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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a pattern of interlocking directorates is emerging following reforms in Mexican corporations, and who, if any, are the powerful actors in this network. Drawing on the Bourdieusian notion of social capital, the paper also analyses theoretically the interlocking directorates, networks and powerful actors, and their influences on and potential implications for corporate governance mechanisms.

The data used in the study consisted of 1,442 internal and external board members of the population of 126 Mexican corporations trading on the Mexican Stock Market as of January 2011. Use of social network analysis (SNA) demonstrates individuals’ links with corporations and allows the production of spatial maps to visualise the network structure of interlocking boards.

Using the measures of SNA developed by Freeman (1979 and Bonacich (1972), the authors identify the most powerful and influential directors in the network structure of board members in Mexico. Board members with the greatest number of connections occupy central positions in the network. The authors also find a catalogue of corporate governance scandals. The inclusion of independent directors seems to have had no influence in ensuring better corporate governance.

Mapping out the directors’ links might offer excellent opportunities for policy makers to see how many companies a single director represents, how they share boards, and the implications for minority shareholders of sharing boards, and to understand the workloads of directors in carrying out the monitoring tasks expected of them.

This paper makes an important contribution by employing SNA to illustrate interlocking directorates and the positions of powerful and influential actors. Examining networks of directors from a “social capital” point of view also provides an understanding of why the role of independent directors remains toothless in family-dominated corporations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firm-level corporate governance measures and regulatory reforms constrain manipulation of operating cash flows, an important firm performance indicator.

The sample comprises firms from an emerging market, India, with data from 2005 to 2011. The authors use the methodology given in the paper by Lee (2012) and multiple regressions.

The authors find that cash flow manipulation is likely to increase with an increase in the controlling ownership. Furthermore, board diligence and better audit fail to curb such manipulation. However, the authors do find that such manipulation has gone down in the recent years, and diligent boards constrain it, possibly due to the recent steps taken by the Indian Government for improving the corporate governance environment in India.

The findings can act as feedback for the regulators and policy makers. Potential investors and analysts may also benefit from the study, since they can be more vigilant about the firms’ cash flow manipulation practices and can demand better governance.

The findings suggest that good corporate governance makes managers substitute earnings management with cash flow manipulation.

This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.

Data are collected from the world competitiveness report for the period 2010-2015. To examine the validity of the study’s hypotheses empirically, the authors use ordinary least squares with correlated panel-corrected standards error (PCSE).

This paper offers additional empirical evidence on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Africa. It highlights that country-level corporate governance structures such as efficacy of corporate boards, strength of investor confidence, regulations of securities exchanges and the operation of the Big 4 accounting firms have significant positive impacts on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper fails to include all African countries because of non-availability of a report for some African countries. Thus, the findings on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in a country are applicable to the countries used in this study.

This paper emphasizes on the relevance of country-level corporate governance structures to ensuring a reasonable level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper partially fills the gap regarding the absence of an empirical cross-country study on how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms focussing on property structures in the economy. This raised the issue of governance in the institutions that would constitute the structures in which production would have to take place. In particular, some Central European countries opted for mass privatisations of the means of production, on the face of it so as to have the people participate in the wealth of the nation. In fact, the wealth of the nation depends on the structures in which it is constituted. Dissipation of property rights will reduce the value of the nation's productive capital, whereas an intelligent structure that creates good governance structures at the same time, increases the value of the producing capital. This relatively simple insight lies at the heart of our understanding of how to analyse different processes of mass privatisation. This essay develops a theoretical framework by which different governance structures can be analysed. The framework consists of a blend of the economic theory of property rights, new institutional economics and Austrian economic theory.

The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is related to social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect.

The study applies correlation analysis, difference tests, and regression model to a sample comprised of 369 large firms listed on FTSE Global 500 covering 11 industries, located in 31 countries. This paper examines three country‐level variables, financial development index, shareholder rights index, and strength of investor protection, and five corporate commitment to sustainability measures, Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (direct, electricity indirect, and other indirect GHG emissions), and the corresponding carbon intensity.

The results support the view that the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is associated with social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect. Companies are more willing to commit to carbon disclosure for countries with higher financial development. Corporate commitment to sustainability is lower if neighbor countries' financial development or shareholder rights are high. Similarly, companies place less strategic importance on climate change issues if their community countries protect investors better, notwithstanding their relatively low level of other indirect GHG emissions.

Future research may build on this research by supplementing the current data with more variables such as domestic financial sector liberalization or measures, such as business environment, financial stability, and size, depth, and access. The negative relationship between commitment to sustainability and investor rights suggests that investor rights and commitment to sustainability are singing different tunes. Corporate commitment to sustainability does not keep pace with investor rights especially for countries with better shareholder rights or investor protection.

This study provides a new perspective on the relationship between financial development/investor protection and commitment to sustainability. This study contributes to the existing literature by using five measures of corporate commitment to sustainability based on firm‐specific data using a sample of the FTSE Global 500. This paper provides a better understanding of the relationship between country‐level characteristics and commitment to sustainability in an environment where global integration is relatively high.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the rights of shareholders, particularly those of minority shareholders in the management of firms in Ghana.

As a result of the largely unexplored nature of this issue in Ghana, a qualitative analysis was conducted to offer a painstaking understanding needed. The case study design is in particular relevant for exploring such phenomenon, as it evolves through the experiences of several key players.

Data indicate that minority shareholders’ influence is, in most cases, nil in every aspect of their firms. Whilst majority shareholders have an absolute right to appoint or influence the appointment of top officials of the firms, minority shareholders’ role in the selection is limited. In addition, in regards to control of corporate decision-making processes, unlike the majority shareholders, the minority shareholders do not have any influence on them. Further, in terms of relevant information, whilst the majority shareholders have absolute access to them anytime they desire, the minority shareholders only rely on annual general meetings to get hold of them, thus limiting their access to corporate information. The revelations unambiguously grant the majority shareholders of the firms absolute control rights whilst undermining the rights of the minority shareholders. This paper was concluded by itemizing the implications of our findings for management, regulators and governments.

It is believed that this is among the handful of studies that have been conducted using developing or emergent economy data to empirically analyse how minority shareholders wield their rights in emergent economies and to add to the mounting pool of scattered cross-country evidence.

The preceding article, “The Social Responsibility of Corporate Management: A Classical Critique,” argues that the Shareholder Theory, which the authors refer to as the “Friedman Paradigm” represents the only intellectually and ethically meritorious model for assessing corporate social responsibility. This response argues that the 19th Century Shareholder Theory is based upon numerous factual and legal inaccuracies and fictions when evaluated in the context of the modern era. Requiring that management serve only the interests of the shareholders is morally untenable. The authors’ assertion that the competing theory, The Stakeholder Theory, is unworkable is based upon both a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the theory. Refinements and clarifications about who qualifies as a stakeholder make the Stakeholder Theory both workable and a very useful way to improve corporate governance. Now is the time to apply the Stakeholder Theory as part of the ongoing process of improving the moral and social responsibility of corporation management.

The paper refers to the development process of corporate governance and shareholder activism in transition economies. It identifies the existing corporate governance structure as well as main problems analysing conflicts in Polish corporations portraying the shareholders' fight for control over the corporations. The analysis of several selected shareholder conflicts, referring particularly to the fights of dominant and minority shareholders allows to point out main shortcomings of corporate governance in transition economies. The lack of standards for corporate behaviour, the poor legal system characterized by weak enforcement of investor protection rights (law in action), the practically non‐existent shareholder litigation as well as the development stage of the shareholder activism. Finally, the paper attempts to trace the development of shareholder protection and ethical behaviour presenting the process of setting high standards for the corporate activity with the reference to transparency, the treatment of minority shareholders and the managerial accountability as well as the monitoring role of authorities carried out by Polish Securities and Exchange Commission and non‐governmental associations or business initiatives (Polish Institutes of Directors, Polish Institute for Investor Relations).

Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete. Hence, the purpose of this research paper is two-fold, firstly, to investigate the extent to which the minority shareholders of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius adopt and make use of the various tools of activism; and secondly, to compare the UK laws on shareholder activism with that of Mauritius.

To achieve these objectives, this study adopted the qualitative research method. Primary data was collected by conducting a survey on minority shareholders of Mauritian listed companies to figure out the extent to which they resort to activism tools, while secondary data was collected through a qualitative legal, document and content analysis to scrutinise regulatory provisions and existing literature on the researched topic.

The results show a moderate implementation level of shareholder activism by the minority investors in Mauritius although it was noted that minority shareholders are more likely to resort to the internal tools of activism rather than external methods. Further to the comparative study conducted, this research recommends a more active participation of the Mauritian regulatory bodies, amendments to the Mauritius Code of Corporate Governance and Mauritius Companies Act and the establishment of a commission responsible for overseeing the exercise of shareholders’ powers and promoting derivative lawsuits among minority shareholders.

Few researchers like Beebeejaun and Koobloll (2018) analysed shareholder activism through the lens of corporate governance with the view of providing recommendations to bring amendments in the Mauritian corporate law landscape. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has yet been effectuated on the extent to which shareholder activism is practised by the minority investors in developing countries, for which this existing study aims at filling in the research gap.

The aim of this paper is to investigate how top management is constructed as a good steward of its company at the annual general meeting (AGM) and how accounting is used in the course of this process.

To meet these aims the authors attended 36 AGMs of Swedish listed companies. The interactions that occurred at the AGMs were analysed, using the theory of translation.

One‐third of all questions dealt with financial accounting issues, while the majority of the questions concerned non‐financial aspects of stewardship, i.e. company's efforts regarding environmental, equality and ethical issues.

There is some concern that the complexity of accounting information may make shareholders feel remote from the company. However, AGMs provide a setting where the financial accounts can be complemented with verbal explanations and visual aids. This contextualizes the financial accounts and makes them understandable to an audience that includes many private investors. This contributed to the fact that accounting was discussed, questioned and referred to. Hence, accounting enables the stewardship function of the AGM.

Although AGMs have been the subject of criticism, they are still an important part of the corporate governance system. Since AGMs are live events, shareholders are able to pursue a topic with further questions, an option that is not available to other modes of corporate communication.

Whereas the AGM has been in the foreground in government inquiries and codes of conduct, it has been largely neglected in accounting research.