The effects of voter control on budget outcomes

Carol Ebdon (Department of Public Administration at the University of Nebraska at Omaha)

Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management

ISSN: 1096-3367

Publication date: 1 March 2000

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of budget referenda on spending levels. An agency theory framework is used to identify the incentives of voters and school boards, and to discuss the use of the referendum as a budget control mechanism. The regression analysis compares expenditures in New York State school districts with and without referenda requirements. Total spending is found to be 5.5% higher in districts without referenda, ceteris parabis. However, the specific rules related to referenda and budget defeats appear to be important determinants of their effectiveness.

Citation

Ebdon, C. (2000), "The effects of voter control on budget outcomes", Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 23-43. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-12-01-2000-B002

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2000 by PrAcademics Press

To read the full version of this content please select one of the options below

You may be able to access this content by logging in via Shibboleth, Open Athens or with your Emerald account.
To rent this content from Deepdyve, please click the button.
If you think you should have access to this content, click the button to contact our support team.