FORMALISM OR ANTI‐FORMALISM: REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance
ISSN: 1358-1988
Article publication date: 1 February 1995
Abstract
The supervisory authority of the Bank of England derives from tradition and statute. The interplay of these two factors can be analysed by applying a formalist/anti‐formalist model. In this paper this has been developed to explain the regulatory cycle and the reasons why anti‐formalism has been adopted. Evidence of recent events in the banking industry has been used to support the argument and explain the actions of the Bank of England.
Citation
ROBINSON, I. and HUSSEY, R. (1995), "FORMALISM OR ANTI‐FORMALISM: REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 129-134. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb024835
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 1995, MCB UP Limited