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The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to show how the financial power of the fossil fuel industries and the prevalence of religious ideology in Congress are the two major obstacles preventing the U.S. government from taking action to slow down global warming. Then to evaluate various approaches to ‘satisfying our energy needs’, by showing a crucial dynamic behind our insatiable drive to consume energy, and to propose some ways of circumventing the current obstacles.

The approach is through a comprehensive study of the relevant evidence and academic literature, interwoven with philosophical reflections on their significance.

The findings are as follows: a major root of the current problem is the dysfunctional political system in the United States, which is corrupted by vast infusions of money from the fossil fuel industries and the dogmatic religious beliefs of Republicans in key positions on Congressional committees.

The implications are several. The proposed technological solutions to the ‘energy problem’ – nuclear power, carbon sequestration, fracking for natural gas and geo-engineering – only address the symptoms and ignore the dynamic that underlies them, exemplified in the story of Prometheus. If we continue to be driven by the Promethean spirit, we risk being subject to excruciating punishment as a result. The solution to our problems is a transition to clean and renewable sources of energy, accompanied by the kind of reduction in material desires that evidently makes for lives that are more fulfilled.

The value of the philosophical perspective on this topic is that it highlights questions of value that otherwise remain inexplicit.

One of the principal tools in analyzing climate change control policies is integrated assessment modeling. While indispensable for asking logical “what if” questions, such as the cost-effectiveness of alternative policies or the economic efficiency of carbon taxes versus R&D subsidies, integrated assessment models (IAMs) can only produce “answers” that are as good as their underlying assumptions and structural fidelity to a very complex multi-component system. However, due to the complexity of the models, the assumptions underlying the models are often obscured. It is especially important to identify how IAMs treat uncertainty and the value-laden assumptions underlying the analysis.In particular, IAMs have difficulty adequately addressing the issue of uncertainty inherent to the study of climate change, its impacts, and appropriate policy responses. In this chapter, we discuss how uncertainty about climate damages influences the conclusions from IAMs and the policy implications. Specifically, estimating climate damages using information from extreme events, contemporary spatial climate analogs and subjective probability assessments, transients, “imaginable” surprises, adaptation, market distortions and technological change are given as examples of problematic areas that IA modelers need to explicitly address and make transparent of IAMs are to enlighten more than they conceal.

During the great post–World War II economic expansion, modernization theorists held that the new American capitalism balanced mass production and mass consumption, meshed profitability with labor's interests, and ended class conflict. They thought that Keynesian policies insured a near full-employment, low-inflation, continuous growth economy. They viewed the United States as the “new lead society,” eliminating industrial capitalism's backward features and progressing toward modernity's penultimate “postindustrial” stage.⁷ Many Americans believed that the ideal of “consumer freedom,” forged early in the century, had been widely realized and epitomized American democracy's superiority to communism.⁸ However, critics held that the new capitalism did not solve all of classical capitalism's problems (e.g., poverty) and that much increased consumption generated new types of cultural and political problems. John Kenneth Galbraith argued that mainstream economists assumed that human nature dictates an unlimited “urgency of wants,” naturalizing ever increasing production and consumption and precluding the distinction of goods required to meet basic needs from those that stoke wasteful, destructive appetites. In his view, mainstream economists’ individualistic, acquisitive presuppositions crown consumers sovereign and obscure cultural forces, especially advertising, that generate and channel desire and elevate possessions and consumption into the prime measures of self-worth. Galbraith held that production's “paramount position” and related “imperatives of consumer demand” create dependence on economic growth and generate new imbalances and insecurities.⁹ Harsher critics held that the consumer culture blinded middle-class Americans to injustice, despotic bureaucracy, and drudge work (e.g., Mills, 1961; Marcuse, 1964). But even these radical critics implied that postwar capitalism unlocked the secret of sustained economic growth.

As CO2 equivalent gases increase beyond a doubling, there will likely be unavoidable damage to U.S. agriculture. In equatorial regions of the world, damage from global warming will occur earlier than in the U.S. Biogeophysical lags, including deep-ocean mixing with warmer surface waters, can delay the warming caused by CO2 emissions. In this chapter, comparative dynamics trace the path of damage to U.S. agriculture from climate change, after considering adaptation to climate change, technological change that will occur both with and without climate change, and ocean thermal lag.