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The plethora of changes in the corporate governance landscape over the past two decades has the potential to tighten governance regimes and influence the preference of supervisory board members vis-à-vis the involved decision-making role of business unit (BU) controllers and their independent fiduciary role. Stricter financial reporting and compliance requirements may lead organizations to prioritize the latter role. However, recent studies support the need to balance these roles, inducing the potential for role conflict. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the influence of a tight and loose governance regime on this balance as preferred by supervisory board members.

This study uses a unique data set from an experiment among 73 supervisory board members. The authors take their perspective because compliance with governance codes and corporate policies are relevant topics for their function.

The authors find evidence for the preference of supervisory board members for “all-round” BU controllers who, irrespective of the governance regime, demonstrate substantial levels of fiduciary and decision-making qualities and deal with the resulting role conflict.

The outcomes of the experiment among supervisory board members provide evidence for their preferences concerning the balance of the two primary controller roles and for the potential of role conflict. The authors have not found studies that provide such empirical evidence.

The emerging business partner role of management accountants (MAs) results in an increased requirement of MAs to make business decisions. Frame dependence cognitive biases regularly influence decisions made in conditions of uncertainty, as is the case in business decision-making. Consequently, this study aims to examine susceptibility of MAs to frame dependence bias.

A survey was conducted among an international sample of practising MAs. The proportion of MAs influenced by framing bias was analysed and compared to findings in other populations. Logistic regression was then used to determine whether MAs who exhibit a higher preference for evidence-based (as opposed to intuitive) decision-making are more susceptible to framing bias.

Despite a comparatively high preference for evidence-based decision-making, the prevalence of framing bias among MAs is comparable to that of other populations. A higher preference for evidence-based decision-making was found to only be associated with higher susceptibility to endowment effect bias.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively examine framing bias for MAs as a group of decision-makers. Additionally, this study’s sample consists of practising MAs, and not only students.

This paper investigates the challenges and opportunities for the deployment of whistleblowing as an accountability mechanism to curb corruption and fraud in a developing country. Nigeria is the institutional setting for the study.

Adopting an institutional theory perspective and a survey protocol of urban residents in the country, the study presents evidence on the whistleblowing program introduced in 2016. Nigeria’s whistleblowing initiative targets all types of corruption, including corporate fraud.

This study finds that, even in the context of a developing country, whistleblowing is supported as an accountability mechanism, but the intervention lacks awareness, presents a high risk to whistleblowers and regulators, including the risk of physical elimination, and is fraught with institutional and operational challenges. In effect, awareness of whistleblowing laws, operational challenges and an institutional environment conducive to venality undermine the efficacy of whistleblowing in Nigeria.

The study presents a model of challenges and opportunities for whistleblowing in a developing democracy. The authors argue that the existence of a weak and complex institutional environment and the failure of program institutionalization explain those challenges and opportunities. The authors also argue that a culturally anchored and institutionalized whistleblowing program encourages positive civic behavior by incentivizing citizens to act as custodians of their resources, and it gives voice to the voiceless who have endured decades of severe hardship and loss of dignity due to corruption.