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The latest financial crisis has stressed the need of understanding the world financial system as a network of interconnected institutions, where financial linkages play a fundamental role in the spread of systemic risks. In this paper we propose to enrich the topological perspective of network models with a more structured statistical framework, that of Bayesian Gaussian graphical models. From a statistical viewpoint, we propose a new class of hierarchical Bayesian graphical models that can split correlations between institutions into country specific and idiosyncratic ones, in a way that parallels the decomposition of returns in the well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model. From a financial economics viewpoint, we suggest a way to model systemic risk that can explicitly take into account frictions between different financial markets, particularly suited to study the ongoing banking union process in Europe. From a computational viewpoint, we develop a novel Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm based on Bayes factor thresholding.

The concept of modularity has gained considerable traction in technology studies as a way to conceive, describe, and innovate complex systems, such as product design or organizational structures. In the recent literature, technological modularity has often been intertwined with business model innovation, and scholarship has started investigating how modularity in technology affects changes in business models, both at the cognitive and activity system levels. Yet we still lack a theoretical definition of what modularity is in the business model domain. Business model innovation also encompasses different possibilities of modelling businesses, which are not clearly understood nor classified. We ask when, how, and if modularity theory can be extended to business models in order to enable effective and efficient modelling. We distinguish theoretically between modularity for technology and for business models, and investigate the key processes of modularization and manipulation. We introduce the basic operations of business modelling via modular operators adapted from the technological modularity domain, using iconic examples to develop an analogical reasoning between modularity in technology and in business models. Finally, we discuss opportunities for using modularity theory to foster the understanding of business models and modelling, and develop a challenging research agenda for future investigations.

In this chapter I discuss judicial contributions to Italian penality. I look at the penal incentives produced by interactions between judicial and political classes, and ask whether judges and prosecutors have been forces for punitiveness or moderation. I discuss the relevance of the Italian case for broader analyses of Western penality.

My chapter offers a political-sociological account of judicial contributions to punishment. I analyse the penal incentives created by different national institutional set-ups, specifically addressing judicial contributions to penality using a framework developed by Joachim Savelsberg and Nicola Lacey. The framework examines judicial structure in the institutional context looking at the penal implications of bureaucratisation of the judiciary and the capacity for co-ordination between judges and politicians. I include judicial legitimacy as an additional dimension in this framework.

I conclude that the Italian judiciary have been forces for punitiveness and moderation. Their contributions can be systematised by looking at the waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy, and the consequent expansion and contraction of judicial powers. I claim that judicial legitimacy is also relevant to other (‘non-Italian’) analyses of judicial contributions to contemporary Western penality.

By adding legitimacy to investigations of judicial contributions to penality I provide an organising principle with which to analyse the penal role of Italian judicial actors. I thus allow Italy to be kept in conversation with existing comparative models, without assuming that it either conforms to the models entirely, or that the models should otherwise be eschewed. I use the Italian case to demonstrate the relevance of legitimacy when analysing judicial contributions to Western penality, arguing that changing legitimacy affects the terms and effect of interaction between judicial and political classes.

In this chapter we investigate whether the pricing of IPOs on Europe’s new stock market differs from that of IPOs on main market segments. We report a 22.3 percentage point difference in the average first-day return of new market IPOs (34.3%) and the average first-day return of main market IPOs (12%). We show that reduced incentives to control wealth losses and different firm and offer characteristics partially explain the higher average first-day return on new market segments. We also find that the bundling of IPO deals has been more important to control underpricing costs on new market than on main market segments.