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The first Research in Labor Economics (RLE) volume was published in 1977. Its founding editor, Ronald Ehrenberg, saw the need for high quality substantive research papers in the labor/human resource area. Each volume was to contain “original contributions comparable (or exceeding) those found in leading journals.” The articles were of three genres: (1) results from ongoing or completed important research endeavors, (2) critical survey articles, and (3) symposia on policy related topics (RLE, Vol. 1, p. vii). In 1995, Solomon Polachek took over as series editor. Beginning in 2007 RLE affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), an international network of about 1,100 labor economists spanning more than 40 countries. Konstantinos Tatsiramos became the IZA coeditor in 2008 after taking over from Olivier Bargain. Finally in 2011 RLE established an editorial board consisting of Orley C. Ashenfelter, Francine D. Blau, Richard Blundell, David Card, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard B. Freeman, Daniel S. Hamermesh, James J. Heckman, Alan B. Krueger, Edward P. Lazear, Christopher A. Pissarides, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Two are Nobel Laureates and all are top labor economists.

The institution of an annual series devoted to current and ongoing research in economics and business should be considered one of the notable developments during the period under review. Long standing need for such a reference not withstanding, there has been until this year no systematic attempt to organize a continuing series which concentrated on selected areas of ongoing research, especially adapted to the Jahrbucher format. By facilitating the publication of research papers which are longer than the conventional journal‐length article yet shorter than a monograph, publishing outlets available to scholars in the field have been infinitely expanded. Two years ago, the Royal Economic Society and the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain, developed an experimental series, published by Macmillan, entitled Surveys of Applied Economics. The JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., has now come out with an annual series, which is expected to fill the gaps in at least seventeen areas of economic theory and business. These are briefly listed below, with pertinent bibliographical citations: Research in Economic Anthropology: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, George Dalton. vol. 1. Sept. 1977‐ $22.00 ISBN 0‐89232‐040‐9; Research in Economic History: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Paul Uselding. vol. 1. Sept. 1976‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐001‐X; Research in Health Economics: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Richard M. Scheffler. vol. 1. Sept. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐042‐7; Research in Human Capital and Development: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Ismail Sirageldin. vol. 1. June/July 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐019‐2; Research in International Business and Finance: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Robert G. Hawkins. vol. 1. May/June 1977‐ $23.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐031‐1; Research in Labor Economics: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Ronald G. Ehrenberg. vol. 1. March 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐017‐6; Research in Law and Economics: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Richard O. Zerbe. vol. 1. Sept. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐028‐1; Research in Marketing: An Annual Compilation in Research. Series editor, Jagdish N. Sheth. vol. 1. June 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐041‐9; Research in Philosophy and Technology: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Paul T. Durbin. vol. 1. March 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐022‐2; Research in Political Economy: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Paul Zarembka. vol. 1. Sept. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐020‐6; Research in Population Economics: An Annual Compilation of Research. Series editor, Julian L. Simon. vol. 1. April 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐018‐4; Applications of Management Science. Series editor, Matthew J. Sobel. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50. ISBN 0‐89232‐023‐0; Research in Econometrics. Series editor, Dennis J. Aigner. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐039‐7; Research in Experimental Economics. Series editor, Vernon L. Smith. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐030‐3; Research in Finance. Series editor, Haim Levy. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐043‐5; Research in Organizational Behavior. Series editor, Barry Staw. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐045‐1; Research in Public Policy and Management. Series editor, Colin Blaydon. vol. 1. 1977‐ $22.50 ISBN 0‐89232‐044‐3.

We evaluate potential determinants of enrollment in an early retirement incentive program for non-tenure-track employees at a large university. Using administrative records on the eligible population of employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, historical employee count and layoff data by budget units, and public information on unit budgets, we find dips in per-employee finances in a budget unit during the application year, and higher recent per employee layoffs were associated with increased probabilities of eligible employee program enrollment. Our results also suggest that, on average, employees whose salaries are lower than we would predict given their personal characteristics and job titles were more likely to enroll in the early retirement program. To the extent that employees’ compensation reflect their productivity, as it should under a pay system in which annual salary increases are based on merit, this finding suggests that adverse selection was not a problem with the program. That is, we find no evidence that on average the “most productive” employees took the incentive.

Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the productivity of individual managers. We find performance contingent contracts may result in a separating equilibrium in which high productivity managers accept contracts low productivity managers find unacceptable.

Although most labor and microeconomic textbooks contain a theoretical discussion of the backward‐bending labor supply curve, scant empirical evidence of this phenomenon exists. In this paper we investigate the behavior of PGA golf professionals as they make labor‐leisure choices for performing on the PGA Tour. Using tournament theory to model this labor market and data from tournament performances over three seperate years, we find significant evidence that higher paid PGA Tour players do indeed operate in the backward‐bending region of their labor supply curves.

The purpose of the chapter is to develop a typology of bad behaviors characteristic of governing boards and to compare the bad behaviors identified in the typology to the governing boards’ expected roles and responsibilities. Several examples of bad governing board behaviors that have occurred at historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) are explored through the lens of the typology. The author argues that the bad behavior of governing boards responsible for the nations’ HBCUs inhibits strategic planning, undermines growth and development, and threatens the long-term viability of these institutions. Finally, recommendations intended to minimize the impact of bad board behaviors are proposed.