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Corporate treasurers, in managing their foreign currency payables and receivables, are continually forced to decide whether to deal forward or to wait and to deal spot in the future. The forward market provides a market where, for a price, the risk of adverse foreign exchange rate fluctuations can be sold off to professional risk bearers. The last ten years have seen considerable turmoil in the foreign exchange markets. In this article I want to examine several issues. Firstly, how do you measure the cost of forward cover under flexible rates and has there been any change in the cost of cover of flexible compared with fixed rates? Secondly, to what extent is the forward market a reliable forecaster of future spot rates? Thirdly, what, if any, are the corporate hedging implications of the behaviour of the forward market?

The national objectives of forward exchange controls are to restrain speculation in foreign exchange, to limit international capital flows and to affect the forward exchange rates. Restrictions on forward transactions are economic welfare costs for enterprises and banks, which are analysed in terms of risk‐return and supply‐demand theory. Empirical answers to whether forward exchange control is really necessary await collection and disclosure of company currency exposure, which itself may contribute to the national objectives implicit in forward exchange controls.

It is widely recognized that expectations of future events have significant impact on exchange rates movements. The role of expectations in exchange rate movements can be considered as a source of exchange rate estimation error. In a sense it is a pity that the majority of empirical evidence on the exchange rate fluctuation clearly negates the validity of such models that are more sophisticated and comprehensive.

This paper analyzes the information content of the forward exchange rates implied by the interest rate parity, using the Korea and U.S. interest rates and Won/dollar exchange rates observed during the period of March 1991 to December 2002. First, we test the cointegration between implied forward exchange rates and future spot exchange rates to examine their longrun relationship, and find the existence of cointegration. Next, we examine the international Fisher effect and estimate an error correction model for their shortrun relationship. Our analysis supports the international Fisher effect for longer maturities. Our result also supports the error correction model that states that the future spot exchange rates will be adjusted reflecting the information contained in the past-period implied forward rates which is not fully reflected to current spot rates. Finally, we also find that the term structure of implied forward exchange rates is associated with the changes in future spot rates for longer maturities. Based on our findings, we conclude that the longrun relationship exists between the implied forward exchange rates and future spot exchange rates, and the shortrun deviation from the relationship tend to disappear as they return to the longrun relationship in the course of time.

Following Clarida and Taylor, the term structure of forward exchange premiums can be interpreted as multiple cointegration vectors, if it is assumed that departures from the risk‐neutral efficient markets hypothesis are stationary. This hypothesis is tested using spot rates and one‐month and three‐month forward rates for six European countries during the 1920s floating rate era. Beginning in late 1924, speculation about a return to gold may have resulted in a non‐stationary forward premium. However, except for this speculative period, the term structure of forward premiums was stationary for three currencies. Thus the empirical results presented are broadly consistent with the analysis of Taylor and McMahon, MacDonald and Taylor and Miller and Sutherland.

Whereas the last decade has seen remarkable growth in United States (US) futures business, in the United Kingdom (UK) the volume in some sectors has been disappointing. Although new markets are continuing to appear (such as the Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange, BIFFEX, which opened for business in May 1985), on 31 January 1985 the London Gold Futures Market (LGFM) announced its intention to close and from time to time there has been speculation that LIFFE, the London International Financial Futures Exchange, may not be able to continue in its present form because of lack of business (although the range of traded instruments continues to expand). Some factors that would tend to discourage business are:

Since the widespread introduction of floating exchange rate regimes amongst the major currencies in the early 1970s, the problem of correctly anticipating exchange rate fluctuations is one that corporate treasurers of companies having any international dealings have had to face in order to manage successfully the exchange risk inherent in international contracts.

This essay analyses alternative strategies for a firm to deal with exchange risk. “Profit maximising” and “risk minimising” strategies are examined as extreme alternatives. The former requires successful exchange rate forecasting, the latter is based on avoiding any impact of unexpected exchange rate changes on the firm. This strategy is illustrated using three “typical” firms as examples: the occasional exporter, the permanent exporter/or importer, and a firm with multi‐national operations. In each case, operational aspects are carefully identified and conclusions are drawn as to the necessary structuring of the firms' liabilities.

The link between foreign exchange and stock markets has numerous practical business implications. If international diversification strategies are to be successful, these markets should display low levels of correlation. In addition, understanding the determinants of asset volatilities, as well as their international correlations, are important parameters for the day to day risk management of financial institutions, the risk management of firms operating internationally, and the pricing of contingent claims. This paper examines whether there is a link between exchange rate stability and stock market volatility and correlations. I find that the connection between exchange rates and stock market correlations and volatilities extends beyond periods of extreme crisis.

In a by now classic article, R.A. Mundell demonstrated that an open economy could maintain internal and external balance without using the exchange rate as a policy tool. This, he showed, could be done by using fiscal policy to produce internal balance, and interest rate policy to produce an imbalance on the capital account to offset whatever imbalance there might be on the current account. There have been two criticisms of this analysis. The first, fairly common in the literature, is that it presumes international capital movements are flows. If, as is often maintained, they are stock adjustments, a certain amount of funds will move in response to an interest rate rise, and then to produce a further reallocation of portfolios a further rise in interest rates will be required. It is thus concluded that Mundellian policy in the presence of a current account deficit would have to be not merely interest rates above those elsewhere, but interest rates rising higher and higher above those elsewhere. The second criticism was first suggested by H.G. Johnson, and later developed in detail by John Williamson. They attacked not the feasibility of the policy, but its desirability. They argued that the policy would produce resource misallocation, both because it compels the choice between home and overseas investment to be made exclusively on short‐term balance of payments grounds, and because it distorts the consumption/investment mix at home.