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Many scholars of international relations have long argued that by plotting on a map of the world all the transnational contacts of private individuals the international system resembles a ‘cobweb’. While the filaments of the cobweb remain uneven in their magnitude as there is a higher degree of contacts between major centres, the globalisation of financial markets, particularly since the 1970s, has enabled the cobweb to have a more global spread. As importantly, the speed and relative ease with which funds may be transferred across borders has intensified the degree of contact along its filaments. While the intent of this model of world society was to highlight ‘legitimised’ transnational contacts, it has become evident that this cobweb is conducive to spreading security threats emanating from nearly all parts of the globe, as well as being rather effective at hiding the spiders that lurk within it.

Information intensive industries such as financial services are being transformed by the Internet. Specifically, it is the interactive, multimedia side of the Internet, known as the World Wide Web (Web) which is driving this transformation. Without the intense graphics, sound bites and other capabilities provided by the Web, the Internet would be a pretty dull place to visit.

In May 1995, shock waves hit the world of US institutional charities, wealthy benefactors and educational organisations. The cause of these tremors was the collapse of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy and its subsequent filing for protection of the United States Bankruptcy Court wherein it listed more than $551m in liabilities and only $80m in assets. Charities owed money by New Era included hospitals, churches, academic institutions and all manner of cultural, civic and religious organisations.

The popular notion is that securities frauds are a non‐violent, white‐collar variety of criminal enterprise. Not necessarily so in a recent case generally known as Premier Benefit Capital Trust. The main perpetrators of this alleged fraud, when being called to account before a court for their activities, appear to have turned decidedly violent. They are accused of conspiracy to murder the Federal Court judge hearing the case.

Twenty years after enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, official corruption and corruption in the financial markets again figures prominently on many government agendas, has been the subject of several recent international actions and has attracted the interest of the media.

The purpose of this paper is to examine from a US regulatory perspective various statues, rules and policies which affect how securities regulators in the US may disclose and share information.

This paper identifies and examines specific federal and state statutes, regulations and case law affecting the ability of federal and state securities regulators to share public and non‐public information.

The findings are that state and federal regulators in the US have wide latitude to obtain information (including use of subpoena power even if no violation of US law is alleged) on behalf of a foreign securities regulator, or one by one state jurisdiction on behalf of another state jurisdiction. There appears to be less restriction on state securities regulators from sharing non‐public information with other governmental entities and self‐regulatory organizations. Information sharing is trending toward informal arrangements rather than formal treaties with cumbersome protocols.

This paper provides a “roadmap” for persons interested in finding publicly available information in the US about companies which have issued securities in the US. It also explains how non‐public information may be shared between securities regulators.

Regulators, individuals and government departments interested in public policy matters will benefit from a review of US laws designed to facilitate the exchange of non‐public information in an effort to protect the integrity of the public securities markets.

A unifying theme apparent at this year's Symposium was the need for balance when lifting the veil of bank secrecy: (1) the need to protect civil liberties versus the need to fight crime; (2) the bank's need to balance its role as policeman while furthering its commercial objectives; (3) the necessity of weighing international cooperation against the awareness that individual nations jealously guard their own legislative regime; (4) the dichotomy of technology that serves both to protect and penetrate secrecy; (5) the balance required when investigating crimes.