-interest journals, as well as, 34 business-ethics journals. We analyzed the contents of our 42 journals for the 25-year period between 1991 through 2015. This research documents the continued growth (Bernardi & Bean, 2007) of accounting-ethics research in both accounting-ethics and business-ethics journals. We provide data on the top-10 ethics authors in each doctoral year group, the top-50 ethics authors over the most recent 10, 20, and 25 years, and a distribution among ethics scholars for these periods. For the 25-year timeframe, our data indicate that only 665 (274) of the 5,125 accounting PhDs/DBAs (13.0% and 5.4% respectively) in Canada and the United States had authored or co-authored one (more than one) ethics article.

The visibility and impact of young activists is evident in 2020 more than ever, most clearly in the Black Lives Matter movement, but also among climate strikers, water protectors, March for Our Lives organizers, and even TikTok users and K-pop music fans. The ambivalence with which adults have responded – from pride to dismissal to demonization – has its roots in implicit yet pervasive assumptions about young people stretching back to the early nineteenth century. Through a brief historical sketch, I demonstrate that the contemporary concept of the “American teenager” is the product of a series of social, economic, and political changes in the United States and that this concept undermines youth activism and gives license to adults to dismiss young peoples' justified anger at injustice. This essay contends that adultism, and specifically ephebiphobia – the fear and loathing of young people – dominates today's cultural perceptions of youth in the United States and contributes to policies in education and law enforcement that have domesticated and criminalized young people, undermining their political power. Understanding of the historical factors that shape adults' attitudes toward young peoples' capabilities as activists is a first step to improving and sustaining collaboration between youth and adults in social movements.