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The evolution of the Fair Trade movement offers an apposite case through which to examine the idea of regulating risk through a “social sphere.” An analysis of Fair Trade through the lens of “defiance” reveals discrete models and actors of risk regulation that evolve in an iterative fashion. These findings not only add complexity and heterogeneity to the social actors and mechanisms of regulation in the social sphere, but also highlight the challenges this diversity poses for the project of alleviating market risk. In turn, the framework of defiance offers a fertile analytical framework for the study of transnational risk regulation by capturing the dynamic actor and institutional complexities that underpin, and embody challenges for, the regulation of risk through the social sphere. The article begins with an overview of the Fair Trade movement and consideration of Fair Trade’s approach to regulating market risk. It then introduces the notion of defiance, focusing on two of its subtypes: game playing and resistance. Following a short overview of the methodological framework employed to analyze these dynamics, the third section applies these analytical categories of defiance to explore primary data gathered on Fair Trade’s evolution. The article shows that the motivational posture of game playing, through its continued experimentation and entrepreneurship in transnational risk regulation, is pregnant with potential to mitigate the risks generated by economic activity.

The pharmaceutical business has long been a source of controversy, particularly the ability to market a drug for human consumption. The thalidomide disaster of the late 1950s and early 1960s invoked all nations in the 15 member states of the EU to require that a pharmaceutical product intended for human consumption have an official market licence before it is allowed onto the nation’s market. Until December 1994 each nation in the EU could decide itself what products came onto its market. From January 1995 the European Commission, facilitated by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, has had the power to decide on applications for pan‐EU market licences. Explores the new EU licensing system, drawing from past and present experience, and argues that although complex at least four sets of motivations lie behind the construction of the EMEA system: the EU prisoners’ dilemma; four types of market failures; extensions of politico‐bureaucratic business and, finally, the inability of the pharmaceutical industry to nurture effectively any feasible alternative to the new system.

Organisations bear a graver responsibility than they regularly realise. This chapter expands the foregoing sentence through a reflection on what the other chapters have said – that marketers' responsibility should go beyond the sale of a product and should include the consciousness of the social and environmental consequences of the product and that responsibility should start with strategy and accompany the product or service from ideation to commercialisation. The messages going out from the company about its sustainability initiatives must also be ethical. The chapter also presents the book chapters' practical value for teaching, research and consultancy as well as for business application and policy making or policy advocacy. Finally, the chapter calls for generally acceptable standards to measure product greenness and for more self-regulation especially in less regulated regions. The overall message is that, through the marketing function, managers can and must orient the firm's internal dynamics towards embracing both business goals and the common good by taking all stakeholders into consideration and creating value to be shared by all.

Critics increasingly highlight the dark sides of the sharing economy resulting from the insufficient regulation of competition, labor, or taxes in its for-profit sector. In this chapter, the authors argue that regulatory solutions for the sharing economy hinge on the understanding of the ways in which the sharing economy is organized. Here, digitalization undermines established regulation through underlying organizational shifts pertaining to places, labor inputs and output responsibilities. Mapping out the field of actors that are or could be involved in regulating the sharing economy, the authors highlight a particular role played not only by digital platforms as market organizers, but also of a variety of other public and private actors such as standard setting organizations, social movements, trade unions, organized buyers and sellers, incumbents, or policy makers. The authors suggest that an understanding of sharing economy markets as fields can not only capture the highly organized nature of the sharing economy, but also serve to untangle the contestations and power dynamics unfolding among various actors engaged in different regulatory issues associated with the sharing economy. Seeing “Uberization” as a next development stage away from the modern corporation after global supply chains, the authors highlight regulatory challenges associated with the even more individualized and dispersed way in which sharing economy markets are organized and also discuss new opportunities for regulation provided by digital technology.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

Defines and discusses the climate for marketing activity within Hungarian society. Compares and contrasts conditions and practice in Western countries with those in Socialist countries. Aims to emphasize characteristics of the Hungarian market which might prove useful for the marketer wishing to establish or extend marketing relations.

Accommodative competitive entry policies (unbundling, resale and interconnection) yield contestable retail telecommunications markets. The combination of setting efficient prices for network elements and allowing competitors to choose their preferred level of wholesale quality renders the retail market self‐regulating with respect to both price and quality. Any overhang of regulation at the retail level under these conditions is potentially harmful to fostering a competitive market outcome.

The purpose of this paper is to chart the chronology of insurance regulation in Ireland and evaluate the integration within European Union directives.

The approach used was to chart the development of insurance regulation in Ireland and establish the stakeholders in the insurance industry that are affected by regulation. The various aspects of the EU involvement in regulation were also listed.

Ireland is one of the few countries that has a single financial regulator that is the Central (Reserve) Bank. The Central Bank is recognised as the Irish national regulator for all insurance activities in the EU and with that carries responsibility for implementing EU directives. In comparing other regulatory systems, there is a mixture of direct government involvement, sector specific regulation, financial services regulation and Central Bank acting as regulator.

Research is based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators. It does not set a standard of regulation or compare different regulators but establishes the different forms of regulation in Ireland and the EU.

The paper establishes Ireland's insurance regulatory environment amongst its European peers. It also charts the development of insurance regulation from solvency to the current model of solvency and consumer protection with the other offices of Financial Services Ombudsman.

The paper is based on research based on literature review and data obtained from the EU regarding national regulators.

German consumers are not really like the image that the German courts present. The portrait of a helpless, debilitated, immature creature who is in need of protection so as not to be led astray by advertising is not accurate. The European Court of Justice paints the average buyer as sensible, attentive and cautious, as well as possessing the ability to analyse the message behind advertising. So, in fact, the German consumer is awake and responsive to European developments. What is needed is a balance between market freedom and the protection of consumers; including a high availability of information for these potential buyers. When the consumer is adequately informed he/she will then be in the position to reap the full benefits of a single European market. But market access is crucial. With the growth of market access and information the subsequent behaviour of the potential consumers is determined by their ability to make rational decisions once given all the information. The availability of consumer information is twofold when applied to regulating the market: the autonomy of consumers becomes the mechanism for reconciling the market freedom rights of manufacturers; and the right that the buyer possesses to have their economic interests protected.

This chapter focuses on the regulatory scheme used by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve medical products for commercial use in this country. After providing a brief introduction of the role of the FDA and the scope of the products regulated by the agency, the chapter outlines the common characteristics of premarket controls for drugs, medical devices, and biological products, including how clinical trials of these medical products are conducted with humans as part of the premarket approval process. The chapter then provides a detailed examination of the particular regulatory scheme for each product category. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how FDA regulates emerging medical technologies, such as cellular and tissue-engineered products. FDA regulates a variety of products intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent diseases or conditions under a legal scheme established in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act and regulations promulgated by FDA. How a product is classified (drug, device, or biologic) forecasts the regulatory approval pathway that must be followed to bring the product to market. This chapter provides education and direction regarding regulatory requirements that must be met to market medical products in the United States.