Corporate governance and stock liquidity: evidence from a speculative market

Abstract

Purpose

Grounded in lemon market theory, this paper aims to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) on stock market liquidity in Bangladesh, where stock market manipulation because of speculative trading is a common concern.

Design/methodology/approach

This study is based on a sample of 2,420 firm-year observations covering all non-financial firms in Bangladesh from 1996 to 2011.

Findings

This study’s results show a significant relationship between governance and liquidity within firms over time. In particular, within firms, when governance quality increases, liquidity significantly improves. For instance, a rise in the governance quality by one standard deviation decreases the illiquidity ratio by 55.97%. The results are unlikely to be confounded by endogeneity.

Practical implications

The results have important policy implications for security regulators, investors, traders and managers. The results support the current regulatory trend of strengthening CG practices in the listed firms in Bangladesh.

Originality/value

This study contributes to the understanding of the role of effective firm-level CG on stock liquidity in the context of an emerging country. Consistent with prior research mostly conducted in the advanced economies, it provides further empirical support that higher CG quality reduces the information asymmetry problem and enhances stock liquidity even in a speculative market.

Citation

Biswas, P.K. (2020), "Corporate governance and stock liquidity: evidence from a speculative market", Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 323-341. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARJ-01-2019-0005