Pushing the limits of accountability: big data analytics containing and controlling COVID-19 in South Korea

Paul D. Ahn (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK)
Danture Wickramasinghe (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK)

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal

ISSN: 0951-3574

Article publication date: 19 February 2021

Issue publication date: 23 July 2021

1639

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how big data analytics pushed the limits of individuals' accountability as South Korea tried to control and contain coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).

Design/methodology/approach

The authors draw upon Deleuzo-Guattarian framework elaborating how a surveillant assemblage was rhizomatically created and operated to monitor a segment of the population holding them accountable. Publicly available secondary data, such as press release from the government and media coverage, were used.

Findings

A COVID-19 Smart Management System and a Self-Quarantine Safety Protection App constituted a surveillance assemblage operating in a “state-form”. This comprises the central government departments, local councils, policing systems, providers of telecommunication and financial services, and independent groups of people. This assemblage pushed the limits of accountability as individuals who tested positive or might bear possible future risks of the infection and transmission were held accountable for their locations and health conditions.

Practical implications

Policymakers may consider constructing this type of state-form for containing and controlling pandemics, such as COVID-19, while dealing with the issue of undermined privacy.

Social implications

The mass may consider to what extent individuals' personal information should be protected and how to hold the governments accountable for the legitimate use of such information.

Originality/value

While accountability studies have largely focussed on formal organisations, the authors illustrated how a broader context of a state-form, harnessing big data analytics, pushes the limits of accountability.

Keywords

Citation

Ahn, P.D. and Wickramasinghe, D. (2021), "Pushing the limits of accountability: big data analytics containing and controlling COVID-19 in South Korea", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 34 No. 6, pp. 1320-1331. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-08-2020-4829

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited


1. Introduction

Illustrating the way South Korea (Korea, hereafter) has responded to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), this paper explores how big data analytics (BDA) has pushed the limits of individuals' accountability. Recent studies have examined how BDA is enlisted in accountability mainly within commercial organisations (Arnaboldi et al., 2017; Andreassen, 2020). However, we know little about the way BDA has shifted the practices of accountability in broader societal settings pushing its limits. We illustrate this from a story of how individual Koreans were held accountable for containing and controlling the pandemic within their social settings.

To theorise this empirical finding, we draw on the notion of “societies of control” espoused by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who envisaged a regime of accountability beyond organisational boundaries. This new regime makes a segment of population accountable for their health conditions as BDA enabled this mode of accountability to penetrate individuals' body. Simultaneously, this system collected and utilised individuals' location and biometric data, such as body temperature, thereby pushing the limits of accountability (Messner, 2009).

This new system of accountability functions in a virtual space, which Deleuze and Guattari (1987) labelled an “assemblage”, and it operates based on actors' desires (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). In a pandemic situation, a government would desire to contain and control the disease, thereby demonstrating and enhancing its legitimacy, while citizens would desire to maintain their health. We examined how individuals' body was held accountable to a surveillant assemblage, pushing the limits of accountability. Relying on the data collected from the public domains (see Appendix), such as government press releases and media coverage (both in English and Korean), we demonstrate how it occurred in Korea.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on BDA and accountability and elaborates the Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical perspective. Section 3 illustrates how Korea handled the pandemic through a surveillant assemblage. Section 4 discusses and concludes the paper.

2. Theoretical framing

2.1 BDA, limits of accountability and privacy

Accountability, which is usually construed as “giving and demanding reasons for one's conduct” (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 447), has often been seen as an organisational phenomenon, although the organisation interacts with a wider societal context. While the accountability research explored how such systems are constructed, justified and maintained within organisational boundaries (e.g. O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007), little is known about how it operates beyond these boundaries (cf. Alawattage et al., 2019). As BDA exploits information from multiple databases rather than from a single set of information, which is implicitly assumed within the social and environmental accounting literature (Leong and Hazelton, 2019), a new setting is created for giving and demanding reasons for one's conduct. Therefore, we consulted the literature to understand how BDA is pushing the limits of accountability and a related issue of privacy.

BDA has wrought enormous changes to management and accountability. BDA shifted our reasoning from a deductive to an abductive form (Arnaboldi et al., 2017), our decision-making mode from causality to correlation, and our analytical focus from samples to populations (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013). Accounting researchers have examined how BDA has transformed accountability within organisations (Arnaboldi et al., 2017; Vasarhelyi et al., 2015). In particular, BDA based on GPS and CCTV has made employees' activities more transparent and thus enhanced their accountability for their conducts (Roberts, 2009). Such surveillance practices have pushed the limits of accountability as individuals, who are labelled “opaque selves” and “exposed selves” who cannot remember the minutiae of events in which they were involved and are unconscious of this accountability, respectively, are now held accountable to the BDA-enabled surveillant regime (Messner, 2009). Such a regime constructs accountable individuals under “the condition of becoming a subject” (Roberts, 2009, p. 959), and thus those who are now cognisant of themselves being transparently monitored make themselves further subjectivised.

This surveillant regime has been also observed at a societal level. Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier (2013) found that just like coloured young men living in a deprived area are more likely to be stopped and questioned by patrolling policemen on the streets due to higher likelihood of crime, middle-aged men with obesity and hypertension are now charged by BDA higher premium for health insurance with an obligation to get regular medical check-ups. These two population categories are likely to comply with the terms and conditions of the insurance and directions of the policemen, respectively, due to their desire for survival and guilt caused by their biometric features, such as blood pressure and skin colour. In this manner, segments of population can be now held accountable via BDA-enabled surveillance regime for possible future risks their body might bear. Therefore, this practice is pushing the limits of individuals' accountability (Messner, 2009), while the inherent risks are being transferred to those individuals (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013).

Such BDA-enabled surveillance carries privacy issues because it uses (or often misuses) personal information (Fuchs, 2011). As privacy is a social construct, its boundary depends on sensitivity of disclosed information perceived in a society (Davis, 2009). In a liberal society, individuals' right to privacy was taken for granted and highly valued (Fuchs, 2011). Their personal information was used only if they waived their privacy right by voluntarily disclosing their information (i.e. via social media) or giving a third party informed consent to its use (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013). However, the privacy right has been undermined by commercial organisations harnessing BDA (Moffitt and Vasarhelyi, 2013). They access and exploit information on customers' credit card transactions and/or their online behaviours for commercial purposes (Fuchs, 2011). This information might have been originally collected legitimately, but later they are shared (and/or even sold) and exploited often without the customers' knowledge (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013). Nevertheless, people panicked by COVID-19 tend to become less sensitive to the privacy issues.

2.2 Assemblage: pushing the limits of accountability

Assemblage is construed as “a way of assembling or arranging” for an “ordering or arrangement” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007, p. xiii). It comprises heterogenous materials, such as institutions, bodies and desires, which interrelate and alter one another like a rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) characterised a rhizomatic structure as non-central, non-hierarchical, open and continuously moving network. The rhizomatic assemblage operates as a self-governing entity along with other heterogeneous materials, unlike in an orthodox state which is stratified as a form of governance within a “hierarchised aggregate”. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) conceptualise this unorthodox form of governance as a “state-form”, which assembles and arranges the heterogenous materials into a homogenised order.

An assemblage is organised in a territory, but it also de-territorialises and re-territorialises to construct a governable order (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) elaborated this by illustrating how nomadic troops moved from “smooth” spaces to “striated” spaces. The striated spaces, such as a city enclosed by walls, are mappable, understandable and thus governable by an established state. In contrast, smooth spaces, such as steppes, are anthropogeographically amorphous, non-formal and open. Nomadic troops living in smooth spaces continuously territorialised striated spaces, which were, in turn, de-territorialised enabling them to “establish, occupy, and extend” their smooth spaces (Deleuze, 1995, p. 33). In the accounting research, these notions were used to study how the creation and delivery of news is being de-territorialised from mainstream media, a striated space and then re-territorialised in social media, a smooth space, wherein news is constantly assembled and arranged freely without hierarchy or centre (Carter and Whittle, 2018; Munro and Thanem, 2018). So, we understand that an assemblage is ceaselessly moving, continuously territorialising, de-territorialising and re-territorialising spaces making them fluid and self-governing.

Deleuze and Guattari saw that assemblages operate in a wider regime of control, which they labelled “societies of control” (Deleuze, 1992, pp. 3–4). This regime is “underpinned by continuous forms of free-floating control, which…are not restricted to particular sites of confinement” (Munro and Thanem, 2018, p. 72). Instead, the societies of control “spread out everywhere”, creating “rhizomatic movements” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007, p. ix, 67). These movements are fluid and open, and thus humans, artefacts and institutions are interconnected in a decentralised and non-hierarchical manner constructing “a continuous network” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 6).

This rhizomatic continuous network was observed in Korea's response to COVID-19. Thanks to BDA, both structured and unstructured data generated and collected by various organisations and machines were assembled and arranged to form a surveillant assemblage that captured “who is infected at which locations” (Chang et al., 2020, p. 82). Consequently, those who tested positive and those who contacted them can be accountable for their locations and health conditions in respect of possible future risks of COVID-19 infection and transmission, mostly without their knowledge.

3. The surveillant assemblage in Korea

On 19 January 2020, Korea's first case was confirmed for COVID-19, which was initially reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 (Lee and Lee, 2020). The number of daily confirmed cases soon soared and reached its peak with 909 cases in Korea on 29 February 2020 [1]. In response to this outbreak, Korea tried to contain and control the pandemic focussing on 3Ts: fast Testing (testing as quickly as possible), meticulous Tracing (tracing trajectories of those who have tested positive and those who contacted them) and appropriate Treating (treating those who tested positive) (MoHW, 2020c). For our analysis, we focus only on the track and tracing technologies, namely, the COVID-19 Smart Management System and the Self-Quarantine Safety Protection App, which formed a surveillant assemblage. This surveillant assemblage was rhizomatically constructed and operated to hold those who tested positive and those who contacted them accountable for likely risks their body might bear.

3.1 COVID-19 Smart Management System: enacting a state-form

From the first confirmed case, the Korean Center for Disease Control and Prevention [2] [KCDC: an agency under the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW)] conducted shoe-leather epidemiological investigations tracking and tracing the trajectories of those who tested positive for the previous 14 days by interviewing them (Lee and Lee, 2020). As the number of confirmed cases skyrocketed in February 2020, KCDC, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MoLIT), the Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology (MoSI) agreed to develop a real-time automatic contact tracing system (MoLIT, 2020a). Consequently, the COVID-19 Smart Management System (the System, hereafter) was introduced digitising the entire contact tracing process. The System was developed in two weeks and piloted for 10 days from 16 March 2020 (Moon, 2020). The System development speed was extraordinarily rapid because the Smart City Data Hub, a type of BDA used in the System, had been already completed in December 2019 by collaboration of 33 private-sector corporations and eight public-sector organisations participating in an initiative of MoLIT for purposes of collecting and harnessing urban data on traffic, safety and energy uses (Moon, 2020). While Arnaboldi et al. (2017) reported how metropolitan cities often collect and harness a wide range of urban data, such as “signals from diverse sources, geo-referenced social media data, mobile phone data, Wi-Fi data, traditional data and many others” to manage, control and predict activities within the cities (pp. 765–766), the System exploited such urban data to contain and control COVID-19. We observed here that the System territorialised networks of the central government departments and public and private-sector agencies in a rhizomatic rather than hierarchical manner, creating a state-form in an emergency situation to respond to a sudden outbreak of COVID-19.

The fully-fledged System has been in place since 26 March 2020 for epidemiological investigations. Mr Park, a director at KCDC who oversaw the System operation stated that “the System has made contact tracing faster. It gives a lot of help in our response to contain Covid-19” (Policy Briefing, 2020). As the System was considered successful, MoLIT [3] held a press conference (including foreign press) on 10 April 2020 to publicise this success. Answering questions from journalists, Mr Park elaborated:

[The System] allows real-time process of large-scale urban data. Also, machine learning technologies are incorporated in the System…. The System collects personal information of the confirmed cases which are determined by the Health officials, epidemiological investigators…. The information used includes the location data from [three] telecommunications companies and credit card records [from 22 companies] (MoLIT, 2020b).

Mr Park's statement indicates that the System was enabled by BDA and formed a rhizomatic surveillant assemblage. Personal data collected and stored discretely by telecommunication companies and finance corporations were territorialised and then assembled and re-arranged into the System on a real-time basis. Considering that most Koreans use smartphones [4], most economic transactions were processed without involving cash by debit or credit cards, and both mobile phone numbers and debit/credit card accounts are tied to the owners' national identification numbers (Lee and Lee, 2020), this surveillant assemblage could monitor most people's everyday trajectories.

When those who tested positive did not clearly remember where they went and whom they closely contacted (Messner (2009) would label them “opaque selves”), CCTV footages for the “previous fifteen days” were added by the Korea National Police Agency (the Police, hereafter) to the System “to clarify missing links” (MoLIT, 2020b). Hence, the System territorialised the Police to reinforce the contact tracing. KCDC was then able to reconstruct in 10 minutes the trajectories of those who tested positive in detail and cross-check others who contacted them (Lee and Lee, 2020). If a person who previously visited a certain place tested positive later, everyone in that place would be sent a text message advising them to be tested (Bicker, 2020). In summary, the System territorialised three telecommunication service providers, 22 debit/credit card companies, and the Police, rhizomatically assembling and arranging the surveillance information about the location of individuals' body which was previously stored discretely (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Therefore, we regard the System as a “computer that tracks each person's position … [and]… singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 7).

Once the locational information was gathered, it was released to the public on MoHW's website (http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en). An official at KCDC stated:

We share with the public only places where there was close contact or infections could have spread – like where there are many people, where the patient was known to have not worn a mask (Kim, 2020).

The locational information of those who tested positive and those who contacted them was further disseminated in different forms by various parties. Local councils sent everyone within their territory the latest updates via text messages to lead them to avoid infection hotspots, compare their own trajectories with those publicised, and decide whether to be tested and/or self-quarantine. An example of this type of text message reads:

15th foreigner in Jongno-gu (a borough in Seoul) staying at the Somerset Palace Hotel in Seoul has tested positive. For more information, such as their path of movement, please visit our website (Kasulis, 2020).

Local councils sent this type of alert messages using a location-based technology, and thus if one moved from one borough to another, (s)he would receive the messages from different jurisdictions. Locational information of everyone's body was shared on a real-time basis through mobile phones by telecommunications companies with local councils, which have now been territorialised by the System. Hence, individuals became what Messner (2009) called “exposed selves” who were held accountable for their locations not necessarily cognisant of this accountability. In this manner, the System has pushed the limits of accountability of individuals, who were held accountable for possible future risks of infection and transmission that their bodies might bear.

Moreover, independent groups of people further processed the publicly available locational information to make it more user-friendly and disseminated it via websites and applications. A number of websites, such as http://coronamap.site [5] and https://corona-live.com [6] were developed by independent groups of people in order to visualise the official statistics of COVID-19 deaths and confirmed cases and to provide real-time exposure maps, which disclosed the trajectories of the infected patients and hotspots on virtual maps (Lee and Lee, 2020). In this regard, several mobile applications, such as “Corona 100m”, that had similar functions were developed independently. Mr Bae, the developer of Corona 100 metre, stated:

[This type of applications] allows people to see the date that a coronavirus patient was confirmed to have the disease, along with that patient's nationality, gender, age and where the patient visited. The person using the app can also see how close they are to coronavirus patients (Watson and Jeong, 2020).

As these websites and applications were developed independently of the government, the System has territorialised a smooth space of the public, whose desire enabled the rhizomatic dissemination of the personal information of those who tested positive.

At the early stage of pandemic, the fear of infection and transmission permeated Korean society and thus most Koreans found that the dissemination of the personal information was useful and necessary, preferring transparency over privacy. In April and May 2020, foreign media emphasised this preference by interviewing the public:

It's good for people to know if there are infected people visiting the same places that they might go to (a male in his 20s) (Kasulis, 2020).

I think we should provide that amount of information. When confirmed patients occur, both my friends and I go online to check their routes (a male in his 20s).

It is a violation of privacy, but it is necessary (a female in her 60s) (Bicker, 2020).

This preference of transparency over privacy originated in Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, when 2,931 people quarantined, of whom 186 tested positive (the second largest number after Saudi Arabia) and 39 died. Since then Koreans have developed their desire for health and safety at the expense of privacy and personal information, and transparency was deemed a “vital social practice – an exercise of care in relation to self and others” (Roberts, 2009, p. 969). In this context, then government was accused by the mainstream media of withholding from the public the personal information about MERS patients (Kasulis, 2020). Consequently, the Contagious Disease Prevention and Control Act was revised in 2015 to exceptionally override some provisions of the Personal Information Protection Act, which “in principle bans the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data without prior informed consent of the individual whose data are involved” (Park et al., 2020, p. 2129). Since this legal amendment, “location data collected from mobile devices, personal identification information, medical and prescription records, immigration records, card transaction data … transit pass records for public transportation, and CCTV footages” were allowed to be legitimately gathered for a contagious disease prevention and control purpose (Park et al., 2020, p. 2129). In this context, current government highlighted transparency as a key principle in response to COVID-19 (MoHW, 2020c) and the System territorialised these types of personal information.

However, as fatality rate of COVID-19 was found to be lower than expected and thus the panic gradually subsided, there arose concerns about privacy right infringement caused by excessive transparency. Publicly disclosed personal information, such as surname, age, residential suburb, and travel route of confirmed patients was sufficient enough to identify the person (Song, 2020) and making people accountable for a risk of transmission turned into a blame game (Messner, 2009, p. 936). Consequently, as the public concern about privacy violation grew intensive over Summer 2020, the Contagious Disease Prevention and Control Act was revised again in September 2020 to better protect personal information. Now information deemed less relevant to an epidemic, such as surname, sex and age, should be kept confidential and the collected personal information should be destroyed when there is no more need for the information (Song, 2020). These rounds of legislative revisions confirm Davis' (2009) argument that the extent of privacy protection depends on collective sensitivity and consensus with respect to privacy issues in a society.

3.2 Self-Quarantine Safety Protection App: accountability for health conditions

Another component of the surveillant assemblage was Self-Quarantine Safety Protection App (hereafter, the App), which was developed and used by the Ministry of Interior and Safety (MoIS). MoIS developed two versions of the App: one for those self-quarantining and the other for public monitoring (MoIS, 2020a). The App was launched on 7 March 2020 to automatically monitor self-quarantining people's locations and health conditions for 14 days (MoIS, 2020b). As the App was developed by MoIS [7] concurrently with the System, we see a rhizomatic arrangement of the surveillant assemblage.

A user guide and the App published in English by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [8] (MoFA, 2020a) illustrates how it monitored those self-quarantining. When they install the App on their smartphones, they must make their locations known, be available for calls from public servants assigned to them, and give consent to the collection and use of their personal information including their name, date of birth, sex, nationality, mobile phone number and self-quarantine address. This information was then shared with other institutions composing the surveillant assemblage, such as local councils administering an area to which the quarantine address belonged. According to the MoHW's COVID-19 Response webpage, this information sharing aimed “to strengthen the monitoring system” (MoHW, 2020a).

To ensure that those self-quarantining always carry their phones, public servants in their local councils called them randomly once or twice a day, and when the phone stays put for a long period of time (usually 3 hours during day time), an alert message was sent to the public servant while the phone beeping. If they left the selected quarantine place, both the phone users and the public servants would be notified of this movement so that the public servant would encourage the self-quarantine breaker to return to the self-quarantine place. Failing this, the Police would enforce the self-quarantine (MoIS, 2020a). Cases of those fined for leaving the self-quarantine area were often reported by the press (Jang, 2020). In this manner, the App also territorialised local councils and the Police.

In addition, the App users must report at least twice a day (alarm went off twice a day for this purpose) regarding their COVID-19 symptoms such as body temperature (37.5 °C or higher), cough, sore throat and respiratory difficulties or breathlessness. This practice indicates that those who closely contacted a COVID-19-confirmed body had to self-quarantine and report every day to KCDC via the App for 14 days about their locations and health conditions. In this way, the limits of accountability was being pushed as those self-quarantining were held accountable to the App for their locations and health conditions to mitigate possible future risks of COVID-19 infection and transmission that their body might bear.

Moreover, this practice was extended to inbound travellers as Korea implemented special entry procedures comprising post-entry test, quarantine and monitoring (MoHW, 2020c). Inbound travellers were COVID-19 tested upon arrival and, if the result was negative, they were required to self-quarantine for 14 days, and then their locations and health conditions were monitored via the App [9]. Just like other App users, they must report their health conditions twice a day for 14 days from the arrival date (MoHW, 2020a). Prior to the arrival in Korea, the travellers were advised of this requirement by KCDC (2020).

KCDC (2020) emphasised the possible consequences of non-compliance: “[i]f you do not fully comply with those stated above, you will face up to 1 year [incarceration] or a 10-million Won fine (approximately EUR 7,000) in accordance with the relevant laws (the emphasis original).” They were reminded of this by the Travel Record Declaration Form they had to fill in and sign upon arrival. This form emphasised:

If you leave your quarantine area without permission during your home quarantine period or otherwise fail to comply with quarantine guidelines [including daily reporting health status via the App], you will be required to wear a safety band on wrist. If you still refuse to comply, you will be ordered to quarantine at a facility (MoFA, 2020b).

So, the inbound travellers' use of the App during the self-quarantine period was not merely a recommendation but legal enforcement. In this way, inbound travellers, regardless of their nationality, were held accountable to the surveillant assemblage not because of their own current health conditions but due to the possible future risks of COVID-19 infection and transmission their body might bear. Hence this practice also pushed the limits of accountability.

4. Discussion and conclusion

We illustrated how BDA pushed the limits of accountability. We found that BDA enabled the surveillant assemblage comprising the System and the App to be constructed and operationalised rhizomatically. During the development phase, the System rhizomatically territorialised several central government departments such as MoLIT and MoSI, in addition to MoHW which KCDC belongs to, and 33 private-sector corporations and eight public-sector organisations (Moon, 2020). This formation of the surveillant assemblage was indeed rhizomatic rather than central and hierarchical, because, while the System was being developed by the initiative of MoLIT, the MoIS independently developed the App to monitor the location and health conditions of those self-quarantining.

During the operational phase, the surveillant assemblage rhizomatically territorialised numerous public and private-sector organisations, including three telecommunications service providers and 22 debit/credit card companies, the Police and local councils. To enforce accountability, the surveillant assemblage accessed and exploited data discretely collected by these organisations [10], which comprised a state-form in response to COVID-19 outbreak.

When track and tracing data collected by the surveillant assemblage was disseminated, the assemblage territorialised groups of people independent of the government who further processed the data and made it more user-friendly in forms of webpages and mobile applications. This territorialisation was driven by desires. While the government desired to enhance its legitimacy and approval rate by controlling the pandemic, the citizens desired to maintain their health and safety. So, the technologies originally designed to discretely monitor only their own target objects were now encroaching an uncharted territory: the previously taken-for-granted value of privacy. While this leads us to consider ethical dimension of privacy right, the extended transparency has pushed the limits of accountability (Roberts, 2009; Messner, 2009).

In this manner, we contribute to the discussion of the limits of accountability (Messner, 2009). We found that the BDA-enabled surveillant assemblage held individuals accountable for their locations and their biometric attributes such as body temperature due to possible future risks of COVID-19 infection and transmission their bodies might bear, due not to actual infection. It is the surveillant assemblage that pushed the limits while the state-form underpinned by the surveillant assemblage reinforced the society of control, subjectivising individuals who now understand that they are being monitored by that assemblage.

We also contribute to the newly emerging Deleuzo-Guattarian accounting studies which theorised controls in relation to overall functioning of societies of control (Carter and Whittle, 2018; Munro and Thanem, 2018). We argue that it is the BDA-enabled surveillant assemblage that facilitates a state-form in societies of control. We hope that other researchers may explore how this would happen in different trajectories of state-form.

There is a social implication as well. We found that individuals are held accountable to the surveillance assemblage for their locations and health conditions at the expense of their privacy. The mass may consider which types of personal information should be legally protected to which extent, and how to hold the governments accountable for the legitimate use of such information (Davis, 2009; Fuchs, 2011).

Notes

1.

Korea experienced the second wave in August and was going through the third wave in November 2020. However, 29 February 2020 still shows the highest number of confirmed cases in one day. As of 1 December 2020, MoHW (http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en) reported 34,652 cumulative confirmed cases, amongst whom 27,885 have been released from isolation, 6,241 are still being isolated and 526 have deceased.

2.

KCDC was renamed Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency in September 2020.

3.

The fact that this press conference was not held by The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters, the official central control tower, nor by MoHW but by MoLIT suggests that the development and operation of the System was not centrally arranged.

4.

Both the total population and the number of smartphones being used in Korea were around 51 million in 2019 (Gallop Korea, 2019).

5.

The pop-up notice window presents the names of individuals who contributed to the development and operation of the website.

6.

The pop-up window indicates that corona-live was not an official but privately run website.

7.

MoIS is equivalent to Ministry of Home Affairs of other countries, but “Safety” was added to its name because MoIS oversees firefighting and policing systems.

8.

This indicates that MoFA was also rhizomatically connected to the surveillant assemblage.

9.

A small number of travellers, in particular those on diplomatic visa, were exempted from the use of the App. Instead they were required to install another application called Self-Diagnosis App, which did not include the function of daily reporting of health condition for 14 days (MoHW, 2020b).

10.

This finding is in contrast with the social and environmental accounting literature, which implicitly assumes using a single set of database to hold an organisation accountable for its activities (Leong and Hazelton, 2019).

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Corresponding author

Paul D. Ahn can be contacted at: Paul.Ahn@glasgow.ac.uk

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