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The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent and variation in the estimates to which crime can be prevented using patterns of repeats and near repeats, and whether hotspot analysis complements these patterns.

Crime data for four study areas in New Zealand are used to examine differences in the extent of burglary repeat and near repeat victimisation. Hotspots of burglary are also created to determine the extent to which burglary repeats and near repeats spatially intersect hotspots.

The extent of repeats and near repeats varies, meaning there is variation in the estimated prevention benefits that repeat and near repeat patterns offer. In addition, at least half of the burglaries repeats and near repeats were not located within hotspots.

The use of other techniques for examining crime concentration could be used to improve the research observations.

By showing that levels of repeats and near repeats vary, the extent to which these observations coincide in hotspots offers practitioners a better means of determining whether repeat and near repeat patterns are reliable for informing crime prediction and crime prevention activities.

The paper is the first known research study that explicitly measures the variation in the extent of repeats and near repeats and the spatial intersection of these patterns within crime hotspots. The results suggest that rather than considering the use of repeat and near repeat patterns as a superior method for predicting and preventing crime, value remains in using hotspot analysis for determining where crime is likely to occur, particularly when hotspot analysis emphasises other locations for resource targeting.

The strategic intelligence assessment (SIA) plays an important role in contemporary intelligence‐led policing by helping to identify strategic priorities for policing activity, crime reduction and improvements in community safety. Originally defined in the UK's National Intelligence Model, the SIA is produced annually by all local UK police districts as well as other agencies in the UK and internationally that have adopted intelligence‐led principles. The purpose of this paper is to critique the two most common approaches to its production, structuring its content following a “crime‐type” template or an assessment that is based on previous strategic priorities.

The paper's critique is based on reviewing one hundred SIAs from police forces and Community Safety Partnerships in the UK and through speaking to practitioners on their experiences in using these intelligence products to determine strategic priorities.

The paper identifies weaknesses in both, arguing that neither tends to generate strategic intelligence products that are fit for the purpose for effective decision making, and in particular in helping to harness support from local government partners to address persistent and causal factors. As an alternative the study introduce a problem‐oriented approach to the production of strategic intelligence, with an assessment made in relation to place (locations and temporal features), offending and offender management, and victimisation and vulnerability.

The paper illustrates that the problem‐oriented approach leads to the production of a SIA that is more cross‐cutting in its analysis of crime and community safety issues, and more naturally leads to the identification of strategic priorities that focus on addressing causal issues.