Search results

Research on Economic Inequality Volume 12 is the outgrowth of University of Alabama Poverty and Inequality Conference, May 22–25, 2003. The motivation for the conference was to honor John P. Formby upon his retirement. The conference, funded by the University, was designed to bring together three groups of people; first, some of the most recognized scholars in the field, second, current and former colleagues of John Formby’s working in this field, and third, Dr. Formby’s former Ph.D. and post-doctoral students. Seventeen papers were presented, 11 of which are authored or co-authored by Dr. Formby’s former students. Peter Lambert and Yoram Amiel also participated in the conference. Dan Slottje, John Creedy, Shlomo Yitzhaki and Quentin Wodon did not attend but contributed papers.

We examine individuals' distributional orderings in situations involving (a) comparisons of social welfare and (b) choice under uncertainty. There is a special focus on whether these orderings satisfy the principle of transfers (the principle of mean-preserving spreads). The results are compared with those of earlier work that was conducted in the context of inequality and of risk.

This volume is the outgrowth of the first meeting of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality (ECINEQ). The Society's aims are to “provide an international forum for all researchers interested in the study of economic inequality and related fields, bringing together the diversity of perspectives.”

The purpose of Volume 10 is to collect together original research papers on fiscal policy (taxes and transfers) and inequality. The first two chapters of Volume 10 address methodological issues in tax progressivity measurement. John Creedy examines the questions of to what extent can redistribution be achieved using a structure of consumption taxes with different rates and exemptions. The paper shows that progressivity is maximized when only one commodity group is taxed, the commodity group with the largest total expenditure elasticity. Generalizing this result, Creedy shows that the tax rate should fall as the total elasticity falls. Creedy illustrates his approach using data on Australia’s indirect tax system. In Chapter 2 Lea Achdut, Yasser Awad, and Jacques Silber propose an alternative way to define tax progressivity as a function of marginal, not average tax rates. Changes in tax progressivity indices are usually defined in terms of changes in average tax rates, while changes in tax policy are usually stated in terms of changes in marginal tax rates. Thus, this paper fills a gap between theory and applied work. They apply their approach to study the progressivity of Israel’s National Insurance tax system.

This paper analyses the principles underlying the theories of risk and inequality, and the connections between the two. Using two experimental designs, we investigate the structure of individuals’ rankings of uncertain prospects in terms of risk and inequality. We examine these individual perceptions in the light of the conventional principles underlying risk and inequality. We show that, although the principle of mean-preserving spreads and the principle of transfers are often rejected a weaker principle, “lowest-to-highest” is usually supported.

We run income inequality questionnaire in 17 universities in the USA. In the questionnaire we examine how students of economics compare inequality of income distributions, when transfers are made between income recipients. The results are analysed in terms of several personal characteristics of the respondents: family income, ethnicity, sex, geographic origin, number of siblings, age, and by ranking of the universities.

The leaky bucket and the transfer principle are tested under conditions of individual uncertainty, behind a veil of ignorance and when positions are known. We find that choices under individual uncertainty are slightly more risk seeking than behind a veil of ignorance indicating that the conventional practice of modeling inequality aversion as risk aversion does not lead to serious error. However, our subjects can not be said to be risk seeking or risk averse but rather protect against downside risks and seek upside gain. As in previous experiments, we find that choices with positions known are quite insensitive to inefficiency and exhibit considerable antipathy to returns that accrue to others, whether richer or poorer. Richer American males are least likely to support leaky-bucket transfers that reduce inequality once positions are known. Lottery players, but not smokers show greater risk preference given individual uncertainty.