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The trust in participation banks depends largely on authentic dependence on Sharia, legal financial instruments and fair yet transparent distribution among account owners and banks. Taking into account the economic Islamic principles and those of mudarabah agreement, this study aims to identify problematic areas pertaining to profit sharing in addition to revealing opportunities leading to the improvement of the profit distribution system while developing a new profit distribution system proposal.

This study proposes two hypotheses (H). H1: There are partial deviations between the profit considered to be legal according to the economic principles of Islam and the practice of participation banking. H2: There are partial deviations or loss of right in practice between the mudarabah contract concluded among owners of participation account and participation banks. In-depth interview technique and review of the literature including legislation were used to determine the parameters affecting the distributed profit. The collected data was tested through comparison with the theoretical framework of the mudarabah contract.

There are two separate fund pools used in participation banks, including equity and participation accounts. Managers’ selection of pools set according to their personal goals related to balance sheet profit management may cause profit to pass between participation accounts and equity. Many issues negatively affect the distributed profits. For example, incomes from funding commissions, reserve requirements and idle funds, although they originate from participation accounts, are recorded in the bank’s income. In addition, the bank does not return the profit initially recorded in its own account to participation pools, whether or not profit.

The interviewed officials were cautious to avoid a negative perception of the sector. This made it difficult to determine the real situation of applications decided with initiative in profit distribution. Although the authorization documents have partially been published, it is still difficult to access most licensed documents. There is no independent audit report made considering the interest-free banking principles regarding the profit distribution system of participation banking. The scarcity of the literature on the subject is another limitation. The research does not cause any harm to the reputation of participation banks.

Adopting a single-pool system in line with the global practices will end the shift of right between pools while ensuring a fair and transparent system. In this system, the bank equities, other shareholders’ funds and participation accounts are collected and operated in a single pool. The pool profit and loss are distributed as per the shares in the pool. The profit per each participation account is distributed based on the share of each participation account in the pool and profit-sharing ratio.

Participation banking is expected to support the real economy by means of production, leasing, merchandising based on certain religious, ethical and contractual principles. Bringing funds of conservatives, that does not go to conventional banks for avoiding of interest, in the economy is expected to provide new sources to reduce the foreign dependency for the economy and to supply a financial alternative for the conservatives who stay away from interest-based economic activities. However, if this will represent an alternative to debt-based systems, then products, contracts, business processes and legislations driven according to interest-free banking principles should be developed.

This study introduces and analyzes a new proposal of the profit distribution system of participation banking. A similar methodology is used in interest-free banking on a global scale, especially in Malaysia, and is compatible with the profit distribution decisions in AAOIFI’s depositor accounts. However, this methodology is considered to be new as far as participation banking is concerned. The implementation of this new methodology will eliminate several problems identified in the profit distribution system of participation banks. This research provides an academic contribution to the participation banking profit distribution system and represents a reference material on the subject.

A pooled income fund (PIF) is one of the methods created under the 1969 Tax Reform Act whereby a taxpayer may make a tax‐deductible remainder gift to a charitable organization. The fund, established by a charitable organization to receive irrevocable gifts from at least two donors, pays current income to the individual beneficiaries for life, but at the termination of each income interest, the allocable principal must revert permanently to the charitable organization. In recent years, a number of PIFs have been offered to the public by charitable organizations through broker‐dealers or related entities. There are numerous securities‐law issues implicated by the sales of these PIFs, including: (i) whether broker‐dealers may solicit donations to such funds and receive compensation for their solicitations; (ii) the effect of the broker‐dealers’ solicitation and receipt of compensation have on securities registration for the PIF or units offered therein under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the Investment Company Act of 1940; (iii) whether staff and persons affiliated with the sponsoring charity, including parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, also should be permitted to solicit donations; (iv) whether such charities or persons, or parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, then should be required to register as broker‐dealers; (v) what securities licenses may be required of the aforementioned parties; and (vi) whether there are ways to design the manner in which third parties other than broker dealers are compensated to resolve any potential issues arising from answers to the previous questions. This article first sets forth the applicable law involved in the analysis and then attempts to answer each of the issues presented above.

This study analyzes small-sized asset owners’ optimal choice problems in selecting an outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO). While large-sized asset owners can select OCIOs through procurement auctions, it is difficult for small-sized asset owners to use this method. Instead, they access OCIO services by participating in an investment pool or utilizing OCIO funds. In this study, the authors compare the two OCIO selection methods. The authors construct an agent-based model for OCIO selection to reflect the heterogeneity in production efficiency and preferences. The results of this study imply that when the market has enough investment pools, the utility of all small-sized asset owners increases. To enhance the growth in the OCIO market, the investment pool should represent the preferences of small-sized asset owners and enable individual owners to find an appropriate OCIO.

Pooled investment funds are an extremely important component of the institutional investment management business, serving as a critical tool for achieving diversification and economies of scale in a broad range of market and investment environments. These advantages have increasingly led fund sponsors to seek investors across national borders. Nonetheless, cross‐border sales of pooled funds are fraught with numerous regulatory and tax complexities. This is particularly true for sponsors seeking to tap the enormous United Slates institutional market. This paper takes a solution‐based approach in examining the complexities of selling non‐US pooled funds to US institutional investors.

This paper aims to examine whether the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) model excludes important aspects of terrorist resourcing and whether the terrorist resourcing model (TRM) provides a more comprehensive framework for analysis.

Research consisted of case studies of resourcing activities of four listed terrorist organizations between 2001 and 2015: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, a grouping of Al Qaeda-inspired individuals and entities under the heading “Al Qaeda inspired” and Hezbollah.

The most prevalent resourcing actors observed were non-profit organizations/associations, and the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled, often passed through layers of charitable organizations and transmitted through chartered banks. The TRM is indeed found to provide a more comprehensive framework for identifying sources of resourcing and points of intervention. However, it does not in itself recommend effective means of response but it has implications for counter-resourcing strategies because it identifies resourcing actors and nodes where counter-resourcing could occur.

This paper advances the state of knowledge of terrorist resourcing activities in Canada and about the value of doing so through the analytical lens of the TRM as opposed to the predominant ML/TF model.

This paper aims to examine mutual fund investors' response to mergers of Australian mutual fund companies.

Two matching‐control techniques are employed to analyse the impact of mergers on excess money in and out of open and closed funds involved in the transactions. The paper employs cross‐sectional regression analyses to examine the impact of mergers on different types of parties to mergers.

The results suggest that mergers are not accompanied by increased money flows. Instead investors withdraw from the target funds prior to and after the merger. Funds belonging to specialist mutual fund companies record more gains in assets under management than declines following mergers, and that money inflow gains at competing funds induce reductions of management expense ratios at target funds.

This paper studies mergers in only one industry in a single country. Future studies may extend to other industries and economies.

This paper extends prior research on the flow effects of mergers at individual fund level by considering the issue at the corporate level.

The financing of healthcare services has been of a major concern to all governments in the face of increasing healthcare costs. For developing countries, where good health is considered a poverty reduction strategy, it is imperative that the hospitals used in the delivery of healthcare services are well financed to accomplish their tasks. The purpose of this paper is to examine how public hospitals in Ghana are financed, and the challenges facing the financing modes adopted.

To achieve the objectives of the study, one major public healthcare institution in Ghana became the main focus.

The findings of the study revealed that the main sources of financing the public healthcare institution are government subvention, internally‐generated funds and donor‐pooled funds. Of these sources, the internally generated fund was regarded as the most reliable, and the least reliable was the donor‐pooled funds. Several challenges associated with the various financing sources were identified. These include delay in receipt of government subvention, delay in the reimbursement of services provided to subscribers of health insurance schemes, influence of government in setting user fees, and the specifications to which donor funds are put.

The findings of this study have important implications for improving the financing of public healthcare institutions in Ghana. A number of recommendations are provided in this regard.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the Court of Appeal's consideration regarding Lehman Bros International (Europe) (in Administration) (Court of Appeal: Civil Division: Lord Neuberger, Lady Justice Arden and Sir Mark Waller). Date of Judgment: 2 August 2010.

The paper outlines the facts surrounding the case and comments on the decision.

The court ruled on trust status and client money protection in relation to Lehman Bros funds.

This judgment provides a rare example of the courts' application of the Client Assets Sourcebook rules and guidance in general private law disputes about property ownership and entitlement that invariably arise within the context of insolvency.

The current financial crisis revealed weaknesses in the US financial system, including the difficulty of valuing complex assets. This paper seeks to examine regulatory and compliance issues for hedge funds valuing complex assets.

Within the context of hedge fund valuation, the paper provides a general overview of: the regulatory background of hedge funds and the central role valuation plays in the operation and regulation of such funds; relevant cases brought by the SEC; and a discussion of valuation best practices.

Hedge funds are not “unregulated.” There is a body of law and accounting standards that applies to hedge fund valuation. Nevertheless, hedge fund valuation standards are evolving in this era of heightened regulatory scrutiny. The common concepts that have emerged from valuation best practices will likely provide the underpinning for any regulatory initiatives regarding hedge fund valuation.

By the time of publication, Congress may pass pending legislation governing hedge funds and there may be additional notable SEC cases on hedge fund valuation.

The economic crisis has revitalized the SEC's interest in this area. Consequently, hedge funds should consider adoption of a compliance program that specifically targets valuation by stressing investor disclosure, independence of the valuation function, comprehensive written valuation polices and procedures, and internal controls.

The paper compiles and organizes in one place the regulatory and compliance standards governing asset valuation by hedge funds.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze new SEC Rule 206(4)‐8 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and discuss its practical implications.

The paper describes the new rule, the types of advisers and funds to which the rule applies, examples of topics on which advisers might make statements that run afoul of the new rule, the application of the rule to both existing and potential investors, the application of the rule beyond statements made in the context of a securities transaction, and the application of the rule to any conduct that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, including negligent conduct. The paper explains that the scope of the new rule extends beyond Section 34(b) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, that the rule creates no new fiduciary duty, and that it creates no new private right of action against fund advisers.

The new rule signals that the SEC continues to focus intently on the fund activities of both registered and unregistered investment advisers, in particular with respect to their unregistered funds.

The new rule is an indicator of the SEC's enforcement intentions. Advisers should review their compliance programs, particularly as they relate to communication and other interaction with current and prospective fund investors, in light of the new rule.

The paper provides an helpful rule description and practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.