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Along with accounting scandals in the past, academics, researchers, and legislators have focused on fraud. The purpose of this study is to examine postgraduate and doctoral studies, articles, and books about forensic accounting and fraud audit published between the years 2008 and 2018 in Turkey. For this purpose, a total of 96 studies have been examined and 35 of these are master’s theses, 10 of them are PhD theses, 45 of them are articles, and six of them are books. These studies were presented in tables as classified. The studies examined in our research are summarized as year they were published, the author, and the scope of the topic and in terms of results. The conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows: (a) the majority of thesis published about forensic accounting and fraud audit are in 2011 and following years. In addition, most of the theses are focused on forensic accounting review rather than fraud audit. (b) Results in the articles reviewed are in the same direction with theses. (c) There are very few books about fraud audit and forensic accounting. One of them is related to fraud audit, while the rest of them are related to forensic accounting and forensic accounting profession. We suggest extending the scope of the study and making to other countries.

The need for independent audit goes back to the agency theory, the theory of delegation of power and the issue of trust. Stakeholders delegate power to management to manage the business on their behalf, yet they face the risk of information asymmetry and management motivations to commit fraud. The main aim of having an independent auditor was therefore to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and fraudulent behaviour by management. Auditors are required by the International Auditing Standards to detect material fraud and error, and they are expected to have a duty of care for stakeholders. However, recently independent auditors, whether conducting private or public audit, have been scrutinised for failing to detect material fraud. There have been a lot of discussions in the literature about the role of private auditors in detecting fraud, but very little discussions about the role of public auditors in detecting fraud. This chapter will outline the difference between private audit and public audit; explain the legal liability of public auditors in relation to fraud detection; the role of public auditors in detecting fraud; and will critically review the root causes for auditors’ failure to detect fraud.

Professionals who carry out the forensic accounting profession must have an extensive knowledge of accounting, as well as an effective knowledge of law, auditing, internal audit, business management, psychology, crime science, and, in particular, computer technologies. In today’s digital business environment, it has become difficult to identify fraudulent transactions with traditional methods. Developments in information (data) and information technology have helped increase anti-fraud control programs and fraud research opportunities. In particular, fraudulent financial reporting disrupts the reliability, accuracy, and efficiency of financial markets in terms of existence and continuity. The forensic accounting profession has been able to improve the effectiveness of inspections by using big data techniques, data analytics, and algorithms (Rezaee, Lo, Ha, & Suen, 2016; Seda & Kramer, 2014; Singleton & Singleton, 2010).

The aim of the author, in this chapter, is to evaluate the contribution of using big data techniques in forensic accounting applications and the skills that will be provided to students while integrating these techniques in forensic accounting trainings. For this purpose, studies on forensic accounting education and their applications were reviewed. In addition, opinions were evaluated by considering the relevant literature about the importance of big data, benefits of big data, use of big data techniques, and interest shown of them.

Accounting-based financial scandals caused by fraudulent financial reports negatively affect the financial markets and cause loss of confidence in investors. Financial reporting quality needs to be improved in order to build and maintain trust in financial markets. To increase the quality of financial reports, fraudulent financial reporting risks should be defined. At this point, regulators, practitioners, and researchers are in constant search.

There are improved approaches to the detection of financial reporting frauds in the literature. Many studies have been conducted on the “Fraud Triangle Theory” and the “Fraud Diamond Theory” approaches. The Fraud Triangle Theory argues that while fraudulent action is taking place in defining the elements of press, rationalization, and opportunity, the Fraud Diamond Theory approach argues that in order to achieve these three elements, the capability to carry out a fraud in individuals must be improved.

In this study, it is aimed to investigate the effect of Fraud Diamond elements on fraudulent financial reports. For the scope of the research, data of 26 companies from Manufacturing Industry enterprises operating in BORSA ISTANBUL between 2013 and 2017 were used. Financial reports of the companies are divided into two groups: (1) Fraudulent Financial Reports and (2) Non-Fraud Financial Reports. The hypotheses developed within the scope of the research were tested using the Logistic Regression analysis in IBM SPSS Statistic 20 program.

As a result of the study, it has been determined that there is a negative correlation between borrowing level, asset profitability, independent audit firm, auditor exchanges and institutionalization level, and fraudulent financial reports. It was understood that the change in assets and the size of the audit committee did not have any effect on the fraudulent financial reports.

We analyze the economic consequence of government intervention on the incidence of accounting fraud and audit fees of both Big 4 and local big auditors on Chinese audit market in the period 2006–2013. In 2009, Chinese government issued favorable polices to local big auditors and required certain Chinese companies to give priority to these auditors. We find that market share of Big 4 auditors is quite stable before and after government intervention, but market share of local big auditors increases at the cost of local small auditors after intervention. Although audit fee premiums of both local big and Big 4 auditors have increased after intervention, the positive effect of local big auditors on audit fee premiums has significantly decreased. Further, both Big 4 and local big auditors are not likely to reduce the incidence of accounting fraud in pre- and post-intervention period. Our results suggest that Chinese government support to local auditors does not significantly enhance these auditors’ competitiveness in terms of audit fee and audit quality.

This chapter adopts Porter’s ‘audit trinity’ approach comprising internal audit, external audit and audit committee to discuss the role auditing can play in the management of corporate fraud.

The chapter maps the historical background of and the developments in external audit as an assurance service, the internal audit function and the audit committee. Based on this, it explains the nature, types and possible causes of corporate fraud within the context of business risk with a view to establishing how auditing can help in managing such frauds.

The chapter highlights the relationships that should exist between the three audit types in order to support a sound internal control system as a tool for preventing and detecting corporate fraud.

The chapter identifies cost, opportunity, connivance and managerial override as factors that could limit the ability of auditing to manage corporate fraud. It also suggests ways of addressing these limitations.

As the current upward trend in IT adoption for corporate operations continue to open new sets of corporate fraud windows, this chapter examines how an entity’s internal controls can be used to prevent and detect these growing fraud schemes.

The chapter’s unique strength is its adoption of a holistic approach to auditing to suggest ways of managing corporate fraud – a novelty in the corporate fraud literature. It is hoped that future research in the area will bring empirical insights to the issues raised and perspectives covered in the chapter.

This chapter examines whether professional auditors’ affect toward client management influences fraud likelihood judgments and whether accountability and experience with fraud risk judgments moderate this effect. This research also explores the process by which affect influences fraud judgments by examining affect’s influence on the evaluation of fraud evidence cues. Results indicate that more positive affect toward the client results in lower fraud likelihood judgments. Accountability is found to moderate this effect, but only for experienced auditors. These findings have implications for fraud brainstorming sessions where all staff levels provide input into fraud risk assessments and because client characteristics are especially salient during these assessments. Importantly, results also support the proposition that affect impacts inexperienced auditors’ fraud assessments through errant attribution of client likability to evidence cues that refer to management, rather than biasing all client-related evaluations. Together, these findings suggest that education and training can be improved to better differentiate relevant and irrelevant cues in fraud judgment.

Ethics play an important role in society; however, many economics models assume that individual players act “economically” rational and ignore situations where an individual may forgo economic benefit for the public good. This chapter models the strategic interaction between auditors and management and allows for management to choose the economically irrational outcome of behaving ethically even when doing so defies their own financial self-interest. One of the model's assumption is that a certain percentage of managers do not engage in a “strategy” to misreport their financial statements because doing so is “unethical”. If recent accounting scandals are indicative of an ethical crisis in this country, this model offers hope because an increase in the percentage of unethical mangers leads to a decrease in fraudulent reporting. The model also illustrates the effects of an increase in the rewards for committing fraud (e.g., greater numbers of stock options, restricted stock, and accounting-based performance incentives) and an increase in the penalty for detected fraud (e.g., stiffer penalties for fraud from Sarbanes–Oxley).

Casino gambling in the United States has increased significantly in the last 30 years, going from just 2 states (Nevada and New Jersey) in 1988 to 41 states with over 980 casinos. This rapid growth of casino gambling has resulted in additional social costs, including workplace embezzlements committed by problem gamblers. Embezzlements contribute to greater fraud risk for organizations in casino regions and are expected to rise as casinos multiply and increasingly cater to convenience gamblers. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the proximity of casinos as a fraud risk factor for embezzlement. The authors recommend that internal and external auditors for companies located in casino areas assess this fraud risk and where appropriate, perform audit procedures to address this risk. There is also an opportunity for external auditors to assist those companies located in casino regions (that may lack internal auditors) in establishing fraud prevention programs.

Research in psychology and accounting suggest that affect (client likeability) toward a person can impact human judgment, resulting in more favorable treatment for likeable than dislikeable individuals. This study investigates whether two debiasing mechanisms, justification and self-review, mitigate the impact of affect (client likeability) on fraud risk assessments. Consistent with prior research on nonfraud audit judgments, this study finds that in absence of any debiasing mechanism, inexperienced auditors are susceptible to affect biases in fraud judgments. Extending prior research, we find justification is not sufficient to mitigate likeability, but self-review is an effective mechanism to mitigate the effect of client likeability in a fraud judgment task. Supplemental findings indicate that general accounting experience, in itself, does not mitigate client likeability; however, the effectiveness of the self-review mechanism extends to these participants.