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In 2017, global plastic production reached 348 million tonnes. Despite growing concerns about the environmental challenges associated with both plastic production and plastic waste, recent estimates suggest that plastic production and subsequent waste is expected to double by the year 2035 (European Commission, 2018). To help reduce the amount of plastic waste that litters the oceans and damages the environment, the European Union has recently commissioned a study about the feasibility of levying a tax on plastic products (New Economic Foundation for the Rethink Plastic Alliance, 2018). However, very few academic articles currently exist that critically examine the arguments for or against a plastic tax and thereby enlighten government and regulators on the subject. This chapter investigates whether plastic taxes can be used as an economic disincentive for plastic products and explores its advantages and disadvantages within a circular economy. It explores whether a plastic tax is the right economic instrument to limit the use of plastics, generate design and technical innovations for bio-based materials and degradable/recyclable plastics, create other economic incentives to optimize the value of plastic and its waste collection, and increase public awareness and responsibility. We find that a plastic tax may be a suitable solution as it is likely to influence the design, production, consumption, and waste sectors if designed properly. Yet, the tax should be carefully implemented and combined with other instruments to obtain the desired outcomes and reduce the occurrence of unfavorable side effects.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama continues to actively promote his party's East Asian Community (EAC), which he had as a centrepiece of his coalition government. This chapter supplements an earlier one where I compare the EAC with that of the late South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's Northeast Asian Community (NEAC) and examine the impediments that have been the cause of friction in the region, the removal of which is fundamental to the creation of these communities, and show that that they will be around for a very long time. This chapter concentrates on what the EAC can learn from the European Union experience since both Hatoyama and Roh have stated that it is the EU that has been the source of their inspiration. It argues that the basic requirements for a ‘customs union’, let alone a ‘common market’ or ‘economic community’, will not be realised by the EAC in the foreseeable future. This suggests that the best that can be hoped for is a ‘preferential trade and investment arrangement’, between China, together with Hong Kong and Taiwan, Japan, both the Koreas and the United States, otherwise one must wonder why the EAC or NEAC is needed, rather than the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 that are presently in the making. The problem is that both Hatoyama and Roh have ruled out the United States as a full member while at the same time they want it to continue to provide security for the region when full membership would enhance that. Nevertheless, the vision is admirable and should be desired by the whole world, not just the parties directly involved, so should receive our full support.