Outsourcing of employers' responsibilities in the false name of flexibility

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of the paper is to report on an in‐depth study of “pay‐rolling” agencies. Pay‐rolling agencies are a particular form of employment intermediaries through which employers attempt to bypass statutory obligations concerning workers' benefit entitlements and trade union rights, simply by paying workers through an agency. The paper was prompted by the growing amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting proliferation of pay‐rolling agency systems in Pakistan.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper involved a total of 97 interviews were undertaken in six case studies across three industrial sectors with employees, employers, agency and union officials and industry specialists.

Findings

Findings revealed sufficient evidence on the use of pay‐rolling agencies. The results confirmed the anecdotal evidence that some employment agencies are not truly genuine. The evidence suggested that there is a growing trend for agencies to be simply a sham arrangement, refuting the notion that temporary agency work has only been a natural and inevitable response to changes in the economy.

Originality/value

The paper furthers the understanding of the motives and characteristics of agency employment beyond the conventional model of genuine agency work.

Citation

Sheikh, A.Z. (2010), "Outsourcing of employers' responsibilities in the false name of flexibility", Employee Relations, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 495-508. https://doi.org/10.1108/01425451011061658