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Research in industrial and organizational psychology demonstrates that the regulation of negative emotions in response to both organizational stressors and interpersonal workplace interactions can result in functional and dysfunctional outcomes (Côté, 2005; Diefendorff, Richard, & Yang, 2008). Research on the regulation of negative emotions has additionally been conducted in social psychology, developmental psychology, neuropsychology, health psychology, and clinical psychology. A close reading of this broader literature, however, reveals that the conceptualization and use of the term “emotion regulation” varies within each research field as well as across these fields. The main focus of our chapter is to make sense of the term “emotion regulation” in the workplace by considering its use across a broad range of psychology disciplines. We then develop an overarching theoretical framework using disambiguating terminology to highlight what we argue are the important constructs involved in the process of intrapersonal emotion generation, emotional experience regulation, and emotional expression regulation in the workplace (e.g., emotional intelligence, emotion regulation strategies, emotion expression displays). We anticipate this chapter will enable researchers and industrial and organizational psychologists to identify the conditions under which functional regulation outcomes are more likely to occur and then build interventions around these findings.

In his article “Diversifying Mergers and Risk: Some Empirical Tests”, Thompson (1983) modelled the change in the systematic risk of the acquiring firm before and after merger. We propose a modification to this method which considers the difference between the systematic risk of the merged firm and that predicted by capital market theory on the basis of the constituent firms' betas. Furthermore merger will probably lead to a change in the structure of the acquiring firm, both intrinsically and financially. Thus in order to remove any complications caused by debt restructuring of the combined firm after merger, we suggest that the analysis is carried out using ungeared or intrinsic betas. An empirical study which follows that of Thompson but implements the above modifications is performed, and conclusions are drawn which have implications for studies that have considered the benefits of merger to the acquiring and target firms.

In both the United States and Europe there has been a spectacular growth in the number and importance of management buy‐outs since the late 1970s. The typical characteristics of these deals differ somewhat on either side of the Atlantic in ways which are outlined below. However, in each environment the term “buy‐out” refers essentially to the transfer of ownership of the assets of an existing firm — which may itself be an independent entity or a wholly‐owned subsidiary or division — to a new and especially established group of equity holders which intends to keep at least some of those assets in their former use. In the US buy‐outs have often involved very large asset transfers, indeed multi‐billion dollar deals have been quite frequent. The transaction is typically financed by a limited subscription of equity from specialist venture capitalists and perhaps from the firm's management, together with a very large input of debt capital. The latter has often been in the form of high coupon (so called “junk”) bonds. The characteristically high ratio of debt to equity in buy‐out finance has given rise to their American description as leveraged buy‐outs.

It is now curious to recall that ten years ago management buy‐outs were infrequent and largely ignored by those not directly involved, (Arnfield et.al., 1981). During the subsequent decade a previously unrecognised oddity has become not merely commonplace but a major force in restructuring the private sector and in privatising public services. In 1989 there were over 500 recorded management buy‐outs (MBO's) and associated deals to a total value of £7.5 billion. In the same year these transactions accounted for 22% of all mergers and acquisitions by value and almost one third by volume. Furthermore, in the latter half of the 1980s the MBO spread to Europe and now appears poised to become a major instrument in dismantling the state industries of Eastern Europe.