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This paper seeks to give consideration to the family imprint on governance in the context of firms experiencing economic recession. It aims to rely on agency and stewardship theories to empirically examine the relationship between CEO duality and slack resources on family firm performance during economic recession.

Trend analyses were used employing hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to evaluate the influence of duality and slack resources on the performance of 75 family‐controlled public firms (FCPFs) during the 2001‐2002 US economic recession and recovery.

The results indicate that duality and slack by themselves do not influence firm performance. However, family firms with a combined CEO‐chair and ample slack resources experience enhanced performance both at the onset of recession and at its conclusion. The findings suggest that a unified leadership and access to slack provide the family with the means to weather economic hardship. The paper makes the case that the stewardship afforded by this combination provides clear benefits to outside shareholders.

The absolute leadership and decision‐making control afforded to a CEO‐chair who also holds the reins over firm resources helps to favorably position the business and ease its course through difficult times. The results of this paper suggest that what is good for the family may also be good for other stakeholders in the firm, in this case non‐family shareholders.

With this study, attention is drawn to the governance of family businesses during times of economic duress. To the authors' knowledge, this study represents the only empirical investigation into family firm governance within this unique, albeit prevalent context.

This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

In this paper, the authors build a prescriptive framework for managers to help assess potential shifts in consumer behavior during economic recession. The framework offers a guide to help evaluate the extent of customer attrition risks, and to devise customer‐centric strategies to stabilize businesses in light of recessionary demand shocks.

The framework is built based on insights gained from surveying approximately 500 small, medium‐sized, and large businesses during the 2001‐2002 and 2007‐present recession. The executives surveyed worked in a wide array of industries, at organizations that varied in size from one person to thousands of employees.

The framework suggests that the interaction between two consumer behavior dynamics – lock‐in and utility specificity – determines the extent of customer retention and attrition to businesses experiencing recession. As such, all organizations need to assess the likelihood that their customers will alter their purchases in response to recessionary pressures. The authors provide measures to help managers anticipate shifts in buying behavior and formulate appropriate responses for customer retention and acquisition.

Research on effective management strategies for coping with recessions remains one of the most important but nevertheless overlooked areas in strategic management. In most instances, prescriptions fall under two broad categories – i.e. seek out inefficiencies and reduce costs. The authors contend that for companies to successfully navigate recessionary environments they need to reach beyond efficiency measures to also adopt strategies minimizing customer loss during the recession and luring back buyers post‐recession. The authors offer insights to help managers evaluate customer acquisition and retention recession.

The purpose of the study is to explore the board of directors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) as a distinct source of value creation and to conceptually investigate the going‐private transaction via LBO as a response to deficient governance structures as well as the post‐buyout board restructuring.

The paper provides a review of the literature on LBOs boards, and relies on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop testable propositions. The work suggests that the board as a particular source of efficiency gains in LBOs warrants further empirical research.

The paper gives strong credence to the argument that boards represent a unique source of value creation in LBOs. Previous agency‐theoretic work is complemented by focusing on the monitoring function of the board, but resource dependence theory introduced to suggest the importance of a strategic service and support function. The work is conceptual in nature and thus requires subsequent empirical testing to verify assertions set forth in this study.

The paper shows that incentives of managerial equity participation and the discipline of debt are gradually losing their distinctiveness in today's buyout industry. To compete in an increasingly crowded environment, LBO specialists need to identify new sources of value to generate attractive returns for their investors.

The paper extends the existing LBO literature by introducing resource dependent as a complementary framework. Given that the traditional LBO literature examines the discipline of debt and managerial ownership that explain their efficiencies, the role of LBO boards as a distinct value creation mechanism in buyouts is introduced.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐17; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐17; Property Management Volumes 8‐17; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐17.