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The end of the twentieth century was filled with an ironic mix of panic and fatalism; together with optimism and hope. ‘Digital armageddon’ in the form of the Y2K bug was reportedly on the horizon (Vulliamy, 2000), but as we know, never transpired. If, however, Y2K had materialised and affected technology as predicted, the consequences would have had profound macro and micro impacts – economically, politically, socially and spatially. Cities – with their super-concentration of technological infrastructure, hardware and software – would arguably have endured the brunt of this catastrophe. Had this disaster occurred, its reach would have been well beyond the city, spiralling out from the CBD to the suburbs, rural settlements, jumping national boundaries, and ultimately bringing economic, transport and communication systems to a near halt, rendering day-to-day living experiences unbearable, if not virtually impossible.

Homelessness research is identified as one example of sensitive social research that engages ‘vulnerable’ (Liamputtong, 2007, p. 4) participants as well as an area of difficult research practice. This chapter explores how using qualitative research methodologies have led us to reinterpret aspects of our research practice and to develop an inclusive approach in our work on homelessness. In articulating our approach, we explore influences shaping the context of our research practice and ideas that are effective in researching homelessness. We present these as key principles informing our approach, alongside strategies we have developed for enacting inclusive research practice.

Before the September–October 2008 Financial Crisis, investment banks were hooked on debt. In 2007, a year before its failure, Lehman Brothers held equity just 3.3% of its balance sheet (that is, its debt/equity ratio well exceeded 29); virtually all the rest was financed by borrowing. Leverage is an elixir that makes profits soar when times are good but magnifies losses when the economy sours. Currently in India, several companies have seen their balance sheet out of shape because of overleverage, but banks continue to be benevolent, often forced by political interventions (see Cases 6.1 and 6.2). Most of these business groups are nearly dead, with their equity almost wiped out. There is little chance they will survive but for their banker’s largesse. Ever-greening of loans is keeping them alive, but what could be the end game? For instance, just a year before economic liberalization in India, few enterprising men invested in the steel business. They borrowed monies from the banks and banks continued to finance their operations, and now they are realizing that the promoters cannot meet with their debt obligations. The banks, however, did not want to accept financial loss and hence commonly agreed to ease the payment obligations so that the loans remained good and not degenerate to NPAs. This is tantamount to refinancing to service your loans. But now the banks overwhelmed with accumulated NPAs are trying to sell debt. How do you legally, ethically, morally, and spiritually (LEMS) justify share-market concentration in the hands of very few promoter investors? What are their long-run unintended economic, legal, ethical, and moral consequences, and why? This chapter studies this market turbulence and the role of bankruptcy laws and court systems in bringing about some change in the debt-overleveraged corporations.

At the beginning of the nineties, the Danish construction market was in the midst of a severe slump (Eurostat, 1995). At the same time, the German market was beginning to boom, due to the process of unifying the two German states (European Construction Research, 1995). Because of the poor home market circumstances, many Danish construction industry actors, including individual architects and architectural firms, attempted to find work in Germany (Halskov, 1995). However, the aspirations of most of these actors were dashed. By 1996, many of the largest Danish civil engineering and contracting firms had lost billions of Danish kroner, and a great number of small firms, typically architectural firms or subcontractors in the construction process, had also experienced severe losses, some of which had jeopardized the very existence of these firms (ibid.). This turn of events surprised both insiders in the Danish construction industry and the general Danish population as both groups believed that Denmark has high construction standards and that the most of the firms that had attempted operations in Germany were technically competent and had sound domestic business policies.