Search results

This chapter identifies three crisis warning indicators driven from trading in emerging markets’ carry trades, and empirically examines whether these indicators could predict two major financial crises that hit the global financial markets in the last decades — The 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2008 global crisis. The probit regression is used to examine the power of the three indicators in forecasting financial crises, using data from eight Asian emerging countries which serve as proxies for emerging markets, independent of the origination of the crisis. I use both fixed effect and random effect estimation to measure crisis impacts. The empirical results show that financial crises could have been predicted. Probit estimation show that carry trade returns can predict a financial crisis, and the estimation results are robust to both panel level and country-level analysis. These three indicators are by no means an exhaustive list of all possible predictors of financial crisis. The literature suggests other fundamental indicators of financial crises such as the current account deficit and foreign debt. However, this chapter cannot fully consider these indicators for lack of data at this point in time. Although financial crisis may be better predicted by the well-known fundamental indicators, the contribution of this chapter is simply that carry trade-related indicators can help in predicting crises.

This article studies how the Regenerative Government (1880–1903) in Colombia positioned monetary policy as one of the central subjects in the political arena by the end of the nineteenth century, and how the struggles of this attempt transformed the political economy of the period. In the background of the monetary, debates were some relevant characteristics: the country was facing serious difficulties as a consequence of an uneven integration of sectors to international trade, the de facto bimetallic regime, the formation of conglomerates of regions, and the difficulty of implementing paper money. Facing this situation, the Regenerating Governments found themselves in the need of imposing monetary and credit rules. They attempted to implement the scientific rules prevailing at the time and the possibilities that the national reality allowed them. As a consequence, the interests of the merchant elites and bankers had eroded the existing free banking system. Some bankers took advantage of the situation of the dubious management that the State gave to the monetary issue and succeeded on speculative finance increasing their wealth. Others, on the other hand, tried to strengthen their relations with the State. In this perspective, this article will synthesize the main aspects by agents of the debate between free banking and forced course.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

This chapter examines exchange rate options for East Asian countries, taking into account their real economic linkages as well as their international financial relations. Particular consideration is given to possible exchange rate cooperation within the region. For this purpose, the literature on the optimal peg is reconsidered and subsequently extended to include a country's international financial asset and liability situation. That is, instead of focusing solely on nominal or real effective exchange rates, the chapter proposes a blend of “real” and “financial” exchange rates for analyzing “optimal” exchange rate policy.