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This study investigates the effect of honesty reminders on budgetary slack. Based on self-concept maintenance theory, the authors posit that honesty reminders can reduce budgetary slack by making people more aware of their own standards of honesty, resulting in more honest behavior. Using an experimental research design, the authors find evidence that honesty reminders reduce budgetary slack. The authors also find that although penalties can similarly reduce budgetary slack, they tend to cause distrust and resentment from subordinates. Therefore, honesty reminders may be a less costly method than penalties for reducing budgetary slack.

Financial reporting decisions are influenced by environmental and individual factors. One environmental factor is the example set by management. Research has shown that the tone at the top is related to financial reporting decisions. However, this does not take into consideration that ethical cues from an employee's supervisor might also be relevant. On an individual basis, people who make unethical financial reporting decisions do not appear to be bad or evil people. So, why do these seemingly “good” people make these decisions? The theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008) posits that individuals balance the desire to gain by behaving unethically with the desire to maintain a positive self-image by behaving ethically. How one balances these is based on one's ability to rationalize an action as honest, with decisions seen as having an ethical component being more difficult to rationalize. Findings indicate that having one person in a leadership position demonstrate a commitment to ethical behavior is related to more ethical financial reporting decisions, whether that person is at the top or closer to the middle. Additionally, a strong tone at the top is related to perceiving a situation is an ethical dilemma while a strong tune in the middle is not. Last, the authors find that a stronger perception that a situation is an ethical dilemma is associated with more ethical financial reporting decisions when the tune in the middle is controlled for, but not when the tone at the top is controlled for.

We present a model of organizational monitoring that integrates organizational justice and information privacy. Specifically, we adopt the position that the formation of invasiveness and unfairness attitudes is a goal-driven process. We employ cybernetic control theory and identity theory to describe how monitoring systems affect one's ability to maintain a positive self-concept. Monitoring provides a particularly powerful cue that directs attention to self-awareness. People draw on fairness and privacy relevant cues inherent in monitoring systems and embedded in monitoring environments (e.g., justice climate) to evaluate their identities. Discrepancies between actual and desired personal and social identities create distress, motivating employees to engage in behavioral self-regulation to counteract potentially threatening monitoring systems. Organizational threats to personal identity goals lead to increased invasiveness attitudes and a commitment to protect and enhance the self. Threats to social identity lead to increased unfairness attitudes and lowered commitment to one's organization. Implications for theory and research on monitoring, justice, and privacy are discussed along with practical implications.

This study uses a budgeting experiment to examine the effects of peer influence and firm earnings position on managerial honesty. In the experiment, participants report production costs to request funds from the firm based on their actual private cost information. The firm’s earnings position is manipulated at two levels, a gain condition and an edge condition, and the authors find that participants overstate costs (i.e., are less honest) to a greater extent in the dishonest peer influence condition than in the honest peer influence condition. The authors also find that the effect of peer influence on managerial honesty is context dependent. Specifically, participants respond to both dishonest and honest peer influence in the gain condition but they do not respond to peer influence in the edge condition. This study provides evidence for honest peer influence on honesty and it highlights the role of earnings position on the effect of peer influence on honesty. Controlling the disclosure of certain peer information is not possible because individuals can learn about peer information (honest or dishonest) formally or informally. Such uncontrollable peer information may be harmful to firms. The results suggest firms that provide managers with the consequences of managerial budgeting on the firm operational outcomes can neutralize the effect of peer influence on managerial honesty when managers’ budgeting decisions significantly affect firm profits.

Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.

Self-report questionnaires are the predominant method used in human resource management (HRM) research to assess employees’ work-related psychological constructs (e.g., processes, states, and attributes). However, this method is associated with significant shortcomings, including the introduction of self-serving bias and common method variance when used exclusively. In this chapter, the authors challenge the assumption that individuals themselves are the only accurate source of the self-focused information collected in HRM research. Instead, the authors propose that other-ratings – ratings of a target individual that are provided by a workplace observer, such as a coworker, supervisor, or subordinate – can accurately assess commonly measured work-related psychological constructs. The authors begin by explaining the advantages of other-ratings for HRM research and practice, reviewing the history of other-ratings and how they emerged in the personality and person-perception literature, and outlining how they have been used in HRM research to date. Then, the authors build upon Funder’s (1995) realistic accuracy model to develop a theoretical argument detailing why workplace others should be able to accurately judge how another employee thinks and feels about work. Next, the authors highlight existing evidence in the literature on the accuracy of other-ratings and present the results of a preliminary meta-analysis on the ability of other-ratings to predict self-ratings of work-related psychological constructs. Finally, the authors discuss potential moderators of other-rating accuracy and reflect on a number of practical considerations for researchers looking to use other-ratings in their own work. The authors intend for this chapter to meaningfully contribute to the larger conversation on HRM research methods. Other-ratings are a simple, yet powerful, addition to the methodological toolkit of HRM researchers that can increase flexibility in research design and improve the overall quality of research.

In this chapter, the authors present a theoretical model useful for analyzing people’s perceptions of what they should do, should not do, and should be allowed to do at work. These perceptions create powerful motivational forces that shape workplace behavior. The authors describe various aspects of this model – a deonance perspective – as it relates to rights (permissible behavior) and responsibilities (behavioral prescriptions and proscriptions). The authors demonstrate how it offers new insights beyond those available from existing theoretical models, and the authors outline its implications for research and the practice of human resource management.