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Public hospitals have long been major players in the US health care delivery system. However, many public hospitals have privatized during the past few decades. The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the impact of public hospitals' privatization on community orientation (CO). This longitudinal study used a national sample of nonfederal acute-care public hospitals (1997–2010). Negative binomial regression models with hospital-level and year fixed effects were used to estimate the relationships. Our findings suggested that privatization was associated with a 14% increase in the number of CO activities, on average, compared with the number of CO activities prior to privatization. Public hospitals privatizing to for-profit status exhibited a 29% increase in the number of CO activities, relative to an insignificant 9% increase for public hospitals privatizing to not-for-profit status.

It is well recognized that hospitals do not operate in a competitive market typically observed in the economics literature, but rather alternative measures of performance must be developed. In other words, health policy analysts, managers, and decision-makers cannot rely on determining efficiency via the typical profit maximizing/cost minimizing firm but develop techniques that address the issues germane to hospital productivity. What has been presented in this book demonstrates the research in both productivity and policy that must attend to this anomaly. In this introductory section, we briefly summarize the theoretical underpinnings of this book.

Change in ownership among U.S. community hospitals has been frequent and, not surprisingly, remains an important issue for both researchers and public policy makers. In the past, investor-owned hospitals were long suspected of pursuing financial over other goals, culminating in several reviews that found few differences between for-profit and nonprofit forms (Gray, 1986; Sloan, 2000; Sloan, Picone, Taylor, & Chou, 2001). Nevertheless, continuing to the present day, several states prohibit investor-ownership of community hospitals. Conversions to investor-ownership are only one of six types of ownership change, however, with relatively less attention paid to the other types (e.g., for-profit to nonprofit, public to nonprofit). This study has two parts. We first review the literature on the various types of ownership conversion among community hospitals. This review includes the rate at which conversions occur over time, the relative frequency in conversions between specific ownership categories and the observed effects of conversion on hospital operations (e.g., strategic direction and decision-making processes) and performance (e.g., access, quality, and cost). Overall, we find that the impact of ownership conversion on the different measures is mixed, with slightly greater evidence for positive effects on hospital efficiency. As one explanation for these findings, we suggest that the impact of ownership conversion on hospital performance may be mediated by changes in the hospital's strategic content and process. Such a hypothesis has not been proposed or examined in the literature. To address this gap, we next study the role of strategic reorientation following hospital conversion in a field study. We conceptualize ownership conversion within a strategic adaptation framework, and then analyze the changes in strategy content and process across sixteen hospitals that have undergone ownership conversions from nonprofit to for-profit, public to for-profit, public to nonprofit, and for-profit to nonprofit. The field study findings delineate the strategic paths and processes implemented by new owners post-conversion. We find remarkable similarity in the content of strategies undertaken but differences in the process of strategic decision making associated with different types of ownership changes. We also find three main performance effects: hospitals change ownership for financial reasons, experience increases in revenues and capital investment post-conversion, and pursue labor force reductions post-conversion. Membership in a multi-hospital system, however, may be a major determinant of both strategy content and decision-making process that is confounded with ownership change. That is, ownership conversion may mask the impact of system membership on a hospital's strategic actions. These findings may explain the pattern of performance effects observed in the literature on ownership conversions.

Hospitals worldwide command the majority of any countries’ health care budget. Reasons for these higher costs include the aging of the population requiring more intensive health care treatments provided in hospitals, the relatively high costs of labor in this labor intensive industry and payment systems that may encourage inefficient behavior on the part of hospital managers and physicians, that have not been fully mitigated via reforms and regulations.

The health care industry has been influenced by changes in the market structure and new technological developments during the recent decades. With the new technological developments in medicine, some less complex care moved out of the hospitals that led to decrease in demand for inpatient services. This recent change in hospital care created excess capacity in hospital markets, and therefore hospitals started to explore potential financial gains through horizontal consolidations. This has resulted in a wave of mergers in 1990s, which transformed the US, Canadian and European hospital markets. This, in turn, created concerns among policy makers and researchers in terms of its welfare implications.

The long-term financial stability of hospital systems represents a “grand challenge” in health care. New ownership forms, such as private equity (PE), promise to achieve better financial performance than nonprofit or for-profit systems. In this study, we compare two systems with many similarities, but radically different ownership structures, missions, governance, and merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies. Both were nonprofit, religious systems serving low-income communities – Montefiore Health System and Caritas Christi Health Care.

Montefiore's M&A strategy was to invest in local hospitals and create an integrated regional system, increasing revenues by adding primary doctors and community hospitals as feeders into the system and achieving efficiencies through effective resource allocation across specialized units. Slow and steady timing of acquisitions allowed for organizational learning and balancing of debt and equity. By 2019, it owned 11 hospitals with 40,000 employees and had strong positive financials and low reliance on debt.

By contrast, in 2010, PE firm Cerberus Capital bought out Caritas (renamed Steward Health Care System) and took control of the Board of Directors, who set the system's strategic direction. Cerberus used Steward as a platform for a massive debt-driven acquisition strategy. In 2016, it sold off most of its hospitals’ property for $1.25 billion, leaving hospitals saddled with long-term inflated leases; paid itself almost $500 million in dividends; and used the rest for leveraged buyouts of 27 hospitals in 9 states in 3 years. The rapid, scattershot M&A strategy was designed to create a large corporation that could be sold off in five years for financial gain – not for health care integration. Its debt load exploded, and by 2019, its financials were deeply in the red. Its Massachusetts hospitals were the worst financial performers of any system in the state. Cerberus exited Steward in 2020 in a deal that left its physicians, the new owners, holding the debt.

Purpose – This chapter examines how drug prescribing behavior in Taiwanese hospitals changed after the government changed reimbursement systems. In 2002, Taiwan instituted a system in which hospitals are reimbursed for drug expenditures at full price from a fixed global budget before the remaining budget is allocated to reimburse all other expenditures, often at discounted prices. Providers are thus given a financial incentive to increase prescriptions.

Methodology – We isolate the effect of this system from that of other confounding factors by estimating a difference-in-difference model to analyze monthly drug expenditures of hospital departments for outpatients during the years 1999–2006.

Findings – Our results suggest that hospital departments which use drugs more heavily as part of their regular medical care increased their drug prescription expenditures after the implementation of the global budget system. In addition, we find that the response was stronger among for-profit than not-for-profit and public hospitals.

Implications – Hospital doctors responded to the financial incentive created by the particular global budgeting system adopted in Taiwan by increasing expenditures on drug treatments for outpatients.

Although the nonprofit sector is enormous, we know little about how workers there are compensated. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the literature is scattered across many fields including Human Resources Management, Accounting, Economics, Finance, Organizational Behavior, Political Science, and Sociology. This chapter aims to synthesize the research on nonprofits from an economics point of view, while carefully considering the work in the many other areas. In addition to using data from the U.S. census to provide a description of employment and wages in the nonprofit sector as well as a comparison with the for-profit sector, this study describes institutional details in nonprofits, considers why organizations form as nonprofits, reviews possible theories for a for-profit/nonprofit wage gap, performance pay in nonprofits, management compensation in nonprofits, gender issues, and international research.

Bundled payments for care are an efficient mechanism to align payer, provider, and patient incentives in the provision of health care services for an episode of care. In this chapter, we use agency theory to examine the evolution of bundled payment programs in private and public payer arrangements, and postulate future directions for bundled payment development as a key component in the provision and payment of health care services.

Based on the Current Population Survey, 46.6 million Americans did not have health insurance in 2005 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006). Lack of insurance is often associated with lower utilization rates, which may in turn adversely affect health status (Ayanian, Weissman, Schneider, Ginsburg, & Zaslavsky, 2000). Since universal health insurance is not provided for in the US, uninsured individuals must either self-pay or rely on charity care provided by hospitals and health clinics. The majority of charity care is produced in the public sector, either at the state, county, or local level (federal hospitals primarily serve a particular segment of the population – e.g., veterans in the case of Veterans Administration hospitals). Public hospital provision of “safety net” hospital services is particularly prevalent in large urban areas (Lipson & Naierman, 1996). These safety net hospitals are defined by the Institute of Medicine as having an “open door policy to serve all patients regardless of their ability to pay and provide substantial levels of care to Medicaid, the uninsured, and other vulnerable patients” (IOM, 2000). Private not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals also provide charity care but to a lesser extent than public providers, especially since the imposition of cost cutting measures both by Medicare and Medicaid (federal programs that fund health care for the elderly and indigent, respectively) and by managed care. Given that approximately 15% of US GDP is allocated to health care, cost cutting measures are laudable; however, care still needs to be provided for individuals who cannot afford it, and the burden of providing this care has to be borne somewhere in the health care system.