Search results

Using data from the 2013 European Company Survey, this chapter operationalizes the representation gap as the desire for greater employee involvement in decision-making expressed by the representative of the leading employee representative body at the workplace. According to this measure, there is evidence of a substantial shortfall in employee involvement in the European Union, not dissimilar to that reported for the United States. The chapter proceeds to investigate how the size of this representation gap varies by type of representative structure, information provided by management, the resource base available to the representatives, and the status of trust between the parties. Perceived deficits are found to be smaller where workplace representation is via works councils rather than union bodies. Furthermore, the desire for greater involvement is reduced where information provided the employee representative on a range of establishment issues is judged satisfactory. A higher frequency of meetings with management also appears to mitigate the expressed desire for greater involvement. Each of these results is robust to estimation over different country clusters. However, unlike the other arguments, the conclusion that shortfalls in employee involvement representation are smaller under works councils than union bodies is nullified where trust in management is lacking.

The recent introduction of the European Directive on information and consultation and its forthcoming implementation into United Kingdom (UK) law has increased the focus on workplace representation arrangements. This paper examines the interplay between non-union and union representative arrangements at Eurotunnel (UK) and assesses their effectiveness in representing the needs of employees over a five-year period. Importantly, the paper also examines the pros and cons of both non-union employee representation and union voice arrangements. The findings show that the effectiveness of non-union structures as bodies representing the interests of employees in filling the lack of representation is questionable. However, union recognition through an employer-union partnership agreement has also raised important issues regarding the effectiveness, impact and legitimacy of unions at Eurotunnel. The main implication of this research is that the existence of a mechanism – union or non-union – for communication between management and employees at the workplace may not be a sufficient condition for representation of employee interests. Effective employee voice over workplace issues may be essential for achieving and maintaining employee satisfaction. Voice, the right to be heard and having influence over workplace issues and at times an acknowledgement of differing interests may be essential conditions for more effective decision-making process.

In Britain, labor−management partnership has been the fulcrum of the Labor Government's employment relations programme since its election in 1997. The Involvement and Participation Association (IPA, 1997; website: http://www.partnership-at-work.com) − the influential employers’ organization − has been at the forefront of promoting labor−management partnership to improve productivity in UK firms through greater employee involvement and participation (see http://www.partnership-at-work.com). The Trades Union Congress (TUC; partnership institute website: http://www.partnership-institute.org.uk) and several of its constituent unions have also endorsed partnership with employers as a route to promote employee ‘voice’ at work, secure better bargaining outcomes and improve union membership levels and density (Undy, 2001). Union density in the UK private sector has declined from 19.9 per cent in autumn 1997 to 17.2 per cent in autumn 2005, while in the public sector it has declined from 60.9 per cent to 58.6 per cent over the same period of time (Grainger, 2006). Advocates of partnership argue that such arrangements deliver mutual gains to the parties involved, viz. higher productivity and profits for employers, better wages and higher employment security to workers and greater influence over management decisions for unions, which in turn help them to attract and recruit new members (e.g. Haynes & Allen, 2001; Deery & Iverson, 2005).

The effect of variable pay schemes on workplace absenteeism is estimated using two cross-sections of private sector British establishments. Establishments that explicitly link pay with individual performance are found to have significantly lower absence rates. The effect is stronger for establishments that offer variable pay schemes to a greater share of their non-managerial workforce. Matched employer–employee data suggest that the effect is robust to a number of sensitivity tests. Establishments that tie a greater proportion of employees’ earnings to variable pay schemes experience lower absence rates. Quintile regressions suggest that the effect is greater among establishments with a higher than average (‘sustainable’) absence rate. Finally, panel data suggest that a feedback mechanism is present; high absenteeism in the past is correlated with a greater future incidence of individual variable pay schemes, which, in turn, is correlated with lower current absence rates.

Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and/or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we develop a two-period model of efficiency wages in which increased monitoring attenuates the gradient of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.

Using data from a large cross-section of British establishments, we ask how different firm characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from using team production. To compute the predicted benefits from using team production, we estimate structural models for financial performance, labor productivity, and product quality, treating the firm's choices of whether or not to use teams and whether or not to grant teams autonomy as endogenous. One of the main results is that many firm characteristics are associated with larger predicted benefits from teams to labor productivity and product quality but smaller predicted benefits to financial performance. For example, this is true for union recognition as measured by the number of recognized unions in an establishment. Similarly, when a particular firm characteristic is associated with lower benefits from teams to labor productivity or product quality, the same characteristic is frequently associated with higher predicted benefits to financial performance. This is true for the degree of financial participation and employee ownership and also for establishment size and a number of industries. These results highlight the advantages of analyzing broader measures of organizational performance that are more inclusive of the wide spectrum of benefits and costs associated with teams than the labor productivity measures frequently studied in the teams literature.

Utilizing data drawn from 18 in-depth case studies the authors explore in detail the factors shaping employment in a diverse range of Irish small- and medium-sized enterprises. Existing theory in HRM is deemed inadequate in capturing the complexity of HRM in SMEs especially as it treats organizations as hermetically sealed entities. In an effort to animate the criticism directed at normative models of HRM the authors use a conceptual framework with an emergent, open systems theoretical proposition to examine the parameters, dynamics and determining factors of HRM at each of the case study companies. The results show that the notion of a normative HRM model was not coherent in terms of actual practices but rather reactive, and emergent HRM-related processes were often imposed to meet legislative requirements or to reinforce owner–manager legitimacy and control. The authors conclude that an appreciation of the interaction between structural factors both inside and outside the immediate work milieu is crucial if the heterogeneity of HRM in SMEs is to be adequately accommodated and understood.