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This chapter analyzes how firms conduct their dividend policy around the world. In principles, firms are free to pay or not to pay dividends and choose dividend levels. However, in some countries, the government requires firms to pay dividends annually in order to protect minority shareholders. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela are five countries of mandatory dividend payments. In addition, using the Compustat database, we investigate how nonfinancial firms pay dividends over the period 2001–2020. The percentage of payers tends to decrease across four time periods including 2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and 2016–2020. Newly listed firms are less likely to distribute dividends than old firms. “Payers,” “Always payers,” and “Former payers” have positive earnings while “Nonpayers” and “Never payers” experience negative earnings. “Never payers” have the highest level of cash while “Always payers” and “Former payers” have the smallest cash reserves. Moreover, Asia-Pacific has the largest proportion of payers but it tends to decrease. America has the lowest proportion of dividend payers, but it tends to increase. Firms in developing countries are more likely to pay dividends. Both the proportion of payers and the average payout ratio of civil law countries are much higher than those of common law countries. The United States has the lowest percentage of paying firms and dividend payouts. Furthermore, construction and wholesale trade industries have the highest proportions of payers and payout ratios. Mineral and services industries are less likely to pay dividends. Tax rates for dividends and capital gains are diverse across countries.

This chapter presents both main arguments of dividend policy theories and their empirical evidence. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend decisions are not relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, there are several market frictions in the real world (e.g., information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, firm maturity, catering incentives and taxes). Therefore, academics use them to develop theories which help them explain corporate dividend decisions. Particularly, signaling theory considers dividend payments as a signal about firms' future prospects since outside investors face information disadvantage. “Bird-in-hand” theory argues that investors prefer dividends to capital gains since the former have lower risk than the latter. Agency theory is developed from the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. Corporate managers have high incentives to restrict dividend payments. Furthermore, transaction cost theory and pecking order theory posit that firms prefer internal to external funds. This drives firms to hold more cash and pay less dividends. Life cycle theory explains dividend policy by firm maturity. Mature firms have fewer investment opportunities, and thus, they tend to pay more dividends. Catering theory states that dividend decisions are based on investors' demand. Firms pay more dividends since investors prefer dividends and assign higher value to dividend payers. Tax clientele theory argues that firms that have corporate dividend policy rely on the comparative income tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Under the tax discriminations against dividends, firms tend to restrict their dividends in order to increase their stock prices.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.

As a financial policy, dividend policy significantly affects firm value. This chapter analyzes how stock prices react to dividend decisions. First, a dividend payment is an extraction of value; therefore, stock price theoretically drops by the dividend amount on the ex-dividend day. In practice, the price drop and the dividend magnitude are not equal because of tax clientele, short-term trading, and market microstructure. Investors are indifferent in trading stocks before and after stocks go ex-dividend if they obtain equal marginal benefits from the two trading times. The difference in tax rates on dividends and capital gains leads to the gap between the price drop and the dividend amount. Moreover, if transaction costs are considerable, investors have high incentives to short-sell stocks until they cannot obtain more profits. The final outcome of this short-term trading is the difference between the price drop and the dividend amount. Furthermore, market microstructure factors such as limit orders, bid-ask spread, and price discreteness also create this gap. Second, dividend announcements convey valuable information to outsiders. When firms announce increases (decreases) in dividends, their stock prices tend to increase (decrease). Third, dividend policy is negatively related to stock price volatility. This negative relationship is explained by duration effect, rate of return effect, arbitrage realization effect, and information effect. Empirical evidence for this relationship is found in many countries. Finally, dividend smoothing is also considered as a signal about firms' future earnings. Consequently, firms with stable dividends have higher market value. In other words, dividend stability has a positive effect on stock prices.

This paper aims to test the empirical validity of the dynamic trade-off theory in its symmetric and asymmetric versions in explaining the capital structure of a panel of publicly listed US industrial firms over the period from 2013 to 2019. It analyzes the existence of an adjustment of leverage toward its target level and whether the speed of this adjustment is influenced by the debt measure, the model specification or/and the fact that the actual debt ratio is higher or lower than its long-term target level.

This paper uses a quantitative research methodology using panel data analysis under the partial adjustment model and the error correction model using the generalized moment method in first differences and in systems to explore the dynamic nature of firms’ capital structure behavior.

The results show that the effects of the conventional determinants of leverage are globally consistent with the trade-off theory predictions. The dynamic versions confirm that firms exhibit leverage-targeting behavior. Although this speed of adjustment (SOA) depends on the debt and model specifications, it is around 60% on average. The estimated SOA is higher for the market leverage measure compared to the book leverage. The asymmetric adjustment model reveals that firms are more sensitive to reducing leverage than increasing it when they are away from their target; overleveraged firms exhibit approximately 5% faster adjustment than underleveraged firms when book leverage is used.

The originality of this research paper lies in its development and test of an asymmetric model to allow the leverage adjustment speed to vary depending on whether the firm’s debt ratio is above or below its target level and the methodological approach as well as the different model specifications used and the insights generated through the application of rigorous econometric techniques.

The scope of this research is to investigate performing loan efficiency for fifty European banks during the period 2008–2017.

The study is structured as a two-stage analysis of performing loan efficiency and its driving factors. In the first stage of the proposed methodology “Data Envelopment Analysis” is used to estimate performing loan efficiency for each bank included in the sample. A bootstrap statistical procedure enhances the findings. In the second stage, the impact of other factors on the efficiency scores of loan performance using tobit regression is investigated.

The results are consistent with the findings of the individual banks' financial analyses. According to the findings of DEA implementation, the evaluated banks may enhance their cost efficiency by 39% on average. In addition, the results indicate that loan efficiency performance improves after 2015, coinciding with the business cycle's upward trend. The tobit regression is employed in the second stage to examine the influence of bank-related and macroeconomic factors on banks' loan management efficiency. According to the findings of the tobit regression, three factors, namely the capital adequacy ratio, GDP per capita and managerial inefficiency, have a substantial influence on performing loan efficiency.

This research investigates the effectiveness of European economic policy in protecting the European banking system from the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis in several euro area members. The results highlight the distance of the Eurozone from the level of the ‘optimal currency area’.

The authors measure the cost of equity to earnings yield differential for a sample of 2,035 non-financial firms. In a series of Logit and Tobit regressions, the authors examine if the cost of equity to earnings yield differential is related to dividend policy in the manner predicted by agency theory.

Agency theory says a firm's optimal dividend policy is partially determined by the relationship between the earnings yield and the cost of equity capital. When the cost of equity is higher (lower) than the earnings yield, firms are motivated to (not) pay dividends as this reduces the cost of capital and holding other things constant, increases corporate valuations. The authors test whether managers set dividend policies to maximize the value of the firm.

The study’s findings show that when the cost of equity is higher (lower) than earnings yield, firms are more (less) likely to be dividend payers and the payouts are higher (lower). The results are robust to the inclusion of share repurchases as an alternative to cash distributions. The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories.

The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper testing the cost of equity hypothesis.