Analysis of the role players in wildlife trafficking and the measures to combat it in South Africa

Abstract

Purpose

Corruption is one of the main facilitators of increased wildlife crime in South Africa. It is important to look at the current legislative framework to determine how wildlife crime can be combated effectively. This paper aims to provide an analysis of the process of wildlife crime, focusing on wildlife poaching and trafficking role players and critically analyses the legislation in place to combat the phenomenon.

Design/methodology/approach

A critical analysis of existing literature such as case law, legislation, peer-reviewed publications and electronic articles was used to identify the legislation and processes for the prevention of wildlife crime in South Africa. Common denominators were identified in these sources to provide a baseline for examining wildlife crime.

Findings

Wildlife criminals rely extensively on corruption during all facets of their trafficking schemes. The use of traditional environmental laws is not effective in dismantling wildlife trafficking networks, as prosecuting those in the upper echelons is often challenging. The extensive reliance on corruption during all facets of wildlife trafficking provides an opportunity for law enforcement to use such corruption crimes as predicate offences in racketeering prosecutions, thus ensuring kingpins find it more difficult to escape prosecution, owing to their involvement in criminal enterprises that sustain themselves through patterns of racketeering.

Originality/value

This paper contributes knowledge to narrow the research gap with regard to wildlife criminals and how they function. It also addresses possibilities to improve prosecution and disrupt wildlife trafficking networks.

Citation

Marais, E., McIntyre, J.-L. and Aslett, D. (2024), "Analysis of the role players in wildlife trafficking and the measures to combat it in South Africa", Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-06-2024-0180

1. Introduction

Wildlife crime is seen as the fourth-largest organised crime in the world (Chemudupati, 2019). Lui (2023:119) maintains that Africa is the “major point of origin for the illegal export of wildlife to Asia” and in this context, South Africa serves as both a source of and a transit route for wildlife products (South African Integrated Anti-Money Laundering Integrated Task Force [SAMLIT], 2021). South African wildlife and natural resources are poached and trafficked globally and are also traded illegally at the local level.

Wildlife crime covers a range of activities, such as importing, exporting, poaching, unlawful hunting, trafficking, processing, receiving and possessing wildlife or parts thereof, which leads to overlapping offences (Geldenhuys, 2020; Martini, 2013). It is, therefore, necessary to assess the primary piece of legislation aimed at combating organised crime in South Africa, which is the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 21 of 1998 (POCA). The POCA criminalises gang networks, racketeering and money laundering (POCA, 1998).

The (UNDC) United Nations on Drugs and Crime (2000) defines an organised criminal group as a structured group of three or more people that exists for a period, intending to commit serious crimes to obtain material or financial gain, directly or indirectly. However, organised crime groups can also be seen as criminal networks with various role players, all of which are involved in some form of illicit activity. Many of these criminal networks are beginning to switch their focus from trafficking in drugs or humans to trafficking in wildlife because, according to Corruption Watch (2021) and Geldenhuys (2020), the penalties are far less severe and wildlife crime is a rare offence with few laws that can be utilised to pursue it.

Prosecuting wildlife criminals should therefore include all the crimes that could be related to wildlife trafficking, and the focus should thus not be placed only on environmental legislation. Environmental crime legislation often carries low penalties, and to successfully combat wildlife crime, focus should be placed on more serious crimes that could lead to greater sanctions.

Wildlife crime is furthermore closely linked with corruption, which facilitates the trafficking of illicit wildlife products (Liu, 2023:122). Corruption can therefore be found across the entire wildlife crime trafficking process, and all role players may be involved in various forms of corruption (Corruption Watch, 2021; Viollaz et al., 2018).

Corruption is defined by Viollaz et al. (2018) as the unlawful demand, abuse or use of one’s position or authority in exchange for business, financial or personal advantage. In the South African legal context, corruption is defined as follows Snyman (2012:428):

Anybody who accepts any gratification from anybody else or offers or gives any gratification to anybody else to influence the receiver to conduct herself or himself in a way which amounts to the unlawful or irregular exercise of any duties, commits corruption.

This paper addresses the research problem of how existing South African legislation and structures can contribute to the combating of wildlife crimes. Furthermore, where required, recommendations are made for changes to enhance the combating of wildlife crime in South Africa. The research question that is addressed in this study reads as follows:

RQ1.

How can the existing South African legislative framework contribute to the combating of wildlife trafficking?

The paper addresses the following objectives:

• to analyse the modus operandi used by criminal networks to traffic wildlife, and thereby determine the roles of the various members of wildlife trafficking networks;

• to analyse the role of corruption in the various facets of wildlife trafficking; and

• to determine how the existing South African legislative framework provides for the combating of wildlife trafficking networks.

The research methodology entails a critical analysis of existing literature.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the role players in wildlife crime and analyses the role of corrupt activities in wildlife trafficking. Section 3 determines how the provisions of existing legislation may be used to combat wildlife trafficking. The conclusion of this study is presented in Section 4.

2. Role players of wildlife crime

One of the primary facilitators of wildlife trafficking, poaching and related cross-border activities is corruption, while fraud, forgery and uttering, money laundering and tax evasion are also instrumental in the success of illicit wildlife trafficking (Martini, 2013).

The involvement of organised criminal groups in wildlife crimes is indicative of a professional network of wildlife offenders who are capable of handling larger volumes of wildlife trafficking [Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021]. In fact, there are claims that some organised criminal groups have switched from dealing in narcotics to rhinoceros (“rhino”) horn because the rewards are comparable, and the odds of arrest and prosecution are smaller (Geldenhuys, 2020; Kleemans, 2007; Yeater, 2011). The penalties for wildlife crime are also much lower than other organised criminal activities such as, for instance, diamond smuggling or drug and human trafficking. Wildlife trafficking furthermore involves multiple levels involving numerous role players, which can make combatting the phenomenon more difficult and is exacerbated by the fact that data on the number of people involved in these networks are scarce.

The following Figure 1 illustrates the identified role players that are involved in a successful wildlife trafficking network. A discussion of each role player follows.

2.1 Poachers

2.1.1 Profile and role.

Poachers are usually local to the source country and, according to SAMLIT (2021), can entail: employees of the targeted game reserve; individuals who are unemployed and desperate to care for themselves or their families; drivers who assist in the transportation of the wildlife; or suppliers of the ingredients of medicine made by traditional healers.

Poachers are the start of the wildlife trafficking process. They violate laws and regulations by killing, catching or capturing animal species that are endangered, and they are also typically the ones who are caught [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership) 2021; Viollaz et al. (2018)]. Poverty is often the primary motivator of wildlife crime at this level. Poachers are the lowest-paid people throughout the value chain and, according to SAMLIT (2021), their main goal is to provide for their families. These individuals mostly live in substandard living conditions in neighbourhoods that are often governed by poaching gangs. Park law enforcement staff, including guards and rangers (Martini, 2013), who are meant to protect wildlife, also reside in these perilous neighbourhoods. This leads to members of the community and wildlife protection staff alike believing that assisting the wildlife poachers is the only way to keep their family and themselves safe by, for example, the identification of specific animals’ areas, waterholes and routes in exchange for compensation (Rademeyer, 2023).

2.1.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

In the early stages of the process, extortion and bribery of government officials are often used to obtain illicit or falsified hunting licences, import and export permits, as well as a variety of falsified documentation [Corruption Watch, 2021; Liberti, 2006; Martini, 2013; UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2011; Rademeyer, 2023]. Officials are often also bribed to disregard illegal and falsified documentation [Corruption Watch, 2021; Martini, 2013; UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2011; Van Dinh, 2012:35; Yeater, 2011]. Of great concern is that these officials may include decision-makers in the field of wildlife protection (Martini, 2013).

Poachers not only hunt protected wildlife but also use the abovementioned methods to obtain sensitive information on facilities where rhino horns are stored and subsequently raid these facilities, negating the need to hunt these animals (Martini, 2013; Van Dinh, 2012:35; Yeater, 2011). In 2014, for example, heavy machinery was used to break into the Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency’s safe, and 112 rhino horns, each weighing approximately 80 kg, were stolen. According to Poaching Facts (2014), 1 kg of rhino horn retailed for around US$ 60,000 in 2014, which means this haul had a street value of around US$4.8m.

Examples of bribing conservation staff also facilitate involvement at this level. For instance, Solly Ubisi and Daniel Chikwa Maluleke, who had both worked in the Kruger National Park for most of their lives, were accused of providing strategic information about rhino locations to syndicates in exchange for financial benefits. They were charged with corruption and fraud associated with wildlife trafficking and poaching (Rademeyer, 2023).

Other methods of criminality relate to favouritism and preferential treatment of friends and family in the granting of hunting licences; the influence of gangs on procurement procedures; and the evasion of national and international rules by hunting organisations to protect the locals (Martini, 2013; Yeater, 2011).

2.2 Runners/brokers

2.2.1 Profile and role.

Poachers sell their illegal wildlife products to runners and brokers, who then deliver these to the middlemen [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership) 2021; SAMLIT (2021)]. Runners or brokers are active in various professions in the source country and may include attorneys, government officials, licenced hunters, property owners and seafood traders (SAMLIT, 2021). The transportation of wildlife often involves transportation businesses, which make use of all manner of avenues, such as water, air, road or rail, depending on the species being transported [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership) 2021].

2.2.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

Attorneys know how to evade law enforcement, while government officials are able to transport goods without fear of random searches of their vehicles and property. These higher-level members of syndicates distance themselves from the physical poaching and maintain their anonymity [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership) 2021]. Official government vehicles are used to smuggle wildlife products, as was found in a case of abalone smuggling that involved nine government employees of the City of Cape Town in 2018 (Geldenhuys, 2020). In another case, rangers in South Africa killed and dehorned rhinos and transported the rhino horn in official vehicles, thus avoiding random searches of the vehicles (SAMLIT, 2021).

2.3 Intermediaries

2.3.1 Profile and role.

Intermediaries are the final role players in the relevant source country. They take delivery of the products from runners/brokers and prepare these for export. Intermediaries are high-level traffickers, who typically act between brokers and exporters and handle the logistical requirements for transporting the products to centres for export [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021; SAMLIT, 2021].

The profile of intermediaries is similar to that runners and brokers (SAMLIT, 2021). However, intermediaries typically use legitimate businesses to hide the products and launder the proceeds of the illegal activities. Front companies include a wide variety of businesses such as casinos, grocery retailers, funeral services, wildlife tourism and storage facilities, amongst others (SAMLIT, 2021).

2.3.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

At this point in the process, the shipment of illegal items is facilitated by bribing officials to provide false documentation and blank export licences [Kleemans, 2007; Martini, 2013; UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2011; Viollaz et al., 2018; Yeater, 2011], and the proceeds are laundered to avoid detection.

2.4 Exporters/importers

2.4.1 Profile and role.

Exporters and importers are key stakeholders in the movement of wildlife items from one country to another after receiving the product from intermediaries, where the blend of legal and illegal activities causes obfuscation [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021]. These role players are often veterinarians, wildlife trade agencies, animal breeders, customs officials, airport officials and quarantine officials (SAMLIT, 2021).

When moving live animals, animal traffickers typically use direct routes of transportation, such as direct flights. However, when moving wildlife products, they typically move the products through multiple locations which have insufficient detection mechanisms (SAMLIT, 2021).

2.4.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

Exporters/importers pay bribes or use extortion to force border authorities to overlook illegal wildlife trafficking by, for example, ignoring forged documents and exporting without a licence, thus leading to an overall lack of compliance and control at borders (Corruption Watch, 2021; Kleemans, 2007; Martini, 2013; SAMLIT, 2021; Viollaz et al., 2018). Wildlife items are relatively easy to conceal in larger shipments, and it is unlikely that an entire shipment would be scrutinised (Martini, 2013; SAMLIT, 2021; Yeater, 2011). An example of such a case involves stolen rhino horns that were mounted as hunting trophies and transported to taxidermists who then transported the horns from South Africa to Asia so they could be sold on the black market (SAMLIT, 2021).

The transportation of wildlife items across borders is facilitated by corrupt government officials and diplomats, as well as the use of front companies [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021]. An example of such a case involves a North Korean diplomat, named Park Chol Jun, who reportedly smuggled rhino horn from South Africa by using his embassy-issued diplomatic bag. As he held diplomatic immunity, his only punishment was to be expelled from South Africa in 2015, as no charges could be pressed (Geldenhuys, 2020).

2.5 Wholesalers

2.5.1 Profile and role.

Wholesalers purchase and receive the product in the destination country from the exporters/importers. The destination country is often the wholesaler’s home country (SAMLIT, 2021). Wholesalers are profiled by SAMLIT (2021) as importers and dealers in pharmaceuticals, private zoos, retail, jewellery or traditional medicine. This creates the appearance of a legitimate operation, as the selling of powdered rhino horn to a pharmacy or wild animals delivered to a zoo does not raise suspicion.

2.5.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

Wholesalers bribe law enforcement to turn a blind eye (Martini, 2013) and pay institutions and public authorities to assist them in laundering the money (Yeater, 2011:17).

2.6 Retailers

2.6.1 Profile and role.

Retailers, as the final role players in the wildlife crime process, market illegal goods to consumers and include pet shops, farms, food markets, jewellers and circuses [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021; SAMLIT, 2021]. The retailer’s profile is therefore similar to that of a wholesaler. No questions are asked when local pharmacies in the destination country sell the product or when zoos trade wildlife. Retailers may further obfuscate the source of the products by buying these in bulk from the wholesalers and processing the products into the products they then sell to customers. Retailers such as jewellers also display pieces made of illegal products, such as ivory beads, amongst jewellery made of legal materials [ECOFEL (Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership), 2021; Kleemans, 2007].

2.6.2 Forms of corruption at this level.

Retailers escape inquiries and obstruct justice by bribing inspectors and police officers (Martini, 2013). If caught, they may bribe a prosecutor to decline prosecution or bribe a magistrate or judge to receive a lenient sentence (Martini, 2013).

2.7 Summary on role players

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that there are a vast number of individuals involved in the wildlife trafficking network. Those at the higher levels of the syndicate are typically harder to detect, as they are not physically involved in the poaching or trafficking, and control events and other role players from behind the scenes (Corruption Watch, 2021). A great deal of trust and loyalty is necessary between these role players, and they pay substantial bribes to low-paid government employees to keep their identities and activities secret (Carr, 2019; Kleemans, 2007; Martini, 2013).

Carr (2019) states that the monetary turnover of these cases necessitates the creation of a specialised wildlife crime tribunal and that prosecutors, magistrates and judges should be trained in prosecuting wildlife crimes. Such initiatives should be supported by specialised training centres in provinces close to game reserves such as the Kruger National Park (Carr, 2019).

Furthermore, the laws governing bail and sentencing for these crimes should be reviewed to classify wildlife crimes as organised crime (Carr, 2019). The cases discussed reveal a long chain of role players assisted by corrupt officials. Gangs of poachers are assisted by law enforcement officials, border guards assist in movement of the products across borders, and the judicial system is crippled by corrupt court officials and legislation prescribing light sentences.

3. Legislative framework for combating wildlife crime

A lack of environmental laws and limited consequences of poaching and smuggling are aiding the poaching of protected wildlife (Viollaz et al., 2018), and linking these activities with the offences of corruption, fraud, money laundering and racketeering is often difficult (Van Dinh, 2012). While there are laws and regulations intended to curb wildlife crimes, many are ineffective and frequently not properly enforced [Martini, 2013; Rademeyer, 2023; WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), 2022]. In addition, certain countries’ wildlife regulations protect only native species and allow trade in protected species from other countries (SAMLIT, 2021), indicating an urgent need for cross-country cooperation and support. While the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other environmental non-profit organisations do attempt to protect wildlife and encourage collaboration between countries and their law enforcement instruments, more needs to be done [WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), 2022].

The remainder of this section explores the South African legislative measures that may assist in the combating of wildlife crime and the links with corruption, as explored above.

3.1 Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PRECCA, 2004) is the primary domestic anti-corruption law in South Africa. Corruption is a major concern in South Africa, with every step of the criminal law enforcement process affected by corruption in the form of bribery, preferential treatment and even state capture (Carr, 2019; Martini, 2013).

The role of corruption in the facilitation of wildlife trafficking implies a violation of both anti-corruption and environmental laws (Van Dinh, 2012). The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2004) therefore notes the importance of cooperation between countries and law enforcement agencies in combating wildlife crimes. The UNCAC states that each country should have legislation that addresses both types of offences to successfully combat wildlife crimes. Van Dinh (2012) sets out the offences that are likely to be committed during these activities, with the role players who are likely to be involved, in Table 1.

Van Dinh (2012) argues that it is important to build a robust legislative framework to combat wildlife trafficking and corruption, as well as to increase ethical standards generally among customs, judicial and law enforcement officials. South Africa is classified as a source, transit and destination country for illicit wildlife trafficking. In addition to creating corruption offences, PRECCA creates a reporting duty in Section 34, which requires persons in positions of authority to report corruption and, in certain circumstances, other offences involving dishonesty. The general corruption offence created in Section 3 of PRECCA is summarised by Snyman (2012:428) as follows:

Anybody who accepts any gratification from anybody else or offers or gives any gratification to anybody else to influence the receiver to conduct herself or himself in a way which amounts to the unlawful or irregular exercise of any duties, commits corruption.

“Gratification” is defined in Chapter 1 of the PRECCA as money, whether cash or otherwise, including a gift, donation, fee, loan, valuable security, reward, interest or property of any description, whether moveable or immovable. It also includes the avoidance of liability, loss, forfeiture, penalty, punishment or another disadvantage.

The specific corruption offences created in PRECCA relate to the following: public officers (Section 4); foreign public officials (Section 5); agents (Section 6); members of the legislative authority (Section 7); judicial officers (Section 8); and members of the prosecuting authority (Section 9). These individuals may receive gratification in exchange for using or manipulating the authority attached to their positions. For example, border officers who are bribed to accept falsified export documents or state officials who are bribed to grant unlawful hunting licences to poaching syndicates. Hence, offences committed by public authorities at all levels are punishable under the PRECCA (Herdieckerhoff, 2018), making it simpler to press charges for corrupt activities (Minnaar-van Veijeren, 2011).

The above discussion of role players in illicit wildlife trafficking shows that it is improbable that wildlife trafficking could be committed without relying on corruption. The PRECCA legislation is clear and concise regarding what constitutes corruption, but enforcement of PRECCA is lacking (Kathrada, 2021). Corruption offences are furthermore punishable by fines and up to 18 years imprisonment (PRECCA, 2004). This is substantially higher than sanctions imposed for environmental crimes. Hence, the focus in combating wildlife crime should shift to the element of corruption and further enhanced by the criminal offences created in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 of 1998, (POCA) which is explored next.

3.2 Prevention of organised crime act

The POCA was created to, amongst others, combat organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities. It also provides for the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activity and the civil forfeiture of criminal assets that have been used to commit an offence or assets that are the proceeds of unlawful activity. The POCA has therefore broadened the substantive law to include crimes based on organised criminal activity, which are often referred to as enterprise-related offences (Von Lampe, 2016:369).

Instead of focusing on the specific environmental offences and their low sanctions (as mentioned above), POCA focusses on the racketeering events surrounding, for instance, illicit wildlife crime, as well as how the illegal gains can be confiscated and forfeited (Aslett, 2018:237–238). The layers of role players involved in wildlife crime, as explored above, often result in difficulty to prosecute those in the top echelons of such criminal groups, as they are protected by the layers of members who act on lower levels of the syndicates (Aslett, 2018:237–238). The forfeiture of such profits is viewed as an effective way of separating the crime bosses from their dishonest gains (Aslett, 2018:237–238).

The racketeering offences created under Section 2 of the POCA target group activity by criminalising membership of a criminal enterprise which has committed at least two predicate offences as listed in Schedule 1 of POCA (Aslett, 2018:240). For prosecution to be successful, the involvement of the accused in the criminal enterprise, which sustains itself through a pattern of racketeering activity, must be proved (Fisher-Klein, 2013).

For purposes of racketeering offences, an enterprise includes any partnership, individual, association, company or other legal person or entity, as well as any union or group of people who are affiliated (Chapter 1 of the POCA). The statute does not define an “enterprise” specifically but includes in the definition individuals and legal persons who may form an enterprise (Fisher-Klein, 2013; Van der Linde, 2022). Such enterprise is unlawful if it engages in a pattern of racketeering conduct (Fisher-Klein, 2013; Van der Linde, 2022).

A pattern of racketeering activity is defined in Chapter 1 of POCA as an ongoing, planned, repeated or continuous involvement or participation in any of the offences listed in Schedule 1. This includes two offences, one of which occurred after the promulgation of this Act and the other of which occurred within 10 years of each other but does not include any time spent in prison.

In S v Green and Another 2006 1 SACR 603 (SCA), for instance, the prosecution demonstrated that the accused participated in offences committed for the enterprise, which means that the accused was not necessarily the person who physically committed the crimes (Fisher-Klein, 2013). This can be effective in prosecuting role players who do not physically poach the wildlife and may therefore not be liable for prosecution under environmental laws. The POCA thus facilities the prosecution of members of wildlife trafficking groups, irrespective of individual criminal conduct.

The offences listed as predicate offences under Schedule 1 include financial crimes such as extortion, fraud and corruption (Fisher-Klein, 2013; Van der Linde, 2022). The listing of corruption offences, as created by PRECCA, under Schedule 1 of POCA is important for the purpose of this study, as it means that the prevalence of corruption under the various role players in the trafficking network can form the predicate offences for racketeering charges. The managers of the businesses, also known as the “kingpins” or heads of syndicates, may be charged with racketeering, as noted in S v Eyssen, 2009, even if they did not participate directly in the wildlife crimes.

Negligence is sufficient for purposes of racketeering under POCA. Furthermore, when some aspects of racketeering occur within South African borders and other aspects take place outside of South Africa, the POCA allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction (Fisher-Klein, 2013; Van der Linde, 2022). This aspect is important because illegal wildlife trafficking often takes place across borders. The fact that wildlife trafficking is a transnational crime gives rise to extraterritorial jurisdictions, which means that offenders may be charged with and found guilty of racketeering in South Africa while the predicate offences were committed outside South African borders.

Using racketeering as a basis to combat wildlife trafficking groups carries much harsher sentences than those under environmental legislation (Herdieckerhoff, 2018). The sentence for conviction of racketeering offences carries a fine not exceeding R 1,000m or imprisonment for a period up to imprisonment for life.

4. Conclusion

Wildlife crime involves a network of role players who rely on corrupt activities to facilitate their trafficking schemes. Often, as in other forms of organised criminal groups, the trafficking kingpins are not involved in committing any physical criminal activity, which makes prosecuting them challenging. Low-level actors are readily replaceable, meaning any prosecution of such role players is not effective in preventing the enterprise from continuing with its wildlife crimes. Other strategies are therefore required to combat the phenomenon, such as the use of legislative frameworks and structures aimed at organised crime.

The reliance on corruption in all facets of wildlife trafficking means that offences created by the PRECCA can form the predicate offences required for racketeering prosecutions under the POCA. The general corruption offence, as well as the offences relating to specific persons, thus create an arsenal that law enforcement can use to establish these predicate offences, besides the traditional environmental crimes.

The racketeering offences created by the POCA target all role players in the trafficking networks, which makes it harder for kingpins to escape prosecution. The elements of enterprise and pattern of racketeering are well defined and the trafficking networks will meet these definitions, thus enabling law enforcement officials to combat the phenomenon more effectively. Ultimately, racketeering offences carry harsh sentences, which may have a better detrimental effect than the light sentences associated with traditional environmental crimes. Using the provisions of PRECCA and POCA is therefore vital to the effective combating of wildlife crime in South Africa.

Figures

Figure 1.

Role players in wildlife crime

Table 1.

Offences related to environmental crime

Article UNCAC	Description	Wildlife trafficking role players involved
Art. 15	Active and passive bribery of public officials (national)	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers
Art. 16	Active and passive bribery of international organisations’ officials and foreign public officials	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers
Art. 17	Misappropriation, embezzlement or other diversion of property by public officials	Wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 18	Trading in influence	Runners/brokers, intermediaries, wholesalers
Art. 19	Abuse of functions	Runners/brokers, intermediaries
Art. 20	Illicit enrichment	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 21	Bribery in the private sector	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries
Art. 23	Laundering proceeds of crime	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 24	Concealment	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 25	Obstruction of justice	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 26	Offences that involve the liability of legal persons	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders
Art. 27	Participation and attempt	Poachers, runners/brokers, intermediaries, exporters/importers, wholesalers, retail traders

Sources: UNCAC (2006); Van Dinh (2012)