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Purpose – This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001–2010.

Design/methodology/approach – We use a direct method to gauge controlling shareholders’ tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders, and we present a simple model to link corporate governance and the degree of entrenchment by the largest shareholder. We use both Logit and Probit models to predict the likelihood of tunneling and use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression to address the endogeneity issues.

Findings – There are significant deterioration effects between controlling shareholder's tunneling and firm performance. Firms with more tunneling activities typically have larger controlling ownership, greater evidence of state control, less balance of power among large shareholders, and weaker board characteristics.

Research limitations/implications – The positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation implies that the controlling shareholder might divert personal benefits from the public firms at the expense of minority shareholders.

Originality/value – We focus on the effects of corporate governance restructuring on executive compensation and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in the Chinese context, and we also investigate whether these effects are stronger with the involvement of state ownership. We empirically address the issues between executive compensation and expropriation of minority shareholders.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

This chapter analyzes and discusses the empirical results of the study. The discussion is organized under the following themes: independent director, audit committee, auditor independence, corporate code of conduct, adoption of IFRS, and measures for improvement. Three main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the current institutional environment does not yet fully support the Anglo-American practices. Second, in recent years the quality of financial reporting has improved considerably, which is largely attributable to strengthened accounting rules and regulations. However, the imported Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting, except for enhancing auditor independence, have had only a minor impact on financial reporting quality. Third, although the imported practices are not working as intended, the vast majority of interviewees stated that it was appropriate to move toward internationally acceptable principles and standards. Improving laws and regulations seems to be the main measure for rendering the institutional environment in China more supportive of Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting.

This chapter describes how governments and regulators could introduce selective de-regulation based on exempting corporations from existing practices when they amend their constitutions to provide superior outcomes for investors and other stakeholders. An example is presented on how a company efficiently raised new equity through constitutional changes that also allowed the regulator to exempt it from the compliance processes and costs of changing auditors. System science is used to argue that the introduction of self-enforcing co-regulation based on outcomes rather than practices could introduce competition for developing the most efficient and effective regulation by both companies and regulators.

Corporate governance plays a decisive role in the financial performance of a firm. While the majority of the firms in China and India are owned and managed by its promoters, the present study attempts to examine the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics on firm value for these two economies. The study employs panel data methodology with industry and time fixed effects on a sample of 1,042 firms listed in National Stock Exchange of India and 450 firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange of China. The study finds promoter ownerships to positively impact a firm’s value creation process, while institutional investors exert a negative influence. Although CEO duality enhances firm value in China, the results show otherwise for Indian firms. Additionally, while board independence is positively correlated to firm value in India, it has a negative effect on firms in China. Finally, the study finds that larger board size contributes favorably toward better decision making.

Businesses are now under more pressure from society, legislatures, and other stakeholders to act responsibly since there is a deeper understanding of how businesses affect society globally. Whether a company environmental policy is actively pursued or passively approved, boards are ultimately in charge of it. Hence, the aim of the study is to investigate the influence of the board of directors’ characteristics, namely board size, meetings, independence, gender diversity, and qualification, on environmental disclosure. The study covers all listed manufacturing companies in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain for the years 2018–2022. The study expects that the board of directors’ characteristics should have a significant impact on enhancing the environmental disclosure. The finding of the study will add a vital contribution to the literature as it is the first study to be conducted in a developing country, such as Bahrain, where no study has yet been conducted there. The finding will help different parties, for example, policy makers, regulators, and shareholders as well as managers on the effect of the board of directors on the level of high quality in environmental disclosure that will build a good reputation for companies.

This chapter assesses the effects of corporate governance (CG) variables on the level of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD), Shari'ah Supervisory Board Disclosure (SSBD), and Financial Disclosure (FD) for Islamic banks. This study, based on a sample of 95 Islamic banks, assessed this in 2013. The findings suggest that CG mechanisms, firm's age, auditor and shari'ah auditing department are effective in influencing SSBD, CSRD, and FD practices in Islamic banks. This chapter encourages regulators to improve CG mechanisms in their Islamic banking systems through the optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) and the board's characteristics in order to promote transparency and disclosure. Moreover, the findings support theoretical arguments that firms disclose CG information in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported financial statements. The empirical evidence of this study enhances the understanding of the CG disclosure environment in Islamic banks as a promoting new financial system.