Search results

In this chapter, we explore the legal framework of AGMs in seven Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) of shareholder decision-making rights. We find that, since only a small part of the decision-making rights is harmonized at the European level, there are numerous differences in shareholder rights among national laws. These decision-making rights are usually about the topics director (re-)elections, pay matters, share capital, amendments to articles of association, annual accounts, etc. To be able to conduct empirical research in the remaining chapters, we develop a categorization framework of 15 voting items.

This study examines the relationship between institutional investors and director remuneration in Malaysia against an important institutional backdrop of political connection. Our panel analysis of 434 firms from 1999 to 2003 finds a negative relationship between institutional ownership and director remuneration suggesting the effectiveness of institutional monitoring. Although we find no evidence to suggest a politically determined remuneration scheme, the negative relationship between institutional ownership and remuneration becomes less in politically connected firms. This suggests that political connections mitigate institutional monitoring in relationship-based economies.