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A striking feature of inflation in developing countries is the high variability from one period to another. This feature would seem to make forecasting of the inflation rate a difficult task. This article applies three different forecasting techniques to predict the monthly rate of inflation in India over the period June, 1971 to May, 1980: The three methods used include the more conventional regression method and the newer time‐series and combined regression‐time‐series methods. A subsidiary objective is to examine the empirical applicability of the monetarist model of inflation in a developing economy. It is found that the combined regression‐time‐series model and the regression model are good predictors of the monthly rate of inflation in India. The results also indicate that the monetarist model performs well in predicting the monthly inflation rate in a regression framework.

This paper uses Sims‐Granger causality to examine the causal relationships between (1) the money stock and income, and (2) the reserve money base and the money stock for India. These relationships are empirically investigated so as to determine the role of money in economic activity and the role and channels of monetary policy in a developing economy. Both the conventional regression method used by Sims and the more recent time‐series method developed by Box and Jenkins are utilised in the tests. The results indicate (a) that money does not play a causal role in economic activity while conventional money‐demand functions with income as the right‐hand side variable are vindicated, and (b) there is weak support for the Central Bank's alleged control over the money stock through control over the reserve money base. The differing nature of the results with respect to the two methods adopted point towards the sensitivity of the Sims‐Granger causality test to the type of filtering procedure chosen.

This study seeks to examine differences in the signals of brand quality that consumers utilize in and across different countries. The approach is driven by the practical goal of helping international firms understand how they could tailor their marketing mix to target consumers based on the particular signals of brand quality that they use in different countries.

Survey data are collected from Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and the USA and analyzed using factor analysis to identify the signals that are used as extrinsic and intrinsic cues of brand quality in different clusters of countries. Two major dimensions of signals of quality are identified and used to generate four clusters of countries representing different beliefs in signals of brand quality.

Two major dimensions of signals of quality are identified and used to generate four clusters of countries representing different beliefs in signals of brand quality. These dimensions broadly fall in to those that can be characterized as external signals (brand popularity, retailer's name and volume of advertising) and internal signals (brand name, price and country of origin) with the eight countries clustering in terms of these signals. Thus, Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong and the USA form one cluster with Thailand and Russia forming another cluster while Indonesia and Singapore show differences in their signal preferences.

Practical implications in terms of standardization versus differentiation of marketing mix strategies are discussed. The most important implication is that differentiation of marketing strategies would seem to be advantageous contrary to the commonly held view that international firms need to standardize their marketing strategies in the face of increasing globalization and alleged consumer convergence.

This study seeks to examine differences in the signals of brand quality that consumers utilize in and across different countries.

The possibilities for good governance depends on institutional structures and the economic resources available for ensuring governance. In some cases centralised governance structures are inefficient. In other cases, decentralised structures turn out to be inadequate. In India decentralisation of power to village level has not improved the efficiency of rural development. Decentralisation of power, it is said, by facilitating the empowerment of people in local communities can contribute to more sustainable development. On the other hand, in India, the delegation of power to the states in some cases has resulted in the destruction of the environment. Thus centralised and decentralised governance structure have both merits and demerits. Preservation of the environment which is essential for sustainable development cannot be achieved unless the pressure on forest and natural resources is reduced. This cannot happen in the absence of appropriate property rights of local communities and of rural women. In West Bengal as well as in the central Himalayan region in India it has been found that the disappearance of community control and restrictions on the user rights of villagers reduced the incentive and ability of villagers to use forest sustainability. On the other hand, in Russia, pristine forests are being degraded because of lack of resources of the weak central government. Good governance also depends on appropriate institutions. Corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, inefficient and corrupt law enforcement agencies undermine the capacity of institutions to facilitate good governance for sustainable development. Corruption and rent seeking activities can grow even in an economy which has tried to apply outward oriented economic policies if an appropriate institutional environment does not exist. A state which assumes predatory or semi‐predatory status can systematically incapacitate all institutions for good governance and effective implementation of policies. Thus formulation of policies cannot ensure effective implementation in the absence of good governance which in turn cannot be achieved in the absence of appropriate institutions. Hence, sustainable development requires good policies and effective provision of institutions conducive to good governance.