The purpose of this study is to examine the potential and cost of policy incentives for individuals to defer public pension (social security) claims.
Using Internet survey experiments, the impacts of introducing three potential policies to defer public pension claims are examined: (1) a tax incentive for private term pension premiums, (2) a tax incentive for private term pension benefits and (3) a tax disincentive for financial asset holdings. Effectiveness of information provision regarding projection of future financial assets is also examined.
Tax incentives have a certain impact on deferment of public pension claims. Among incentives, increase of benefits is the most effective one. Providing information regarding future financial assets reduces incentives.
This study is original in measuring cost for delaying public pension claims according to incentives and information provision.
The authors thank Noriyoshi Yanase, Keiko Iwasaki, Hiroshi Yoshida, Atsuhiro Yamada, Armando R. Lopez-Velasco, Natalia Khorunzhina, Seiichiro Iwasawa, Kazuhoro Tashiro, Ken Iwatsubo, the participants for the 88th Annual Meeting Southern Economic Association in Washington DC, the 15th International Conference of Western Economic Association in Tokyo, the 94th Annual Conference of Western Economic Association in San Francisco, the 2019 Japanese Economic Association Spring Meeting in Tokyo, the Nippon Finance Association 27th Annual Conference in Tokyo and the 34th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association for their helpful comments and suggestions. This study was financially supported by the Health and Labour Sciences Research Grant of Japan (H29 Policies General 002)
Kitamura, T. and Nakashima, K. (2021), "An investigation of policy incentives for delaying public pension benefit claims", Review of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 109-124. https://doi.org/10.1108/RBF-09-2019-0117
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