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COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE EC

DEREK RIDYARD (SENIOR CONSULTANT WITH NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (NERA) IN LONDON)
JEAN DE BOLLE (ANALYST WITH NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (NERA) IN LONDON)

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

ISSN: 1358-1988

Article publication date: 1 February 1992

Abstract

The paper sets out the findings of a study by the authors of the EC audit and consultancy sectors, presenting their view that it is auditors' independence rather than competition which provides those concerned with regulation of the industry with the most urgent public policy issues. The authors consider the approaches adopted by EC Member States to protect auditors' independence, concluding that these approaches have a limited effect. The paper closes by proposing an alternative approach to improving assurances of auditors' independence which would combine independent inspection of audit standards, consumer demand for safeguards and moves by suppliers to anticipate that demand.

Citation

RIDYARD, D. and DE BOLLE, J. (1992), "COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE EC", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 163-169. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb024764

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1992, MCB UP Limited