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The Internet of Things (IoT) platform empowers the digital transformation of the manufacturing industry by providing information technology services. Simultaneously, it enters the market by offering smart products to consumers. In light of different service fee scenarios, this article explores the optimal decision-making for the platform. It investigates the pricing models and entry decisions of IoT platforms.

In this study, we have formulated a game-theoretic model to scrutinize the influence of the IoT platform ventured into the smart device market on the pre-existing suppliers operating under subscription-based and usage-based pricing agreements.

Our outcome shows that introducing an IoT platform’s smart device has a differential effect on manufacturers depending on their contract type. Notably, our research indicates that introducing the platform’s own smart device within the subscription-based model does not negatively impact the profitability of incumbent manufacturers, so long as there is a noticeable discrepancy in the quality of the smart devices. However, our findings within the usage-based model demonstrate that despite the variance in smart device quality differentiation, the platform’s resolution to launch their device and impose their pricing agreements adversely affects established manufacturers. Additionally, we obtain valuable Intel regarding the platform’s entry strategies and contractual inclinations. We demonstrate that the platform is incentivized to present its smart device when reasonable entry costs remain. Furthermore, the platform prefers subscription-based contracts when the subscription fee is relatively high in non-platform entry and entry cases.

These findings hold significant practical implications for firms operating in an IoT-based supply chain.

This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance (CG) in the earnings management (EM) of affiliated companies in family business groups (FBGs) listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), using principal–principal agency theory.

The sample of 327 nonfinancial firms of the PSX, consisting of 187 group-affiliated firms and 140 nonaffiliated firms has been used in this study for the period of 2010 to 2019. The study uses different regression models for analysis, with robustness tests of various alternative measures of EM and FBG affiliation. In addition, endogeneity is controlled with the propensity score matching method.

The findings show that EM is less prevalent in affiliated firms compared to nonaffiliated companies. The results show a negative and significant relationship between FBGs affiliated firms and EM. Moreover, the results also show a positive relationship between EM and the interaction term of the CG index and group affiliation. It refers to the fact that effective governance cannot reduce EM in affiliated companies of FBGs as well as in the nonfinancial companies of the PSX. In addition, the quality of CG is higher in affiliated companies compared to its counterpart in nonaffiliated firms. The findings support the principal–principal agency theory that CG cannot mitigate the expropriating behavior of controlling shareholders against minority shareholders by reducing EM in emerging markets due to the ownership concentration phenomenon.

This research study has implications for small investors, government agencies and regulators. The findings of the study show that CG code should make it mandatory for companies to reveal information about their complex ownership structure and ownership information about affiliated companies and directors. Furthermore, it is suggested to revisit the code of CG in the Pakistani context of principal–principal conflict instead of the agent–principal explanation of agency theory based on Anglo–Saxon countries.

This research study has contributed to the CG and FBG literature in relation to EM in idiosyncratic settings of Pakistan. One of the prime contributions of the paper is the development of a comprehensive CG index. This research study used detailed, manually collected novel data on affiliated firms of FBGs in Pakistan.