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When a board is faced with a choice of aiding the public or government during a crisis, or more generally any corporate social responsibility initiative, well established doctrines of American corporate law can protect directors from legal liability in a shareholder derivative lawsuit. A hallmark trait of the public corporation is a separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932). Accordingly, managers have great authority over corporate assets. Delaware corporate law provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”² The board has the authority to manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation, which in the judgment of the board may include corporate social responsibility initiatives and decisions based thereon.

We stress the public demand for accountability of global brands and the rise in normative public brand evaluations in online networks. To gain an empirical and theoretical understanding of these phenomena, we introduce the notion of public brand auditing, which refers to public agents collectively contrasting brands against a multiplicity of shared understandings of what is worthy and good.

Convention theory serves as a theoretical lens to conceptualize public brand auditing, since it provides a normative framework of orders of worth based on which the appropriateness of actions are judged. Empirically, we conduct a netnographic study and illustrate public auditing strategies with online discussions about Google on the Slashdot platform.

We find that public brand auditing comprises two major auditing strategies: drawing leeways of acceptable brand conduct and allocating responsibilities.

Approaching public forms of normative brand judgments from a convention theory perspective allows researchers to better understand how the public holds brands accountable and evaluates brand conduct against higher-order principles.

The concept of public brand auditing helps managers to understand and approach the normative basis of both positive and negative brand judgments.

We urge brands to monitor public demand for accountability and emphasize the importance of the civic, market, and industrial orders of worth in guiding brand conduct.

This paper offers a conceptualization of and a framework for investigating public brand auditing phenomena.

Prior research suggests that perceived levels of a subordinate auditor’s competence affects audit reviewers’ judgments. We extend this line of research by investigating the effects of perceived client competence (hereafter, ClientComp) and its interaction with subordinate auditor’s competence (hereafter, AuditorComp) on audit reviewers’ judgments. Using data from highly experienced CPA audit managers, senior managers, and partners, we find a significant main effect for AuditorComp, but not for ClientComp. We also find that when AuditorComp is high, levels of ClientComp do not affect audit reviewers’ judgments. However, we cannot support the hypothesis that when AuditorComp is low ClientComp will significantly affect audit reviewers’ judgments. These mixed results suggest that in the post-SOX (2002) era regulatory environment, audit reviewers may be exercising heightened professional skepticism about ClientComp whenever they consider clients’ assertions.

Prior research suggests that decision-makers can be biased by anecdotal data, even in the presence of more informative statistical data. A bias for anecdotal data can have significant implications for managers since judgments are often made when both statistical and anecdotal data are present. However, since much of the prior research has been conducted primarily on non-professionals engaged in unfamiliar tasks, it is unclear whether anecdotal biases will occur in managerial decision-making, where training and professional duties may reduce the effects of such a bias. Smith and Kida (1991) note, for example, that judgment biases are often mitigated or modified when trained professionals perform job-related tasks. In this study, managers and others with significant business experience were asked to make a capital budgeting decision in the presence of both statistical and anecdotal data. The results indicate that decision-makers ignored, or underweighted, statistical data in favor of anecdotal data, leading to suboptimal decisions. However, a scientific judgment orientation decision-aid did help to mitigate the effects of that bias. The implications of these results for decision-making in managerial accounting are discussed.

This chapter examines whether professional auditors’ affect toward client management influences fraud likelihood judgments and whether accountability and experience with fraud risk judgments moderate this effect. This research also explores the process by which affect influences fraud judgments by examining affect’s influence on the evaluation of fraud evidence cues. Results indicate that more positive affect toward the client results in lower fraud likelihood judgments. Accountability is found to moderate this effect, but only for experienced auditors. These findings have implications for fraud brainstorming sessions where all staff levels provide input into fraud risk assessments and because client characteristics are especially salient during these assessments. Importantly, results also support the proposition that affect impacts inexperienced auditors’ fraud assessments through errant attribution of client likability to evidence cues that refer to management, rather than biasing all client-related evaluations. Together, these findings suggest that education and training can be improved to better differentiate relevant and irrelevant cues in fraud judgment.

This study investigates whether exposure to a previous client’s earnings management behavior will impact experienced auditors’ judgments of the risk that a current client’s financial statements are materially misstated. Contrast theory predicts the context of previous information can have a priming effect on a current judgment scenario, where the information for the current judgment is contrasted with the previous information. Guided by contrast theory, we exposed auditors to either positive or negative client ethical earnings management behavior. We found the existence of contrast effects, with the positive (negative) context of the previous client resulting in auditors judging a higher (lower) likelihood of material misstatement in the current client’s financial statements. The results have implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of auditors’ judgments as well as provide insight into auditor training efforts.