Ready for european economic and monetary union? Party composition of government, budgeting institutions and fiscal deficit in central and eastern europe
International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior
ISSN: 1093-4537
Article publication date: 1 March 2005
Abstract
This article examines the effect of party composition of government on the centralization of budgeting institutions in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1989-1999, and assesses the impact of the centralization of budgeting institutions on the capacity of these countries to meet the fiscal deficit requirement for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. The article finds that centralization of budgeting institutions through delegation to a strong finance minister and/or prime minister is likely to occur in one-party governments or coalition governments composed of parties which expect to fight repeated elections together, with effective punishment mechanisms. The article finds that countries with centralized budgeting institutions are likely to be more capable of meeting the EMU deficit requirement than countries with decentralized institutions.
Citation
Dimitrov, V. (2005), "Ready for european economic and monetary union? Party composition of government, budgeting institutions and fiscal deficit in central and eastern europe", International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 40-66. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOTB-08-01-2005-B002
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2005 by PrAcademics Press