Disclosure, financial misconduct and listed companies: a critical analysis of the UKLA’s continuing obligations regime

Abstract

Examines the continuing obligations regime imposed on listed public companies via the United Kingdom Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, and how far this protects a company’s shareholders against, for instance, financial misconduct by the company directors. Discusses each of the obligations: disclosure of information, regulation of transactions (including reverse takeovers and related‐party transactions), production of credible financial information, communications with shareholders, directors, and buy‐back of shares. Concludes that the regime is desirable, but there is need to maintain the balance between protection of investors and public without discouraging companies from going public and seeking listing.

Citation

Omoyele, O. (2005), "Disclosure, financial misconduct and listed companies: a critical analysis of the UKLA’s continuing obligations regime", Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 310-326. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790510624800