Search results

This paper analyzes trading and tipping activities in insider trading litigation decided by federal courts from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014.

Legal documents from the US Securities and Exchange Commission, LexisNexis and Westlaw databases were coded to determine profile, patterns of trading and settlement outcomes.

Results of statistical analysis indicate that a defendant in both civil and criminal cases is more likely to trade on the information when he/she receives a direct, financial benefit from breaching his/her duty of confidentiality. The defendant tipper is also more likely to pass on the information to a close personal friend, business associate or family member. The average amount of profit of defendants in both civil and criminal proceedings substantially exceeds the average amount of their settlements.

This paper offers support for the rational choice model – insider trading is often based on rational calculations of benefits not only to the defendant but also to his/her family and associates. Although the threat of civil enforcement and criminal proceedings may possibly deter him/her from committing the crime, results indicate that the amounts of settlement in both proceedings are considerably lower than the amount of profits obtained from the offense.

Insider trading is treated as a punishable offence in many jurisdictions and countries. In relation to this, various theories were developed to justify and enhance the regulation of insider trading in such jurisdictions and countries. For instance, regulatory bodies and the relevant courts in jurisdictions such as the Commonwealth and the European Union as well as in countries such as the USA and the UK have to date developed and consistently applied theories such as the classical theory, misappropriation theory, fiduciary theory, unified theory and equal access theory in their quest to detect, prevent and combat insider trading activities. For the purposes of this article, the aforesaid theories are discussed so as to recommend possible measures that could be adopted by the policy makers to effectively curb insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets. It is against this background that some theoretical aspects of the insider trading regulation as adopted by the Zimbabwean policymakers, regulatory bodies and the relevant courts are scrutinised in this paper. This is done to, inter alia, investigate possible flaws and the rationale for such direct and indirect application of certain insider trading theorem in Zimbabwe. Thereafter, some recommendations in respect thereof are provided.

A qualitative research methodology is used in the entire paper.

It is hoped that the recommendations in the paper will be used by the relevant policymakers to enhance the curbing of insider trading in Zimbabwe.

The paper does not use an empirical research.

It is hoped that the recommendations in this paper will be used by the relevant policymakers to enhance the curbing of insider trading in Zimbabwe.

It is hoped that the recommendations in this paper will be used by the relevant policymakers to enhance the curbing of insider trading in Zimbabwe.

This paper is original research on the theoretical aspects of the regulation of insider trading in Zimbabwe.

Throughout the history of commerce, individuals have searched for informational advantages that will lead to their enrichment. In a time of global capital markets, 24 hours a day trading opportunities, and a professional services corps of market experts, informational advantages are pursued by virtually every market participant. This paper examines one of the most vilified informational advantages in modern capital markets: insider trading. In the USA during the 1980s, insider trading scandals occupied the front pages of not only the trade papers, but also quotidian tabloids. Assailed for its unfairness and characterised by some as thievery, insider trading incidents increased calls for stricter regulation of the marketplace and its participants. In the aftermath of the spectacular insider trading litigation in the USA in the late 1980s, many foreign states began to re‐evaluate the effectiveness of their own regulatory structures. In large part, this reassessment was not the produce of domestic demand, but constituted a response to American agitation for increased regulation of insider trading.

This article examines the implementation of the Insider Dealing Directive, the aim of which is European harmonisation in the UK and in Germany, two European countries with completely different backgrounds on this issue.

The purpose of this paper us to summarize the remarks of the Commissioners and participants in several panel sessions and workshops during the 2013 annual “SEC Speaks” conference held by the Practising Law Institute in cooperation with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, discussing the SEC's accomplishments in 2012 and its agenda for 2013.

The paper summarizes remarks by Chairman Walter and Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher; provides highlights from panel sessions and workshops concerning the Division of Corporation Finance, the Division of Trading and Markets, the Division of Enforcement, the Division of Investment Management, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations as well as highlights from the panel sessions relating to Accounting, Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation. Judicial and Legislative Developments, and Ethics.

The summaries provide an overview of the SEC's most important current rulemaking, projects and policy priorities.

The paper presents current SEC issues and developments addressed by experienced SEC lawyers.

Hypothesizes that the whole concept of “insider trading” is being overplayed. Is the “average” share purchaser disadvantaged? After analysing the case law, the legislation (and proposed legislation) and the financial theory of efficient markets, concludes that insider trading exists only in the strong market hypothesis and only when a fiduciary duty is established. This is not a zero‐sum game in which one wins and the other loses – everyone can win, some maybe more than others. No one is being cheated; there is no way to establish parity of information nor would most investors know how to use it if it could be established. It appears that we could be embarking on a counter‐productive campaign that will punish those who achieve what their profession requires, all the necessary information on which to make an investment decision; particularly if they achieve it first.

The Greek insider trading and market manipulation (market abuse) regime is in the process of transformation by the new Code on Capital Market, which internalises the provisions of the 2003 Market Abuse Directive. The new market abuse prohibition follows an effect‐oriented approach, which, in conjunction with the application of strict administrative law sanctions, is likely to expand the scope of liability. Though, however, the new market abuse regime will facilitate the prosecution of insiders and manipulators, a number of issues are left open to discussion. Consequently, supervisory authorities and courts are required to display particular care in the interpretation and application of the new regime in order to ensure effective enforcement.

With all of the noise surrounding the promulgation of Regulation FD, It will be the subject of many articles and much analysis. This piece gives a background view of the origins of the rule. It also goes into the specifics of the rule. Who is covered, as well as exploring its insider trading implications.