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Purpose — This chapter is aimed at testing the strength of three different drivers to engage in dishonest behavior at work — financial gain, response to injustice, and escape from boredom — and shedding light to the power of individual and organizational values to hold down the effect of these drivers.Design/methodology/approach — We analyze the data of 167 service employees from a large retail organization, who responded to questionnaires which manipulated drivers and organizational values.Findings — As a result we find that the financial and injustice drivers are effectively triggering several dishonest behaviors, whereas — contrary to the expectations — boredom at work does not threaten employers with employee engagement in dishonest behavior. We do find weak moderating effect of individual values in reacting to the drivers for some forms of dishonest behaviors, but the role of organizational values was marginal.Originality/value — In this chapter dishonest behavior is divided into nine specific dishonest acts involving management and customers as the stakeholders whose interests are at stake. We attempt to associate these behaviors with particular drivers. We also look at the moderators in this process: individual and organizational values. To date, espoused values of the organization is an underexplored organizational instrument compared to other situational variables, for instance, the existence of codes of ethics.

Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.

This paper reports the results of a three-year-long research on business relationships, relying on qualitative data gathered through multiple-case study research of four focal companies operating in Australia. The industry settings are as follows: steel construction, vegetable oils trading, aluminum and steel can manufacture, and imaging solutions. The research analyzes two main aspects of relationships: structure and process. This paper deals with structure describing it by the most desired features of intercompany relationships for each focal company. The primary research data have been coded drawing on extant research into business relationships. The main outcome of this part of the research is a five construct model composed by trust, commitment, bonds, distance, and information sharing that accounts for all informants’ utterances about relationship structure.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of ethical climate on the use of deception during negotiation for both individuals and groups. It aims to focus on the use of “ethical climate” as a shared task representation at the group level.

Participants were 458 undergraduate students who earned course credit. Participants engaged in a simulated negotiation task about the selling/purchase of a new car, via an instant messenger program. Those assigned to the “seller” role either negotiated individually or as a three‐person group, and received one of three ethical climate manipulations (honesty, competitive, or control). The main dependent variable was whether the seller(s) disclosed information about a possible defect.

As predicted, groups were less honest than individuals. Participants in the honesty condition were most likely to be honest while those in the competitive condition were the least likely to be honest, although this difference was not statistically significant. Finally, there was a significant interaction effect between size of negotiating party and ethical climate indicating that groups' “default” response was to lie, but they lied significantly less often in the “honesty” condition. Alternatively, individuals' default response was to be honest.

Decision‐making groups have a tendency to compete even if it means being dishonest. However, organizations can help to overcome this tendency by establishing an ethical climate.

While there have been studies published on the effects of ethical climate on decision making at the individual level, there is a gap in the literature on these effects at the group level. Decisions are made at the group level too often to not pay attention to these differences.

The relative honesty of senior business executives is in serious doubt these days, and not without reason. You get the feeling that maybe the parents of a few of the honchos we've seen in the news never told their sons, “Honesty is the best policy.” Here are some other adages that might have helped those beleaguered business leaders.

This study aims to examine how two types of trust affect five key franchisee attitudes/behaviors within a setting where franchisees have strong contractual ties to the franchisor. The five attitudes/behaviors are: identification and satisfaction with the franchisor, compliance and non‐compliance with franchisor directives, and perceived relationship quality. These attitudes/behaviors were chosen because research has found each to affect franchise performance.

The model in the paper features two trusting beliefs that influence attitudes/behaviors. The study gathers US franchisee questionnaire data then analyzes the model using partial least squares techniques.

Trusting belief‐competence was found to reduce non‐compliance with the franchisor, and also increase identification with the franchisor. Both trusting belief‐competence and trusting belief‐honesty were found to enhance satisfaction with the franchisor and perceived relationship quality. Neither of these two trusting beliefs was found to influence compliance with franchisor directives. Perceived mutual commitment appears to strongly influence both trusting beliefs, whereas length of time as a franchisee does not.

The findings support relational contracting theory, showing that even within a contract, trust exerts a significant influence on vital franchisee attitudes. Other research shows these attitudes/behaviors influence franchise performance, though the present study does not measure performance.

The results suggest franchisee trust is key to the ongoing franchise relationship. Hence, franchisors should try to build franchisee trust. They can do so by enhancing mutual commitment and by supplying well‐conceived new products and marketing campaigns.

This study clearly shows the value of franchisee trust and suggests several ways to build it.

Participative budgeting can benefita firm by incorporating subordinates’ private information into financing and operating decisions. In the managerial accounting literature, studies of participative budgeting posit superiors that range from passively committed to highly active participants, some of whom are permitted to communicate, choose compensation schemes, negotiate with subordinates, and reject budgets. This paper synthesizes and analyzes experimental research in participative budgeting with a focus on the role of the superior defined in the research design, and on how that role affects budget outcomes, subordinate behavior, and in some cases superior behavior. We demonstrate how superior type influences economic and behavioral predictions, and likewise affects budgeting outcomes and the interpretation of the results. This paper is intended to further our understanding of how superior type affects behavior in participative budgeting studies, and to facilitate the choice of superior type in future research designs.

Academic integrity is the application of honest, ethical and responsible behaviours to all facets of students’ scholarly endeavours and is the moral code of academia. The international literature reports the prevalence of academic dishonesty in higher education across many disciplines (including the health sciences), and there is evidence linking academic dishonesty in health professional students with future unprofessional behaviour in the workplace. International students are reported to be a particularly vulnerable group. This paper aims to investigate the factors that may be predictive of academic honesty and performance in domestic and international occupational therapy students.

In total, 701 participants (603 domestic students; 98 international students) were recruited from five Australian universities, and data were collected via a two-part self-report questionnaire. ANOVA and multi-linear regression analyses with bootstrapping were completed.

Tendency towards cheating and self-perception tendency towards dishonesty in research, gender, age and hours spent in indirect study were found to be statistically significant predictors of academic integrity and performance.

Limitations of this study were the use of convenience sampling and self-report scales which can be prone to social desirability bias. Further studies are recommended to explore other potential predictors of academic honesty and performance in occupational therapy students.

A range of predictors of academic honesty and success were found that will assist educators to target vulnerable domestic and international occupational therapy students as well as address deficiencies in academic integrity through proactive strategies.

This study investigates the validity of Ferreira et al.’s (2020) Organizational Bullshit Perception Scale by examining its distinctiveness from similar constructs (perceptions of organizational politics, organizational cynicism, procedural justice) and its predictive validity through its relations with important organizational attitudes (organizational identification) and behaviors (counterproductive work behavior and organizational citizenship behavior). This study also examines the moderating effects of honesty–humility on the relations between organizational bullshit perception and the outcomes of counterproductive work behavior, organizational citizenship behavior and organizational identification. Finally, this study examines the incremental validity of organizational bullshit perception in predicting counterproductive work behavior, organizational citizenship behavior and organizational identification above and beyond similar constructs in an exploratory fashion.

Survey data were collected from a sample of working adults online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform across two waves (final N = 323 for wave 1 and 174 for wave 2), one month apart.

The results indicate that organizational bullshit perception, as measured by Ferreira et al.’s (2020) scale, represents a distinct construct that has statistically significant relations with counterproductive work behavior, organizational citizenship behavior and organizational identification, even after controlling for procedural justice, organizational cynicism and perceptions of organizational politics. The results, however, showed no support for honesty–humility as a moderator.

These findings suggest that organizations can benefit from assessing and working to alleviate their employees’ perceptions of organizational bullshit. This construct predicts behaviors and attitudes important for organizational functioning.

This study adds to Ferreira et al.’s (2020) original work by demonstrating organizational bullshit perception’s distinctiveness from existing constructs in the literature and its implications for organizations and their employees.

The authors investigate the joint effects of two environmental variables, performance-based pay (PBP) and performance monitoring (PM), on behavioral dishonesty in a setting where the controls subsequently are absent. In a laboratory study using 88 participants in a 2×2 experimental design, simulating a work environment, the authors manipulate the presence of PBP and PM. Once the participants are accustomed to their assigned work environment and have completed contractual tasks unrelated to the dishonesty experiment, the authors allow them to privately roll dice to determine the size of a bonus gift card. Dishonesty levels are inferred from differences between treatment groups in the prizes claimed. The authors find an interaction effect, where inferred dishonesty in the performance-based-pay group is higher than the fixed-pay group when there is no PM, but lower when there is PM. Although theory and existing literature did not lead us to hypothesize these exact results, they offer important insights into a complex relationship. By jointly examining the effects of worker contracts and workplace monitoring on dishonesty, this research extends the understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. As the workplace grows more complex, employers increasingly rely on information provided by frontline employees and managers. Thus, unintended effects of managerial controls on honesty are an important topic in the business literature.