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Real estate investment trusts (REITs) provide a mechanism through which investors can participate in the real estate market with liquidity and transparency. In this study, we benchmark the performance of 11 residential REITs for the period 2009–2013. The study tracks the performance of residential REITs through the economic crisis period. The data envelopment analysis (DEA) model uses well-performing units (efficiency of 1% or 100%) that are closest to the underperforming unit on the efficiency frontier as a “role model” (peer units) for the underperforming unit. In addition, the DEA model also calculates by how much a nonperforming unit should increase the output level or decrease the inputs level to be on the efficiency frontier (100%) (slack values). Thus, the DEA model identifies the underperforming units and the most feasible path to move to efficiency frontier. The DEA model identifies the peer units that are closely related to these units and calculates the value of the slack variables required to achieve the same efficiency level as their peers.

Real estate investment has been generally accepted as a value-adding proposition for a portfolio investor. Such an impression is not only shared by investment professionals and financial advisors but also appears to be supported by an overwhelming amount of research in the academic literature. The benefits of adding real estate as an asset class to a well-diversified portfolio are usually attributed to the respectable risk-return profile of real estate investment together with the relatively low correlation between its returns and the returns of other financial assets. By using the regime-switching technique on an extensive historical dataset, we attempt to look for the statistical evidence for such a claim. Unfortunately, the empirical support for the claim is neither strong nor universal. We find that any statistically significant improvement in risk-adjusted return is very much limited to the bullish environment of the real estate market. In general, the diversification benefit is not found to be statistically significant unless investors are relatively risk averse. We also document a regime-switching behavior of real estate returns similar to those found in other financial assets. There are two distinct states of the real estate market. The low-return (high-return) state is characterized by its high (low) volatility and its high (low) correlations with the stock market returns. We find this kind of dynamic risk characteristics to play a crucial role in dictating the diversification benefit from real estate investment.

We empirically investigate the hypothesis that the less transparent (more difficult to value) the target’s assets are the more likely it is that the acquiring firm can obtain higher short- and long-term returns. We analyze a sample of 1,538 friendly acquisitions partitioned in two separate dimensions: acquisitions of public versus private firms, and acquisitions of a firm’s assets versus acquisitions of a firm’s assets and its management. Using a sample of (nondiversifying) real estate transactions with a public REIT as the acquirer, we find that acquisitions of public firms have insignificant short-term abnormal returns. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and significant short-term abnormal returns. The acquirer’s abnormal returns are higher in both cases when the transactions involve acquisition of the target firm’s management. We find parallel results when analyzing the acquirer’s Q over the merger year and the three following years. Our conclusions are robust to the type of financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the acquisition.

The real estate market has evolved significantly over the past 10 years and has experienced rapid growth throughout the world in its various forms. Many emerging countries witnessed the significant growth in their commercial real estate markets that became a stable sector of their economies. These countries, after developing a reliable commercial real estate base within their economies subsequently developed real estate financial markets. The growth of the real estate investment trusts, REITs, markets in many countries within the past decade helped attract global capital that facilitated additional investments in local real estate developments. Significantly, this period of time may have witnessed a higher degree of integration of real estate with the broader financial markets due in large part to the securitization of mortgages. Yet the general real estate market was also impacted in many parts of the world with rising prices and subsequent price collapses. This section focuses on the various areas of the global real estate market and the changes that it has encountered as examined by researchers of real estate. This chapter also examines the recent trends in global real estate markets and explores how these changes have affected the broader investment community.

The long-term financial stability of hospital systems represents a “grand challenge” in health care. New ownership forms, such as private equity (PE), promise to achieve better financial performance than nonprofit or for-profit systems. In this study, we compare two systems with many similarities, but radically different ownership structures, missions, governance, and merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies. Both were nonprofit, religious systems serving low-income communities – Montefiore Health System and Caritas Christi Health Care.

Montefiore's M&A strategy was to invest in local hospitals and create an integrated regional system, increasing revenues by adding primary doctors and community hospitals as feeders into the system and achieving efficiencies through effective resource allocation across specialized units. Slow and steady timing of acquisitions allowed for organizational learning and balancing of debt and equity. By 2019, it owned 11 hospitals with 40,000 employees and had strong positive financials and low reliance on debt.

By contrast, in 2010, PE firm Cerberus Capital bought out Caritas (renamed Steward Health Care System) and took control of the Board of Directors, who set the system's strategic direction. Cerberus used Steward as a platform for a massive debt-driven acquisition strategy. In 2016, it sold off most of its hospitals’ property for $1.25 billion, leaving hospitals saddled with long-term inflated leases; paid itself almost $500 million in dividends; and used the rest for leveraged buyouts of 27 hospitals in 9 states in 3 years. The rapid, scattershot M&A strategy was designed to create a large corporation that could be sold off in five years for financial gain – not for health care integration. Its debt load exploded, and by 2019, its financials were deeply in the red. Its Massachusetts hospitals were the worst financial performers of any system in the state. Cerberus exited Steward in 2020 in a deal that left its physicians, the new owners, holding the debt.