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1 – 10 of over 4000The purpose of this paper is to explain the final version of the Remuneration Code, published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in December 2010, which deals with…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explain the final version of the Remuneration Code, published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in December 2010, which deals with remuneration in the financial services industry and incorporates requirements contained in the latest version of the European Union (EU) Capital Requirements Directive (CRD3).
Design/methodology/approach
The paper gives an overview of the Code, focusing on its scope; the deadlines for compliance; the constraints on variable remuneration; the proportional application of the Code through the division of businesses covered by the Code into four tiers, each with different compliance requirements; and voiding provisions – i.e. provisions which render certain contractual terms on variable remuneration void if they breach Code requirements. It also summarizes the related and new obligations on disclosure of remuneration, which were published by the FSA at the same time as the Code.
Findings
The overriding objective of the Code is to ensure that remuneration policies, procedures and practices do not undermine effective risk management.
Practical implications
Now the details have been published and deadlines for compliance set, it is imperative that those in the financial services industry with UK operations, whether in the UK or elsewhere, start taking steps straightaway to ensure that their remuneration policies, practices and procedures are compliant with the new regulatory regime.
Originality/value
The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.
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This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the two approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of directors’ remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors’ remuneration.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and the challenges it face in regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges faced.
Findings
The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.
Originality/value
The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors’ remuneration can be effective in the UK.
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This paper aims to explore the role corporate personality has played in the battle between executive remuneration and fairness, which is linked to rewarding performance. This…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to explore the role corporate personality has played in the battle between executive remuneration and fairness, which is linked to rewarding performance. This paper also aims to explore some of the policy measures taken by the UK Government to curb excessive remuneration especially in the banking sector.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper employs an analytical approach. An analytical approach relies on the collection of new information upon which to base any conclusions. The research supports the arguments being made in the paper.
Findings
The paper shows how the ruling in Salomon, over a century ago, that cemented corporate personality and limited liability in the UK, is hampering many of the measures aimed at rewarding performance and promoting fairness in relation to executive remuneration.
Originality/value
Limited research has been done on executive remuneration. Since executive pay has recently hit the media agenda, this paper purports to tackle a current and ongoing issue.
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Philip J. Morgan and Neil Nick Robson
The purpose of this paper is to explain UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) Policy Statement 09/15, Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services, (the “Code”) which…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explain UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) Policy Statement 09/15, Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services, (the “Code”) which requires certain large banks, building societies and broker‐dealers in the UK to establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies that are consistent with and promote effective risk management.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper explains the background to the Code, including the FSA's views on bonuses and remuneration; describes the characteristics of the approximately 26 large firms to which the Code will apply; discusses the Code's principles concerning remuneration; details the timing of the key steps for implementation of the Code; explains information on remuneration firms must provide to the FSA; and discusses the FSA's plans for follow‐up.
Practical implications
The FSA is likely to publish similar remuneration guidelines that will extend to all FSA‐authorized firms.
Originality/value
The paper provides practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers; a possible bellwether of future similar policies from financial regulators in other countries.
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Stephen J. Perkins and Susan Shortland
The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.
Design/methodology/approach
This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.
Findings
Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.
Practical implications
Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.
Originality/value
The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.
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Jonathan Ben Shlomo, Wolfgang Eggert and Tristan Nguyen
The recent financial crisis has shown that in substantial parts of the banking industry, bonus payments have a short-term focus and are not risk-adjusted. These remuneration…
Abstract
Purpose
The recent financial crisis has shown that in substantial parts of the banking industry, bonus payments have a short-term focus and are not risk-adjusted. These remuneration structures persist as the banking industry is constrained by pressures on the labour market. The unilateral introduction of a longer-term focus in variable remuneration could put a bank at a first-mover disadvantage. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper derives from a literature overview and empirical evidence possible reform measurements toward a longer-term focus in variable remuneration. The paper also discusses the recent reforms in European law regarding remuneration policy.
Findings
The paper argues that an efficient regulation of remuneration policy should be directed at ensuring that remuneration policies and practices are aligned with effective risk management. The financial authorities should therefore closely observe market developments in this perspective and take countermeasures if necessary.
Originality/value
This seminar work gives some interesting insights about opportunistic behaviour and a CEO's short-term incentives from an economic point of view. It provides lawmakers, regulators and firms with a comprehensive comparison of recent remuneration reforms in Europe.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of advice that the remuneration consultants offer to the companies on executive pay. It explores how the advice offered…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of advice that the remuneration consultants offer to the companies on executive pay. It explores how the advice offered affects the level of executive remuneration. Furthermore, it investigates whether the nature of advice offered forms part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA.
Findings
This paper demonstrates that remuneration consultants’ advice on executive remuneration is not always objective. The nature of advice depends on whether the consultants have a balance of portfolio of companies (self-interest) or whether they have the courage to stand up to confrontations from the executives (fear of executives). This study shows that the purpose of using remuneration consultants in advising on executive remuneration is defeated. Also, the practice pushes up pay levels.
Research limitations/implications
The research focused on large consultancy firm operating in the UK and/or the USA. Access to the participants was very difficult due to their busy schedules.
Practical implications
This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels.
Social implications
This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting.
Originality/value
This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels. This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting. Lastly, it informs policymakers on the grey areas of practice that requires best practice.
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